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CULTURE, CHANGE AND CONFUSION

By RALPH TURNER

Men today are creatures of doubt and confusion. The routine of life of the masses is changing. Cultural fixations, transmitted from the past, which support existing institutions are giving way. But, because new patterns of thought and behavior are forming, action for good or for evil is possible in more ways than has been possible for centuries. These are the author's theses. He is Lecturer on Intellectual History in the Graduate School of American University.

CONFUSION of thought and opinion is the distinctive intellectual quality of these times. From it springs the inertia, the hysteria, the arrogance, and the opportunism that everywhere characterize action. Neither tradition, nor religion, nor learning, nor even economic interest asserts a truth to which men hold fast, believing in themselves as they suffer for their faith. Only crude power that serves no other end than its own exercise is certain. And it makes inculcated confusion the means of further aggrandizement. These times have no martyrs and, possibly, can have none. Men die, willingly but without enthusiasm. For they do not feel that their sacrifice serves any purpose, either individual or social. When men find no cause for which to die, then indeed is the supreme tragedy, especially when dying as if one is dying for a cause seems to be increasingly necessary.

For this dilemma of contemporary men many explanations are offered. But in the main they, too, are not explanations but manifestations of confusion. The "isms" multiply, youth criticizes, the conservative appeases, the liberal hesitates, the radical vacillates—all because there is confusion. The sources of this dilemma are far deeper than these surface phenomena. But they are not in the perversity of men, evil as they may be. They are, in fact, in the interaction between belief and opinion received from the past and the unprecedented circumstances of living that have come quickly, not for intellectuals and scholars but for common men. Because belief and opinion are social rather than individual in development, this dilemma can be understood only if the historical setting of these times is correctly interpreted.

THE CULTURAL TRADITION

Most important for this interpretation is an understanding of the cultural tradition—the structure of behavior and thought transmitted from the past—of the men among whom this confusion prevails. This tradition consists of cultural fixations, that is, beliefs and emotional attachments which members of the group, as they grow up within it, come to regard as having significance for the continuing life of the group. Because they are identified with group life, these fixations are supported in many instances by that powerful emotion—in-group loyalty or, in the present world, patriotism—which binds the individual into his group. Associated with them are assumptions, attitudes, bodies of facts, and symbols, such as word arrangements, physical objects, and personalities, that act as stimuli to both positive and negative emotional reactions; these fixations and associated materials are organized in patterns which, for the individuals receiving them, serve as norms of acting, thinking, and feeling. Any occurrence which has meaning in one of these patterns is likely to emerge in a reaction which will be common with many persons. When understood in this way, cultural fixations may be seen as organizing socio-cultural types, that is, structures of individual behavior and feeling, and an individual may be regarded as exemplifying some one of the few types carried in the cultural tradition of his group. His opinions are mainly the reactions to occurrences of this socio-cultural type, and public opinion is a complex of the reactions to going events of the main socio-cultural types shaped by the tradition of the group.

Inasmuch as it is the nature of tradition to resist change, reactions to all kinds of occurrences are likely to be in traditional terms. This means that public opinion commonly presents an over-emphatic assertion of traditional beliefs and emotional attachments. But at times the conditions of life may become so altered that they establish patterns of behavior and thought no longer conformable to the prevailing cultural fixations, or, because other patterns of behavior and thought are introduced from outside sources into a group, their patterns may become disorganized. Individuals influenced by either of these circumstances

may be said to be "uprooted." Because for them the traditional cultural fixations are disorganized, they are likely to react to occurrences in new and different terms, so that, as a result, their opinions will show a wide variety. Over a period of time such individuals will shape new patterns of behavior and thought which will embody their responses to the pervasive conditions in their lives. Thus, if public opinion commonly consists of the reactions of the traditional socio-cultural types, it may contain also the diverse responses of "uprooted" individuals and the more or less stable reactions of newly emerging socio-cultural types.

For those who would measure and interpret public opinion, these observations, if they are valid, may have considerable significance. Those who would measure public opinion should have a clear understanding of the socio-cultural types shaped by the tradition of their group, of the varieties and numbers of "uprooted" individuals in their group, and of the factors which may be organizing new socio-cultural types. For those who would interpret public opinion, this concept of its sources should lead to an evaluation of reactions in terms of the kinds and extent of cultural changes under way. In other words, the successful measurement of public opinion can be carried on only if those who would measure it have an adequate knowledge of the structure and dynamics of the culture in which they operate.

ORIGINS OF CURRENT FIXATIONS

Although it may be assumed that a public opinion has existed in every cultural tradition, a public opinion having political force in the current manner is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating only from the eighteenth century when the cultural fixations which now function, not only in English and French but also in American public opinion, were developed. In other words, current public opinion has origin in a cultural context which began to take shape in the movements that culminated in the American and French Revolutions and in the English movement for political reform.

Historians recognize several developments as having contributed to the formation of a politically significant public opinion in the eighteenth century. Economic enterprise was changing

from the adventure of capital in single undertakings to "business" operating continuously in an extended market; in such operations was developed a body of information about economic and political affairs which, in turn, entered into new judgments on these affairs. New means of communicating and disseminating information and judgments, such as newspapers and periodicals, packet and stagecoach lines keeping as nearly as possible to fixed schedules, and public postal systems, were being founded. At the same time the publishing and circulating of pamphlets became easier; in fact, a continuous literary discussion of various public matters other than religious began. The formation of a relatively broad reading public, having access continuously to new materials bearing on public issues, occurred just before the end of the eighteenth century. The social correlative of these developments was the rise in the towns of a body of persons, mainly traders, manufacturers, and professional men, who thought in terms of this new information and the judgments it supported. Edmund Burke's assertion that one could do more with figures of arithmetic than with figures of speech is an indication of the modes of thinking that were shaping the views of this group. The term "the people" is the verbal symbol which designated it as a political force.

If, in considering the class structure of late eighteenth-century society, the English, French, and American lower middle classes are recognized as the source of the cultural fixations which are now the bases of public opinion in these countries, some of its elements can be more readily understood than if they are thought of merely as current reactions of individual minds. The members of these lower middle classes were "on the make." They were gaining in economic power, which was the means of a control over weaker social groups, especially wage earners, and also the means of an aggrandizement against the established ruling groups—landed aristocrats, priests, and older "merchant adventurers." And every increase of strength which came with expanding trade and changing industry augmented this power. Lacking social prestige, the members of these lower middle classes decried aristocratic ways as snobbish and extravagant. Lacking the learning of

the priests and aristocrats, they cultivated skepticism and turned to fields of study, notably science, outside the range of the traditional education. To the "lower orders," from which they had emerged, they declared economic self-advancement the mark of worth. For them good and evil was defined mainly in terms of the increase and free use of economic power, the possession of which was the chief factor in their advance.

BASIC FIXATIONS

For this reason it is easy to understand that public opinion, when it emerged as a significant political force, was different from the "homely sentiments" of villagers and peasants, from the "safe views" of the aristocrats, from the "righteous attitudes" of state-supported priests, and from the "dangerous notions" of urban craftsmen. More important still, it was different from the views of the older mercantile groups, whose members had identified themselves with the existing political régimes by the purchase of titles and estates, by the acquisition of judicial and administrative posts, and by the adoption by the governments of economic policies based on the principles of mercantilism. The recognition of this last difference is extremely important, for the conflict between the older mercantile groups and the new lower middle classes was decisive in shaping the basic cultural fixations which function in present public opinion.

Inasmuch as the older mercantile groups had realized interests through the aristocratic state, the new lower middle classes sought the overthrow of that state rather than an advance to power within it, and the revolutionary movements of the late eighteenth century accomplished this result. The attacks on nobles, monarchs, and priests, so often emphasized in the discussions of these movements, were in the main incidental to the dislodgment of the older mercantile groups whose economic interests the aristocratic state protected. Thus the political principle that sovereignty resides in the "general will" of "the people" was combined with the doctrine that the best government is the one that governs least. The first doctrine was the basis of the overthrow of the aristocratic state, not the foundation of the democratic state, for when the aristocratic régimes were displaced in France, in the

American colonies, and later in England, the political enfranchisement of most adult males was not introduced. In France the distinction between "active" and "passive" citizens, reflecting a difference of economic status, was invented; in the American colonies and in England the old property qualifications for political activity were allowed to remain.

The doctrine that the best government is the one that governs least was the basis of the abolition of the economic monopolies of the older mercantile groups, but not of the release of ordinary workers from legal controls that placed them at a disadvantage in dealing with those who hired their labor. When these controls were modified, the alterations commonly tended to create the "free labor market," in which the need of the worker functioned as the compulsion to make him accept the job, the wage, and the conditions of work offered by the employer. Similarly the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the American system of government was both a protection against the strong executive—which, inasmuch as its eighteenth-century form was the absolute monarch, the lower middle classes had reason to fear—and a defense for economic power that could function without political support. In the case of individual liberties the situation was not greatly different. They were established as releases from the political controls of aristocratic régimes and the intellectual dominations of priesthoods, but they were not established as protections against the economic power of entrepreneurs who could make the need of workers the basis of an acquiescence in their restriction.

LIBERTY AND LAISSEZ FAIRE

Thus, from the first, liberty and *laissez faire* led dual lives. On the one hand, they released the individual from the control of the aristocratic and priestly classes; on the other hand, although they declared the right of the individual to win economic power if he could, they left him at the mercy of the economic power which he was not strong enough to resist. Combined with this circumstance was the survival of the attitude of aristocratic and priestly régimes that individuals performing hard labor or menial tasks are unfit to participate in political activity or have full access

to learning. This attitude justified the exercise of economic power over the weak, quite as it had originally supported the exercise of political and intellectual controls over them. Other attitudes, such as those declaring economic want to be either a punishment for moral weakness or an opportunity (to be welcomed) for moral purification and those describing economic success as the reward of a godly calling, were also assimilated with the concepts liberty and *laissez faire* in sanctions which left economic power free to function in its own terms. The doctrines of the equality of opportunity and the career of talents, as originally developed, imposed no limitations on this freedom.

The advances of the French, English, and American lower middle classes to political power established these doctrines and attitudes in institutions, somewhat different for each people but on the whole more alike than different; thus these doctrines and attitudes became cultural fixations, transmitted through social interaction from generation to generation and supported by prevailing social approvals and disapprovals. Three important consequences for the structure and flow of public opinion followed from this circumstance.

1. When the doctrines serving the essential interest of the lower middle class, namely, the free use of economic power in the pursuit of wealth, and the emotions aroused in the struggle to make good this interest were fused, they became an ideology. Between institutions and an ideology there is a reciprocal relationship. The mentalities of individuals living under the institutions are organized in the patterns of the ideology, and these patterns, in turn, as they appear in the behavior and thought of these individuals support the institutions. Inasmuch as public opinion originally developed as a political force under circumstances which produced the institutions and ideology serving the free functioning of economic power, its pervasive elements have always supported this functioning.

2. In any culture possessing literate learning, the intellectual segment of the group produces a form of learning which renders the prevailing ideology in the terms which the culture makes the basis of validity. Thus the educated representatives of the rising lower middle classes, following precedents set by the older mer-

cantile groups, produced theories which were true, not as theology but as science. They rested not on divine revelation but on human reason. When these theories displaced aristocratic prejudices, religious dogma, and mercantile doctrines as the norms of individual behavior and social action, they were established as the learning which should be inculcated in all groups; present times know them as "classical economics," or "principles of political economy," or the "theories of a liberal society." However known, they have been, since the political victories of the lower middle classes, the fundamental elements of social theory, particularly at the highest level of education, and the declared principles of governmental action.

Under their influence "intellectuals" also worked out interpretations of many kinds of phenomena, so that in the course of time the prevailing ideology was embedded in many different kinds of learning. It may seem absurd to contend that the rapid development of atomic theory in the nineteenth century was due to the prevailing individualistic economy; but it can hardly be denied that in Darwinism the creative process of animate nature duplicated the economic competition of individuals in the market which the political economists had made the process of an automatic social progress. It is the normal function of "intellectuals" to make God, nature, and man move together in terms of the prevailing ideology; however their learning was glossed with vestiges of aristocratic and priestly learning, the achievements of the leading nineteenth-century intellectual figures of English, French, and American culture accomplished this result.

3. In their negative aspects cultural fixations define "dangerous opinions." Thus if the virtues of the lower middle classes—work, thrift, foresight, fortitude, and prudence—were raised to the leading places in the accepted scale of values, the vices to be avoided were merely their obverse—laziness, extravagance, impulsiveness, indulgence, and imprudence. Economic success was its own justification; economic failure deserved no sympathy. In fact, it was the duty of those who were economically successful to impose upon those who were economic failures the conditions that would compel them to act in ways that would make them successful. This was both "humane" and "intelligent" action. Simi-

larly the advocacy of doctrines and measures not sanctioned by these fixations was merely agitation—"misinformed," or "misguided," or "malevolent," or "irresponsible," or "harebrained," or "visionary," or "utopian." Above all, the advocates lacked "common sense." "Common sense"—one can only praise it—may be understood as the uncritical acceptance of the cultural fixations that support the prevailing ideology; it is the correlative at the popular level of "a sound, if not a brilliant, mind" at the level of "higher learning."

The effect of the establishment of the cultural fixations of the eighteenth-century lower middle classes at the bases of public opinion in France, England, and the United States was to give certain characteristics to the expression, as well as to the flow, of opinion. In winning release from the political controls of aristocratic régimes, these classes made possible the kind of political agitation that supported their achievement. In breaking the economic privileges of the older mercantile groups, they made freedom seem as if it is mainly the lack of restraints on economic activity. In overthrowing the intellectual power of state-supported priesthoods, they advanced tolerance, introduced science into education, and promoted an almost unprecedented multiplication of religious sects. Likewise they stimulated scientific investigation and technological innovation, organized public schools, and created advertising as modes of advancing the economic interest of individuals. On the other hand, they deplored the expression of opinions supporting the re-establishment of the power of the groups they had displaced and, at times, resisted the spread of views which, because these views served the interests of groups over which they exercised economic power, threatened their positions. Most of the intellectual and political action of the nineteenth century can be understood in terms such as these.

AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM

Whereas in England and France the eighteenth-century lower middle class fixations were assimilated in traditions having elements from many sources, in the United States they were from the first modified by elements having origin in the modes of living created by the penetration of the wilderness. This is not

the place to discuss the "frontier" as an influence in the development of American culture; however, it is important to emphasize that because of the "frontier" two interpretations of individualism now run in American life. The one, rooted in the cultural fixations of the eighteenth-century lower middle classes, has explicit expression in the doctrines of economic liberalism now regurgitated as a defense of the economic and social *status quo*; if proper consideration is given to the historical sources of this interpretation of individualism, it may be designated a "foreign 'ism.'" Alongside of it, more in the hearts of ordinary Americans of all regions and occupations than in the mentalities of those who are intellectually trained, stands the native interpretation that became powerful in the national tradition in the Jackson-Lincoln period.

The primary aspect of individualism, as defined in economic liberalism, is a concept of liberty framed mainly in negative terms, that is, in terms of freedom from political and intellectual controls and a lack of responsibility for the social results of the exercise of economic power. As previously noted, this interpretation was serviceable to the lower middle classes in escaping from the control of the older ruling groups. In the native American interpretation of individualism, which was framed under the conditions of the wilderness, of simple technology, and of slight social interdependence, liberty was the positive fact of self-decision, self-effort, and self-sufficiency. The basic difference between the two interpretations becomes clear when it is recognized that economic liberalism offers a theoretical justification of economic inequality, while native American individualism embodies an emotional attachment to equality, both economic and political. The theories of economic liberalism obstruct governmental action to abate economic inequality or ameliorate the evils that flow from it, while native American individualism impels political action to establish economic conditions under which individuals can behave and feel as if they are equals. Clearly the Homestead Act of 1862 was framed in these terms. The corollary of the conception of equality is that one individual shall not be in a position to exercise power, either economic or political or intellectual, over another individual, at least not to the continuous advantage of the former or to the permanent disadvantage of the latter.

In the conflicting sentiments aroused by the phrase "rugged individualist," the dual character of individualism as understood by present-day Americans is well illustrated. When this phrase connotes a crude economic self-interest pursued without regard to social consequences and, indeed, with a lack of sympathy for those who may be the victims of such a pursuit, it draws meaning from economic liberalism. In these connotations the phrase arouses negative emotional reactions because it conflicts with sentiments of fair play and equality implicit in historic American individualism. When the phrase connotes self-reliance, the capacity to endure whatever must be endured, and the abiding by the result of self-decision, however severe they may be, it takes meaning from historic American individualism. Such conflicts of meaning, it seems, must place many obstacles in the way of those who would correctly measure and interpret American public opinion.

Throughout the nineteenth century the development of the means of communication and transportation, the multiplication of newspapers and other organs for disseminating knowledge and judgments, and the organization of permanent institutions to gather news and spread learning, combined with industrial and commercial advances to weave ever more tightly and widely the web of opinion which had formed in the late eighteenth century. There is no need here to sketch the phases of this development. But it is pertinent to emphasize that the economic expansion which permitted the ever wider realization of the lower middle class interest, that is, the free use of economic power in the pursuit of wealth, provided a natural support for the lower middle class cultural fixations. This circumstance also meant that the men who presided over the gathering and disseminating of news and over literary and political expression possessed mentalities shaped by these cultural fixations. This was true partly because of the social origins of the men, partly because of the mode of their economic advancement, and partly because of the kind of power they ultimately won. And the members of other social groups found reasons, as time went on, to accept their leadership. As the lower middle classes remained "on the make," they spawned always more of the types that carried their fixations—the effective personnel of business, government, and education—and success

was their propaganda. In other words, cultural developments during the nineteenth century generally strengthened the fixations which the eighteenth-century lower middle classes had made the basis of public opinion when it appeared as a political force. "Business is business" and "less government in business and more business in government" are recent American clichés which declare them, the first asserting the full independence of economic power to act for itself and the second affirming the right of economic power to make government serve it.

PARADOX OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

In attempts to salvage some of their power from the ascendant lower middle classes, the early nineteenth-century aristocrats and priests modified their historic views, partly in order to compromise with the lower middle classes and partly in order to obtain the support of those groups most directly affected by the free use of economic power. Chiefly they discovered that political power, if restored to their hands, would be exercised in a benevolent paternalism, justified by humane feeling or national well-being or Christian justice. To their credit they acted according to their theories whenever they recovered some of their power.

Spokesmen for the early wage-earning group which grew steadily as industry and commerce expanded were vehement against the new ruling classes. Most of them, as did the aristocrats and priests, painted lurid pictures of the conditions in the new industrial towns. A few of them idealized the traditional countryside—a mistake which played into the hands of the priests and aristocrats. The bitterest among them described liberty, as wrought into institutions by the lower middle classes, to be the "right to starve." Others gave the concept of "the people" a broad meaning, including all adult males regardless of the possession of property, and called for the democratization of government; this program proved not too difficult for the ascendant lower middle classes to accept when they learned that it did not necessarily involve interference with the free use of economic power. In this circumstance was established the paradox of political democracy, namely: "the people" control the state, but the state is powerless to act directly to achieve the welfare of "the people."

The most original among the spokesmen for the early wage-earning class fumbled with new devices, such as model communities, trade unions, and cooperative societies, which, except when they threatened the free use of economic power, were not opposed by the ascendant lower middle classes. The labor movement advanced largely along these lines.

The most perverse among these spokesmen framed a revolutionary doctrine—"Proletarians of all lands, unite"—and began to work for their desired apocalypse. They were most original when they perverted the ideology of the lower middle classes to support their own objective; the economic determinism of the Communists sprang full grown from the brows of the classical economists. But the politics of the Communists were startlingly unoriginal. When Karl Marx made class consciousness the basis of industrial working-class political action, he accepted what had been the normal mode of political action by aristocratic orders, priesthoods, and middle classes ever since societies having a class structure had appeared in ancient-oriental times. The class conflict is implicit in societies based on an agriculture of low productivity; it is the method by which small groups, each having a peculiar means of power—the priesthood supernatural sanction, the aristocrats a monopoly of military violence, and mercantile groups the capacity to purchase—contended for the small economic surplus produced by inert peasant-village masses. Marx merely projected this political struggle into the social changes he saw in the early industrial towns.

From a superficial point of view this projection may seem valid, inasmuch as it involves only the continuation of the past into the present. But another reading of history may indicate that the projection and all of its implications for political action and cultural development are false. Indeed, the record now suggests that Marxism is neither a valid interpretation of history nor a correct theory of politics. This conclusion does not require the acceptance of the ideology carried in lower middle class institutions; rather, it necessitates an examination of recent cultural developments in order to ascertain what may be their real meaning.

CHANGING PATTERNS OF LIFE

If the historian broadens his view of the past to include common men as well as the individuals whose names survive in the documents, no matter how vague the picture of these common men may be, it can be seen that the most remarkable development of recent times is the transformation of their lives.

From early ancient-oriental times, when the first urban cultures developed, until the rise of industrial cities at the end of the eighteenth century the pattern of the lives of common men was virtually unchanging. Socially isolated in villages and bound to the soil by its low productivity, if not by law, they were poor, illiterate, superstitious, suspicious of strangers, and provincial. For them, obtaining the possession of a bit of land as private property was the achievement of independence and security, and whenever they rose against exploiters it was to win this objective. Above all, they understood neither instruction nor agitation except when framed in religious terms. The socio-cultural type among common men was, in fact, the peasant, whose behavior and mentality had been shaped in the neolithic village.

The lower middle class use of economic power in the pursuit of wealth has disrupted this historic pattern of behavior and thought. The crude evidence of the disruption is the concentration of population in cities, which began with and accompanied the technological and economic revolution, directed mainly by the lower middle classes. Its subtle forms constitute the re-education of the masses which this concentration involves.

As the population shifts from the countrysides to the cities, common men change their occupations, diversify their skills, add to the knowledge in terms of which they work, and produce wealth only through a most complex division of labor. They live with an unprecedented capacity to produce wealth but know unemployment—that unique condition of freedom existing in the labor market—which easily reduces them to want. They acquire literacy. They receive “news” from everywhere. They hear of science—germs, vitamins, and explosives—and are shrieked at by advertising. They have new wants and obtain new satisfactions. They receive benefits from property without owning it and

discover that owners of property are not as certain of receiving reward as are those who manage it. They recognize a dependence on social organization, not on weather or, as in the traditional villages, on prayers and charms. And they understand that men, not nature and God, are responsible for most of the things that occur among men.

"UPROOTED" MEN

Although the complete effect of this re-education cannot now be guessed, it is clear that the great body of common men are now culturally "uprooted," that is, torn loose from the traditional fixations of rural communities and subject to the psychological stimulation and organization of cities. It is important to note in this connection that urban psychological forces reach into the rural areas through the market and by means of the new methods of communication, so that among peasants and farmers this re-education also proceeds. This is as true in the United States as in European countries. Because these masses live in a society organized under the cultural fixations that had origin with the lower middle classes, they are inevitably influenced by them; but the circumstances affecting their lives, it seems certain, will shape for them cultural fixations quite different from those that the lower middle classes established in the traditions of England, France, and the United States a century and a half ago.

Only a few observations on the cultural fixations which this re-education of the masses may be shaping are permissible here.

Because in machine technology men create physical power, direct its flow, govern its movements, and determine its result, the belief that control may be usefully exercised in many fields of human activity may be strengthened; the conception of a planned economy roots, perhaps, in this growing belief. Because the increased capacity to produce wealth is so great—a condition which is known to workers by virtue of their occupations—the continued existence of economic want in many forms appears more and more unnecessary. Thus, it seems that the solution of the economic problem of present society involves not so much the redistribution of wealth as it does the release of the capacity for the production of wealth from the controls which do not now permit its utilization.

The cooperation organized in the complex division of labor probably involves the growth of collective organization for the control of economic processes. Indeed, the rise of corporations to dominant positions in national economies may be cited as evidence of this trend. In other words, a private collectivization of the ownership and management of capital is already far advanced; the issue is, therefore, whether these collective structures of capital shall be operated merely for the attainment of private ends or in accord with policies shaped in terms of public interests. The social interdependence organized in urban life supports a great liberation of the individual for self-chosen pursuits. Does this not mean possibly that the stabilization of this interdependence in collective controls over some types of activities may be the way to achieve a liberty far more real than that defined mainly by the free use of economic power? Is it not true that today an ever greater part of the gainfully employed population are workers in hierarchies of employment which serve a private interest? Is not the choice, therefore, not between "liberty" and "regimentation," but between a regimentation that serves private interests and a regimentation that achieves public objectives beneficial to great numbers of individuals?

Lastly, is it not clear that today the driving forces of social change have origin not so much in the belief that conditions of living are worse than they have been and are growing still worse, but more in the faith that with present knowledge, modes of organization, and the capacity to produce wealth, the amelioration of many distresses long endured may now be successfully undertaken?

It should be emphasized that the circumstances with which these observations are concerned exist not in the mind of him who speculates about them, but increasingly they run in the day-by-day routines of more and more individuals. And for that reason they are the psychological materials which these individuals are likely to organize in cultural fixations.

If this view of the cultural developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is accepted, the superficiality of the Marxist interpretation of history becomes clear: not the rise of the industrial working class through revolution, but a fundamental transforma-

tion of the structure of behavior, thought, and feeling of the masses which, as is now evident, is affecting every established institution is the characteristic development of our times. And the circumstances of this transformation are not limited in effect to the industrial working class or the masses, however understood, but bear upon all other social groups. Thus, even if these groups struggle to maintain their positions against rivals, they succeed only by inventing new methods of obtaining and exercising power. Today the class conflict, however it goes on, is incidental to a cultural change far more fundamental than that which accompanied the rise of the lower middle classes, namely, from an order resting on masses whose behavior and mentality were organized and perpetuated in rural villages to an order supported by masses whose behavior and mentality are being organized in contemporary cities. From the point of view of this development it is fair to conclude that the world is today newer than it has been for seven thousand years.

Why do men today everywhere seem so hopelessly confused? The sources of this universal confusion, it may be argued, lie in the disruption of the traditional cultural fixations of the masses as they were shaped in the traditional rural economy. Also it appears that the cultural fixations established by the lower middle classes in the traditions of England, France, and the United States about a hundred and fifty years ago are seriously disorganized by the new circumstances of life that have come with the shift of the population from countrysides to industrial cities. However, at present the cultural fixations taking shape in these new circumstances of life have not yet become the bases either of individual behavior or of social action. Thus neither the old nor the new bases of behavior and thinking have stability; this is the peculiar historical quality of our times.

CONTROL THROUGH PROPAGANDA

The immediate effect of this circumstance is the unprecedented elaboration of propaganda, that is, the attempt to establish cultural fixations by manipulating the materials which enter into the formation of opinion. Propaganda is not a new thing. Indeed, the ancient Egyptian pharaohs and priests were its adept prac-

titioners. In cultures having an economic base in peasant-village masses, the control of religion was sufficient to maintain the proper attitude of acquiescence. Under present conditions, however, far more complex and subtle methods are necessary. Many of the new techniques are only elaborations of old methods, especially the editing of history, the invention of a philosophy, the distortion of science, and the reorganization of education. Some of the newer devices have originated in the practices of business in advertising products and in maintaining "public relations," such as the continuous assertion that a statement is true and the selection of the facts in terms of which individuals are permitted to think.

Finally, the cultural fixations of a population are especially important for the development of a successful propaganda; indeed, if a propagandist can identify the opinion he desires to fix with an element of the tradition of the population, he is likely to succeed. Competition for the sanction of tradition is not only a normal element in propaganda but also a usual aspect of politics. Nazi Bundsmen assumed Hitleresque postures before a flag-draped effigy of George Washington. Earl Browder journeyed to Springfield, Illinois—the home of Lincoln—to proclaim Stalinism to be "twentieth-century Americanism." Franklin D. Roosevelt made much of "economic royalists" in an attempt to raise old antipathies against new Tories. Wendell L. Willkie rode the shrivelled Republican range, promising "better chuck" and "greener pastures." And opponents of New Deal policies, while privately willing to admit they can hardly change them, declaim against them in the name of "individual liberties," "great public debt," "irresponsible executive power," and a "selfish bureaucracy." These phrases, by exciting the negative emotional reactions attached to the cultural fixations of the late eighteenth-century lower middle classes, cause individuals to resist action not sanctioned by the fixations.

However, under present conditions, it seems that propaganda framed in terms of tradition can have little lasting effect, for now, although "uprooted" individuals turn easily to traditional fixations, the day-by-day routines of their lives probably support quite different fixations. The "shape of things to come" lies in the new conditions of living now re-educating the masses, and intelligent

action must be not the assertion of traditional fixations but the discovery of the new fixations developing in this re-education.

MEASURING PUBLIC OPINION

If the foregoing view of the change now occurring is in some degree correct, it must have significance not only for those who attempt to measure public opinion but also for those who try to influence its movements.

Whereas an accurate measure of opinion about a particular act, personality, or policy may be obtained, it is doubtful whether, at least by present methods, the measurement of the significant trends of opinion can be taken. Of course, it is not necessary and, perhaps, not desirable to take such measurements. They may not have news or market value, and, far worse, they may be propaganda for dangerous proposals in terms of prevailing cultural fixations.

If public opinion is considered a function of culture, three first-rate difficulties confront those who would accurately measure it.

1. Questions must be framed so that they do not bring excessively into play either cultural fixations or circumstances that are "uprooting" individuals. It is probably far more difficult to eliminate the over-influence of the first than that of the second. Questions which receive the answer "Don't know" point to an area of judgment in which considerable uncertainty exists; from the point of view of cultural development, these areas are probably quite important and perhaps should be explored.

2. In shaping a panel or sample, attention should be given to the inclusion of the proper proportions of the several socio-cultural types and of the identifiable "uprooted" individuals. Economic or political differences are probably too simple to mark all of the characteristics of these types which affect their opinions. Since socio-cultural types can be defined only by recognizable patterns of behavior and thought, a great deal of research will be necessary before sampling can be carried on in their terms.

3. Many pitfalls lie before the unwary interpreter of data which purport to measure public opinion.

For example, the *Fortune* Survey, which has discovered what it calls the "authentic American compound of conservatism and liberalism" and, as a result, asserts that the average American is "an entrepreneur," reports as responses to the question, "Would you like to go into any kind of business for yourself?" the following answers: "Yes," 50.7 per cent; "Depends," 7.6 per cent; "No," 38.1 per cent; and "Don't know," 3.6 per cent. To the question, "Would you prefer government or private business as an employer?" it reports: "Private business," 50.0 per cent; "Government," 39.5 per cent; and "Don't know," 10.5 per cent. And it also indicates that 43.8 per cent of Americans believe the interests of employers and employees are opposed. It is not difficult to imagine how the Communistic *Daily Worker* might interpret these data. A dull rendering of the gurgitation might read: "The overthrow of capitalism in the United States is imminent. Barely half of the population ever expect to obtain benefits from it either as entrepreneurs or as workers. Almost half of the population now prefer to work for the government rather than for private employers. And over two-fifths believe that the interests of the workers are opposed by the entrepreneurs. Certainly the continuation of the distressing conditions of the past decade will shortly bring the majority to favor the abolition of capitalism. The time is ripe for the working class to revolt."

The implications of the foregoing interpretation of the change now taking place are undoubtedly more significant for those who try to influence public opinion than for those who merely attempt to measure it.

For educators, it may be believed, these implications are likely to have decisive meaning. If education seeks to inculcate the beliefs that support a social order, it cannot hope to succeed if the fundamental psychological bases upon which the social order rests are disintegrating under the impact of the going experience of the masses. If education attempts to develop an integrated personality, it can do this only by discovering and introducing into its subject-matter materials which are in harmony with and support the new fixations that are forming in this experience. If education aims "to train the mind" for independent and creative thinking, it must set

before the student materials and analyses of them which are coherent in terms of these incipient fixations.

Unfortunately educators and those individuals who are masters of specialized fields of learning, especially at the college and university level, are not well equipped to do these things. They lack the understanding that common men are important in the historical process, a recognition of the integration of their specialized bodies of knowledge with social organization, and a knowledge that social factors shape individual minds. Mainly they are masters of decorative learning, or of sophisticated literacy, or of parcelled information, or of philosophic abstraction which they proclaim as valuable for itself alone. Under the doctrines of the suspended judgment—"the facts are not all in"—and objectivity—"let the facts speak for themselves,"—they refuse to take responsibility for thinking about social change, about which there *must* be sound thinking if escape from confusion is to be made. Persons trained in a tradition which makes the individual mind an entity, either rational or mystical, cannot be expected to deal with a situation whose peculiar significance is that it is reconstituting the social basis of mentality.

THE NEW TASK OF LEADERSHIP

For those who would be leaders, intellectual or political, the implications of this interpretation of change in the contemporary world are even more important than for educators, because it alters the fundamental terms of their enterprise. Not only must the intellectual leader speak about new things but also he must speak about old things in new ways. Similarly the political leader must set new goals and find new means to reach old goals. But these new things, new means, and new ways of dealing with old things cannot be indiscriminately developed; they must "make sense" in terms of the emerging cultural fixations.

When first faced with this circumstance, leaders commonly reaffirm their attachment to tradition, and the people respond, for when belief is disturbed, emotion becomes intense. And the appeal to tradition arouses the most intense emotions that support a social order. This situation, however, cannot long endure, for the discord between tradition and the new routine of life which forms the

pattern of reference of the masses impels them to seek new beliefs and new emotional attachments. Thus they run after crack-pots and demagogues. Although opportunists, such gentlemen are more likely to be constructive than those who hold fast to tradition, for they may touch something that is vital in the new circumstance.

But merely to touch something vital is not enough. That special point of departure for orienting thought and emotion in terms of the cultural fixations that are emerging in the new routine of life of the masses must be found. The true task of leadership is to find this point and move from it to an organization of institutions which is coherent in terms of it. Intellectual coherence is a more powerful factor in the historical process than either tradition or class consciousness. However, it is the intellectual coherence not of the individual mind but of the social organization of mentality, of which individual minds are merely socio-cultural aspects. This coherence rests in the cultural fixations which are established in the going experiences of the masses; since these fixations are irrational in the sense that they exist first not as logical concepts but as an ordering of individual experience by non-individual influences, the function of the individual mind is to give them systematic expression in thought and emotion. Rationality functions chiefly to give coherent organization to thought and emotion in terms of irrationally developed assumptions.

✓ The people rule. Education is decisive. Leadership is necessary. Public opinion is supreme. But all function in terms of the basic cultural fixations which at the time are the foundation of the socially organized structure of mentality. It is the misfortune of these times that, because the routine of the life of the masses has been so greatly reorganized, the cultural fixations supporting established institutions are giving way; it is the fortune of these times that, because new fixations are developing, action for either evil or good is possible in more ways than has been possible for centuries. The fate of the future is in the hands of those who understand and use these ways for the achievement of the good; the evil can triumph either by the recognition and use of the forces that support it or by the ignorance of those who, resisting evil, do not know how to achieve the good.

PROPAGANDA BY SHORT WAVE: BERLIN CALLING AMERICA

By HAROLD N. GRAVES, JR.

In the September issue of the *QUARTERLY*, Mr. Graves, Director of the Princeton Listening Center, described Lord Haw-Haw's radio campaign against Britain. In this issue he analyzes German short-wave broadcasts directed to the United States. His account gives a vivid picture of the frequent shifts in German propaganda strategy. The Princeton Listening Center, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, records and transcribes short-wave broadcasts from Europe.

FEW ATTEMPTS by a national government to influence popular opinion abroad have been made in a seemingly less fertile area than German short-wave broadcasts to the United States. Even at the time that German radio service for North America was instituted, on April 1, 1933, American opinion had begun to be disturbed by the precipitous and strangely brutal descent of National Socialism on established institutions within the Reich. One month after the outbreak of war in 1939, a Gallup poll showed that nearly three-fourths of the American people wanted the Allies to win; less than two per cent favored a German victory.

A more practical expression of American opinion, and undoubtedly one of more concern to the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin, was the increasing anxiety of Americans that the United States should extend more aid to the Allies. It was this flow of feeling which the German radio set about to choke with words.

Always, Berlin broadcasters directed their efforts primarily toward "the masses." Reading its lesson from history and the newspapers of the day, the German radio sought to keep alive the fading tradition of American enmity for Britain; by praising isolationists, it sought to encourage American stay-at-home attitudes; by labeling them with a few simple words—"Jew," "capitalist," "British agent"—it sought to discredit those who favored Britain; by its own picture of Germany, it sought to reconcile Americans with the Nazi revolution.

Chameleon-like, these themes changed color and emphasis against the background of events. When flattery and the sugges-

tion of what some might call bribery had failed, the German radio sought to divide class against class, nationality against nationality, race against race, attempting thereby to paralyze American action. Lest this should not serve, there was also intimidation—not only the German-Italian-Japanese pact of September 27, but a minor campaign of *Schrecklichkeit* carried on by the Berlin radio to frighten America into neutral immobility.

AMERICAN VOICES FROM GERMANY

Soon after the outbreak of war, the Berlin radio was serving its North American audience with more than 11 hours of programs a day: from six to nine o'clock in the morning and from ten minutes to five in the afternoon to one o'clock in the morning. About one-third of this time was devoted to talk; there were nine news programs and approximately five commentaries a day, most of them in English. For the rest, as a Berlin speaker once phrased it, German programs contained, "regardless of the war, a choice assortment of broadcasting viands, sparkling musical champagne and other tasty delicacies, such as operettas, variety entertainments, dance music and comic bits."

Chief of the *Deutsche Kurzsieder's* speakers at first was Fred W. Kaltenbach, a native of Iowa and a Ph.D. of the University of Berlin. He exercised his Midwestern drawl in topical talks and, once a week, in an open letter to "Dear Harry and the folks back home in Iowa." Late last winter, he was joined by "E. D. Ward," another Midwesterner who had coined his *nom de voix* out of the letters of his first name; actually, he was Edward Delaney, former press agent, actor and author of cheap fiction. At about the same time appeared "Dr. Anders" ("Dr. Otherwise"); it later developed that he was really Dr. Otto Koischwitz, a German who formerly had been a member of the faculty of Hunter College in New York City. Still later came Gertrude Hahn, possibly of German-American origin, and Constance Drexel, presented as a member of the well-known Philadelphia family.

Kaltenbach, Ward and Koischwitz now monopolize Berlin's three nightly ten-minute commentaries, aimed apparently at a mass audience with high school education or less. Miss Hahn talks

more or less directly to low-income breadwinners; she gives a dramatic monologue once a week, playing the part of a telephone switch-board operator in the offices of "The Pittsburgh Tribune." Addressing a group apparently on a higher level of education and income, Miss Drexel usually discusses the cultural achievements of Germany.

THE INTIMATE TOUCH

Most of these speakers try to create an atmosphere in which the listener will believe that to accept the German point of view is merely to show sound judgment and homely common sense. This atmosphere is one of intimate, colloquial discussion. The discussion form itself is prominent in Berlin broadcasts; there are weekly dialogues between "Fritz and Fred, the Friendly Quarrelers" (Koischwitz and Kaltenbach) and between "Jim and Johnny," the former a benevolent milkman and the latter his unemployed, non-paying Canadian customer.

Even ordinary monologues are so cast that they simulate close-range, face-to-face speech. Koischwitz begins his talks, "Confidentially"; Kaltenbach pauses in his letters to remark, "Well, Harry," and sometimes interrupts his commentaries to ask for agreement, "Don't you think?"

These are man-to-man discussions. Except when they have personally seen such things as traces of British incendiaryism at the Library of Louvain, Berlin commentators rarely claim and sometimes disclaim special knowledge. "Everybody knows" the truth of Kaltenbach's assertions, "nobody will believe" British propaganda and "those who think for themselves" will agree with E. D. Ward.

Berlin's voices, in addition to being friendly and intimate, are often highly quotable. They quip and pun almost continually, and are not above telling a smutty story now and then to illustrate, for example, how the blackout has encouraged sexual promiscuity in decadent Britain. Events abroad are vividly connected with Americana; to Ward, the British contraband control measures are no better than the methods of the "cleaners' protective associations" once managed by American racketeers. Berlin's lively style enhances the possibility that short-waved remarks may be passed on

by word of mouth—for example: "The Sixth Column? Oh, they're the goofy guys who believe in the Fifth Column."

Direct suggestion also has been used to widen the influence of the Berlin radio. Speaking to a fictional friend at the other end of her fictional telephone connection on June 15, Miss Hahn advised her to get a short-wave radio of her own so that she would not have to go to her grandmother's to hear what was being said in Berlin. As early as May 5, "Jim" prefaced an explanation of Britain's "war guilt" in Scandinavia with instructions to "Johnny": "I wish you would tell it to as many people as you meet." On a later program, "Johnny" offered a testimonial: his family was showing him more respect since "Jim" was keeping him abreast of contemporary affairs.

The fact that some Berlin commentators are Americans may itself have tended to reduce the resistance of the radio audience to news and views coming from a foreign country. Since May, when pressures on listener-opinion were conspicuously increased, other steps have been taken to provide mental comfort. Koischwitz is now "your friend," and the views expressed by Ward are "not necessarily those of this station." Ward assured his listeners on August 30, "I am allowed to say on this totalitarian station that . . . I am not an advocate of their [Nazi] political philosophy."

BRITISH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS

In the months preceding the German aggression against Norway and Denmark, confidence in an Allied victory was high, and Americans who thought that the United States should extend more aid to the Allies were in a minority. The German radio devoted only a moderate amount of attention to specifically American attitudes. Its appeals were addressed to Americans as a horse-sensible, proud and moralistic people. Germany had not started the war. Germany had not begun the blockade; she could not be held responsible for the counter-blockade, by magnetic mine and submarine, which followed. Nor was Germany interfering with American mail, plundering American commerce and ignoring American protests. All these crimes could be laid at the door of Britain.

At bottom, the thesis ran, Britain and America were fundamentally different. After a review of British history, for example, one speaker concluded, "Well, does this . . . explain why England has never produced an Abraham Lincoln?" Speaking as "Fritz," Koischwitz on March 2 coined the word "Britality" to describe Britain's "self-righteous conviction that no one else is well-behaved." As an example of Britality, Koischwitz pointed out to "Fred" that the British "even despise the American language."

Specific clashes of American and British interests were illustrated by examples of Anglo-American friction dating back to 1776. The American Revolution, in fact, entitled American listeners to charter membership in Kaltenbach's "British Lion Tamers' Club," to which he also admitted East Indians, Irishmen, Japanese and others who had opposed British hegemony. Contemporary events glowed from Anglo-American friction; the British seizure of American mail was made a minor *cause célèbre*.

BEWARE OF BRITAIN

Still more ominous, the Berlin radio suggested, were British projects for the future. Even if America escaped involvement in war, said Ward, she would be expected to pay the bills of reconstruction. Britain's 'export or die' drive, said another, was directly aimed at American markets. On February 6, a German broadcast alleged that the expansion of Canadian military aviation would allow Britain to dominate American foreign policy. "The *Mauretania* and the *Normandie*," it was said, "are now lying in the New York harbor waiting to take forth the first regiment of American soldiers to fight the war."

This, after all, said Berlin, was Britain's major concern—to involve America in war. Kaltenbach warned "Dear Harry" on March 18 against British propaganda: "The American people are to be led to believe that England and France are the last hopes of democracy, and that Germany is seeking to beat them only because they are democratic. Stuff and nonsense!"

Simultaneously, the Berlin radio praised America and things American, for the double purpose of winning the good will of listeners and reinforcing isolationist attitudes. "Above all," said a

news announcer on March 7, "we cannot help congratulating the American people on their steadfast, neutral attitude . . . America is neutral. . . . She wants to stay neutral."

By contrast with domineering, trouble-making England, who menaced on the very border of the United States, Germany was presented in Berlin broadcasts as a friendly and distant nation, peopled by an admirable race. An American guest speaker reported, "These lovers of nature, the Germans, will walk miles over the countryside to the forests, a tiny brook, the banks of a river or lake, and sit for *hours* breathing in the beauty of the landscape." German-American conflict was impossible; a Dr. Bersking testified, "Again and again, I have been confirmed in my belief that our two countries have much in common, and that there is always fair weather when good fellows get together." Said Kaltenbach, "Let it be said, once and for all, a German victory in this war is no threat to democracy—and certainly not to American democracy!"

Germany, it was suggested, was only following in Europe the precedent set by America in the Western Hemisphere; Germany's reclaiming of Danzig and the Corridor was not so very different from America's Texan *Anschluss* in 1846, and what Germany wanted to do in "Central and Eastern Europe" was what the United States already had done in the Western Hemisphere by the Monroe Doctrine.

THE "WAR-MONGERS"

While Germany had nothing but good wishes for the United States, certain segments of American society, according to the Berlin radio, did not reflect this cordial attitude. The offenders were of the same kind that Adolf Hitler had observed in Vienna many years before: (1) capitalists, (2) Jews, (3) newspapers and (4) "politicians."

Criticism of capitalism was largely reserved for the "Jim and Johnny" dialogues, presented particularly for Canadian listeners. It was the industrialists, said "Jim," who had got Canada into "Britain's war." Whereupon Johnny groaned expressively, "Money, money, money!"

American Jews and newspapers were attacked simultaneously by Miss Hahn on March 2. She began her monologue as follows:

"Hello, Mr. Finkelstein . . . Well, Mr. Finkelstein, even if you are a stockholder and don't like the Germans, we can't change the news around for you . . . Goodbye." Nevertheless, it developed that despite Miss Hahn's apparently unceasing vigilance, an executive of "The Tribune" with the indicative name of Rosenbloom had deleted reports favorable to Germany from the cables of the paper's Berlin correspondent.

Emerging from the sphere of the fictional, the Berlin radio in the person of E. D. Ward took Senator Claude Pepper to task on March 4 for answering critics of British mail seizures: "The publicity given his statements in the London press . . . implies that his views are those of that nation." In the same talk, Ward criticized Congress for its revision of the Neutrality Act in favor of the Allies: "Such a move on the part of the neutral that held the decisive economic power on the world's balance scale has consequences the full extent of which cannot yet be foreseen."

It was the German Army, however, and not the American Congress, which next shaped history in Europe. The German invasions of Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg came as a profound shock to American opinion, exciting the very attitudes which the German radio had tried to smother. For a time, military activity in Norway and Western Europe blotted out that particular attention which previously had been paid to America. Perhaps, too, it was thought that the feeling created in the United States was too unfavorable for direct, frontal attack.

UNSUGARED CRITICISM

Relevant themes were revived about May 25. While the Battles of France and Flanders raged, the campaign to divide Britain and America was redoubled; but it was surpassed by criticism of the United States, which quadrupled in volume.

The American press bore the brunt of the attack. The Berlin radio progressed from the generalities used earlier ("certain American papers") to specific strictures of the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald-Tribune* and *Look* magazine. The germ in Miss Hahn's monologue on March 2 bore fruit in a talk by Kaltenbach

on June 4. He said that at the Jewish World Alliance meeting of 1900, Jewish journalists had been advised to try to dominate the world press. "Today," he declared, "practically every news agency, with the exception of the German and Italian ones, are controlled by the Jews, and the results are apparent from a glance in the papers." In 1917, Kaltenbach recalled, "Jewish influence proved to be of vital importance for drawing America into the war. . . . The Zionist Jew, Brandeis, was instrumental in causing the American press to swing entirely over to the cause of the Allies."

Criticism of American policy and policy-makers became more vehement and more specific. Discussing Senator Pepper again, E. D. Ward said on June 10, "It is bruited about in America that his speech, in which he said that we are already at war with Germany, was suggested and edited by the leader of the British 'Fifth Column' in America." On June 22, Ward returned ominously to matters of American policy: "Europe's war is being decided in America. But who will make the decision—the *people* or the politicians?" Kaltenbach went to the brink of war and looked over on June 23, declaring that the Cabinet appointments of Messrs. Stimson and Knox meant that war would be "but a matter of time—perhaps weeks."

Nevertheless, the German radio pointedly ignored many overt signs of the increased American desire to aid Britain. The sending of "obsolete" Navy bombers overseas was not reported, nor, apparently, was President Roosevelt's "stab-in-the-back" address at Charlottesville on June 10. Although she did not mention the speech, Constance Drexel countered it with a new appeal, voiced on June 11. Patiently, she asked: "Do people in America really believe that Christianity may be helped by the use of weapons?"

THE SLY LION

Criticism of Britain's attitude toward America leaped from the historic past, over the present and into a fearsome future. On June 3, Kaltenbach asked: "Might I suggest to my listeners that the people to watch are the English agents and propagandists in the United States who have a direct interest in seeing America save the British Empire?" What the Allies really wanted, according to

E. D. Ward, was that "the guns to be shipped [from America] have with each one a man in Uncle Sam's uniform."

British agents, said the Berlin radio, were being distributed throughout Central America in order to precipitate incidents which would stir up anti-German feeling in the United States and lead to that country's entry into war. A still more diabolic and dramatic plot was discussed by a news announcer on June 3. He reported that British and French agents had met that day in Paris to plan the sinking of the American liners *Manhattan* and *Roosevelt*, which had been delegated to carry Americans back from the European war zone: "One side was for the torpedoing of the liners, the other for the smuggling in of time-fuse bombs, so-called infernal machines. According to information received both possibilities are to be combined in the most suitable way."

America's excited attitude toward Germany, the German radio now urgently insisted, had no basis in fact. A news announcer stressed on May 28, "There is not the slightest indication of German territorial interests in the Western Hemisphere." Addressing his remarks to Senator Pittman on June 3, Kaltenbach declaimed: "I challenge you to produce one iota of evidence that Germany has any designs on any territory covered by the Monroe Doctrine! Both the German Government and the German people have only the friendliest of feelings for the Government of the United States, the home of so many American citizens of German descent." On June 16, Kaltenbach added a warning: "We would not consider it feasible for America to interfere with European affairs. The experiences following the World War do not invite repetition."

Germany's military campaign halted after the Franco-German armistice; but criticism of America continued to mount like a mercury thermometer in a hot sun. American information services, once criticized merely for being pro-British, now were said to be in active cooperation with British authorities. Allegations about Nazi "Fifth Column" activity in South America were described as "Anglo-North American propaganda." E. D. Ward dealt with an arch-villain of the American press on July 5: "The *New York Times* is . . . owned and controlled by an alien-affiliated group.

Opposed to all that is German or Fascist, and being the official . . . Wall Street Agency for the British Foreign Office, one can scarcely expect any other attitude."

AMERICAN OPINION ASSAILED

American opinion itself was assailed for the first time; in this period, E. D. Ward invented the scornful phrase "150 per cent Americans" to describe those who believed in aid for Britain. On July 8, Kaltenbach announced that certain German-American ties had been broken: "Unfortunately, American membership in the Lion Tamers' Club, under the pressure of anti-German propaganda, has been allowed to lapse. . . . The German Government and the German people have left nothing undone to court American favor. And how has this been rewarded? With reproaches and rebuffs. . . . It is not too late, however, to extend the hand of friendship to the strongest power in Europe."

On August 5, Kaltenbach read a letter purporting to come from a 16-year-old boy in Tennessee: "'Many people over here have become hysterical . . . I have (heard of) physical harm being done to people who are found to be sympathetic to Germany. So if you ever hear my saying anything against Germany, you will know . . . I had to do it for my own protection.'" Kaltenbach added, "Soon it will be time for burning German text books and smashing German cameras and mouth organs. . . . And while we're about it, let's not forget to discharge professors and school teachers who in an absent-minded moment let slip a good word for German science and culture. Don't let it get you down, you German-Americans. . . . People whose opinions really count will admire you for sticking up for Germany in a fight which is no concern of the United States." In sharp contrast to what had been said earlier on the subject of German-American relations, Dr. Koischwitz remarked on August 6, "For the past fifty years . . . America has been more or less anti-German—long before anybody heard of Hitler."

MATERIALISTIC APPEALS

To moralistic appeals now was added a materialistic appeal. Said Kaltenbach on July 5: "Germany is going to win this war.

Why not face the facts and make up to the winner? Why quarrel with the dominant power in Europe . . . when that power is slated to play the leading commercial part on the continent after the war?" On the next day, Kaltenbach positively ruled out another alternative for American trade: "You are attempting now to institute a system of purely pan-American economics. With this begins the deterioration of your commerce . . . South America needs Europe and you need Europe. . . . Is it wise, then for America to adopt an attitude of animosity?" "War," E. D. Ward had said a short time before, "will not be brought about by German provocation, but by America's self-made invitation."

The Franco-German armistice, meanwhile, had halted efforts to divide Britain and America—but only for the time being. The campaign of division was revived and reached a new peak three days before mass air attacks against England began on August 8.

There was an object lesson for Americans in a 185-year-old news item broadcast from Berlin on July 11; it recited how in 1755 George Washington's Virginia militia had been deserted by British troops and left to fight a French and Indian force alone. Having made this a matter of contemporary record, the German radio was more insistent than ever that Britain meant to drag America into war. Kaltenbach remarked on July 22, "Churchill comforted his people last week with the assurance that there will be a British offensive not later than 1942. Perhaps he figured that it would take at least that long to train American troops to save old England." On the same program, Kaltenbach asked outright the question which had been implicit in German broadcasts for many months: "What has England ever done for America to deserve American help?" On August 5, the question was repeated: "England is standing on her last legs. She stands all alone in Europe and there is nothing the United States can do to stave off her defeat at the hands of Germany. And why should she want to? What has England ever done for America?"

GERMANS BEARING GIFTS

Again, Berlin broadcasts drew a contrasting picture of Britain and Germany. While Britain was "calling on God and the United States in its last hour," Germany had only a benevolent and im-

partial concern with affairs in the Western Hemisphere. Whereas Britain could promise only blood and grief, Germany could offer gifts: trade, and the prospect that a near-American way of life would be continued in Europe if Germany won.

Evidence of Germany's good will was presented on July 29 by Air Marshal Goering himself, who told an American journalist that "if anyone in Europe—Germany in the least—thinks or dreams of a possible invasion of North or South America, he was certainly suffering from strange hallucinations. Mind you, Germany intends to cultivate political and economic relations with the United States." Kaltenbach took up the theme again on August 5: "The English Ambassador in Washington was recently quoted as saying that England is America's Maginot Line. . . . My friends, don't put your trust in Maginot Lines. A policy of good neighborliness toward Germany is guaranteed to be more of a safeguard than . . . ten Maginot Lines."

Besides this protection from unspecified danger, Germany had, as Air Marshal Goering suggested, more concrete benefits—and more concrete alternatives—to offer. "Germany," a speaker had said on July 18, "is willing to take American cotton. . . . Everything will depend on America's commercial policy. If necessary, Germany will seek cotton in other countries. . . . That would mean that the United States definitely loses one of its markets for cotton. This is only one item, and there are many others. The larger question is whether the United States wishes to take up Britain's old methods and with them inherit the antipathy of the world."

Spiritual and ideological appeals, once voiced, were not allowed to lapse. Following Miss Drexel's remarks about Christianity on June 11, Koischwitz assured his listeners on August 5 that German churches were filled on Sundays and still serving God. Miss Drexel again appeared, to assure listeners that the victory of the culturally-minded German nation would not mean the end of what Americans called "our way of life." "At the bottom," said Dr. Koischwitz on July 16, "there is a far greater similarity between American democracy and German National Socialism than there is between old-fashioned English class distinction and Americanism."

HOOVER, FORD, AND LINDBERGH

As before, American isolationist attitudes were cultivated. At the time of the Republican Convention, ex-President Hoover was commended for his opinion that America should stay out of war; after Henry Ford had decided not to manufacture airplane engines on British contract, E. D. Ward exclaimed: "Would that there were more Fords in America!"; and Colonel Lindbergh—"a man you ought to know"—was quoted in the assertion that America was safe from air attack.

As the German and Royal Air Forces began to battle over Britain, the German radio's criticism of America grew more outspoken and more intense. On August 10, "the friendly quarrelers" made this exchange:

Fred: DD.

Fritz: What do you mean, DD?

Fred: Well, dynamic democracy. Of course, DD might also mean damned dumb, or daily dozen, or Dorothy Dix. E. D. Ward remarked on August 15, "Secretary Knox says that in the event of England's defeat in the war, the United States will have no friend left in the world. . . . Might not one suggest that there is something slightly—just ever so slightly—wrong in a foreign policy which could bring about such a condition of affairs?"

The Berlin radio then intervened directly in American politics. "If I were home in Iowa," said Kaltenbach on August 19, "I should ask myself, what should my attitude as a German-American be towards the present policy of the Administration? I would support the Administration 100 per cent in building up American defense—not out of fear of a German invasion, but on principle. But I would refuse to support any measures intended to help England against Germany. I would do everything in my power to influence my friends, my neighbors, to keep out of the European mess. I should refuse to support any man for President or Congress who has expressed himself in favor of helping England."

BULLITT AND WILLKIE

Thirty-five minutes later on the same evening, E. D. Ward commented: "Sensible Americans cannot but make a comparison

between the words of Mr. Bullitt [in his Philadelphia speech of August] and the concluding remarks . . . by Mr. Willkie in his speech of acceptance for the Presidential nomination. The latter's words seemed to be dictated by reason instead of radicalism. . . . In the new order of things . . . care for American interests instead of solicitude for European interests went out of fashion with the Model T Ford. . . . When the history of the war is written, it will probably be found that the real enemies of the United States, the ones who brought the greatest calamity on the country were, ostensibly, in the service of the Government."

In a talk on August 25, Constance Drexel discussed German speculation to the effect that the United States Government "*deliberately sent*" the ship *American Legion* "through the war zone in the hope that it might create an international incident which would arouse American opinion to the point of entering the war. . . . The average (German) voices the suspicion that the American Government, or, more specifically, President Roosevelt himself, is responsible for this strategic move in his determination to immerse America in the war against Germany." Commenting on the "dictatorial" defense bill, Ward asked on August 29: "Is it any wonder in Germany and elsewhere the question is being asked: is the United States a democracy any longer?"

Following the Anglo-American destroyer-base exchange of September 3, American sentiment in favor of Britain could no longer be gainsaid. The German radio now turned to this sentiment with a new argument. On August 28, Koischwitz had introduced and half-heartedly dismissed as fantastic the idea that the United States had encouraged Britain to declare war, and had given her aid only to exhaust both Britain and Germany in order to clear the way for American world domination. After the destroyer exchange, he discussed the idea in all seriousness on September 20 and 21. The indication was clear and remarkable: America could best help Britain by not helping her.

RETURN TO EARLIER APPEALS

The Reich's radio efforts to stimulate and keep alive ill will between the United States and Britain had declined after the aerial "invasion" began on August 8. To be sure, Lord Lothian, the Brit-

ish Ambassador in Washington, was assailed as "Propagandist-for-War No. 1" in the United States; German broadcasters maintained that the reported sinking of a British ship with English children aboard was probably a fiction concocted by the British to embroil America in war. Despite these continuing allegations about the sinister intent of British propaganda, most British material was reminiscent of a much earlier period. On September 16, for example, Dr. Koischwitz returned to an idea voiced nearly seven months before: "Confidentially . . . Englishmen . . . detest the American language, which they call 'slanguage.' "

Discussion of German-American relations likewise did not revolve so closely as before about the possibility of American intervention. Here, too, there was a return to earlier appeals. According to a discussion of "Economic Problems" on September 4, for example, Germans were "fighting the same fight for Germany which George Washington fought for America."

Something had occurred to change the German campaign. Did the Anglo-American destroyer-base exchange persuade the Propaganda Ministry that Berlin's hostile tone should be modified? Or was the soft pedal applied to provide the proper introduction to the *fortissimo* of the totalitarian triple pact? At any rate, a general deflation of attention to the United States began about September 1.

At this time, too, the highly specific campaign against American leadership was abandoned. By contrast with the *American Legion* incident, the destroyer-base agreement actually provoked a compliment: "You can't beat a Yankee in a horse trade." References to America now began to have a ring reminiscent of Lord Haw-Haw's earlier broadcasts to Britain. Having put aside, if only for the time being, its most strenuous efforts to stimulate a division between "the politicians" and "the people," the German radio attempted to create cleavage based on race and economics.

FOMENTING DISCORD

On September 1, "Sinister Sam," a Haw-Haw colleague borrowed by the North American service, devoted his weekly talk for the seventh consecutive time to Jews, relating them now more closely to the American scene: "The Jews are the enemies of man-

kind, the enemies of that better world of friendship and love that every decent man and woman in America and elsewhere hopes and strives for." On September 22, "Sam" gave Americans a word of advice: "Maybe you think that Jews do not aspire to political rule. . . . Read their books and those publications which are meant for their own race, and in which they speak freely. You would be astonished and probably alarmed about their dreams of world power." The nightly commentary on "Economic Problems" also turned to the American domestic scene, saying, for example, "It is true . . . in America there are many people who regard every kind of honest work, especially manual labor, as barbaric. . . . Such classes of people are able to live with their families and heirs on the labor of others." On September 23, "Economic Problems" explained a further misery of the masses, "All endeavors of official American organizations to fight disease and crime among the population of America have so far turned out to be futile, since one did not succeed to build proper dwelling quarters for the great masses. And yet, tremendous sums of money are being spent in order to remove slums. . . . The greatest part of this money . . . went into the pockets of real-estate speculators."

Lest internal dissension should not appear as a result of these ministrations, German propaganda and the German radio finally relied on fear. Two weeks before the signing of the German-Italian-Japanese pact directed chiefly against "any power not now at war" with the signers, the German radio instituted a new program, characteristically entitled, "Hot Shots from the Front." Consider a "hot shot" of October 13, in which a regular announcer put himself in the place of a pilot participating in an air raid over the English port of Hull: "A hail of a hundred bombs—of thousands of incendiary bombs of all sizes—goes down carrying disaster and destruction. Then from the harbor of Hull, an inferno of flames shoots up. Fires flicker in the night. . . . Yellow and red, it is burning down there. Greenish-blue flames lick between the piers. . . . A gigantic, apparently growing conflagration rolls on far below us. . . . The whole suggests a disturbed ant-hill. . . . The claws of the German eagle are sharp."

BERLIN EXPLAINS ALL

For about two weeks following the announcement of the triple pact, "Hitler weather" did not prevail in the ether. By the time that the German North American Service was clearly audible again, Berlin speakers were explaining that the pact was primarily economic: it was thrust upon the signatories by the necessity for competing with British and American industrialization; it was directed chiefly against "British commercial piracy."

Nevertheless, criticism of America bounded to a point even above its previous peak. Recalling the experience of the *Literary Digest*, Kaltenbach remarked on October 14: "The American people are supposed to believe, on the findings of the Gallup poll, that the majority of the American people want every aid given to England short of war. . . . The only question in my mind is whether the public interviewed in this connection really represents a cross section of American opinion." Using Bernard Baruch and Governor Lehman of New York as examples, "Sinister Sam" asserted that chief "among the loud-voiced pro-English sympathizers . . . are men of the Jewish race and their Christian friends in the foreground." That political candidates could be included in the group was suggested by E. D. Ward on October 30: "Hypodermics of hysteria poison . . . have been systematically and persistently injected into the minds of the American people in recent months . . . to aid (the) campaign."

On October 18, E. D. Ward sharply attacked the defense program as a "palpable subterfuge for goading a nation into a fever of hysteria. . . . Let no one mislead you as to the purpose back of all this disguised defense. . . . Change the names, the dates, the serial number and you have the same story that was written 22 years ago. . . . It happened before, didn't it?" On October 30, less than an hour before President Roosevelt was to make a speech in Boston on the preannounced topic of aid to Britain, Ward remarked, "when the addresses . . . made on the American radio and the campaigners tell of the assistance being rendered to Britain and also to France, make a mental note of it, that so far the assistance to France is nil." On November 6, German news

broadcasts explained that the election was a "purely American affair" and that the breaking of the third-term tradition seemed quite "in line . . . with such political changes as the remaking of the Supreme Court." To Ward, the election was "no surprise," and the reason was simple: Roosevelt had been reelected through the efforts of the "Administration . . . machine" and profit-hungry munitions makers.

GERMAN PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

This, in part, was how German radio broadcasts had sought to mold opinion in the United States during nearly a year of war. Quite possibly without realizing it, American listeners had felt at first hand the "psychological warfare" so well publicized in its European application. By a ratio of better than three minutes of broadcasting time to one, the German radio had concentrated on a negative drive: to destroy pro-British rather than create pro-German feeling. A surface technique used to paralyze possible American action was simple name-calling, with frayed adjectives already familiar in National Socialist idiom being attached to unfriendly elements. An occasional technique was to confuse, most spectacularly in the case of the "Fifth Column," for which the Berlin radio gave four different definitions almost simultaneously. Reserved for great occasions was frightfulness, used before the triple pact and also just before Hitler's peace offer of July 19.

A basic and familiar technique was the attempt to atomize and divide the opposition by creating friction among its component groups: national, as in the case of Britain and America; economic, as in the case of America's "classes" and "masses"; and racial, as in the frequent references to Jew and Gentile and, on at least two occasions, white man and "nigger." Equally basic was the constant appeal to various self-interests and loyalties: loyalties, for instance, to isolationist Anglophobe tradition, to Christian ideals, to the pocketbook and, apparently *in extremis*, to Britain herself.

In the fourteenth month of war, the chief difference between German broadcasts to Britain, an avowed enemy, and those to the United States was one of quantity rather than quality. The same classic arguments and techniques had been applied to both audi-

encies; even inequalities in the frequency of use made of such techniques was disappearing. During November, criticisms of America occurred nine times as frequently as they had eleven months earlier. Of Germany's anxiety about America's possible influence on the outcome of war, and of the Reich's hostile attitude toward the United States, there could no longer be any doubt.

WANTED: RADIO CRITICS

By ROBERT J. LANDRY

Of all the established arts, radio broadcasting alone has no adequate corps of professional critics. Yet it reaches more people today than any other medium of communication and is one channel for ideas which must be kept unclogged if democracy is to survive. The radio editor of *Variety* discusses the need for professional radio criticism and demonstrates how critics might help in bringing the broadcasting art to maturity and protecting the industry against inimical tendencies.

IT is, I believe, regrettable that there is so little published radio criticism in the United States. This scarcity exists at a time in the cultural development of America when publications of all kinds deem it appropriate to probe for form and technique and significance in such esoteric arts as the ballet, the cantata, drypoint etching, woodcarving and the "gutbucket jive" of frenzied Negro trumpeters in obscure dives. Criticism is rampant in the presence of unabashed "stage turkeys" and even the B (for bad) movie is given serious, straight-faced criticism. As for books which come off the literary belt-line like V-8's in Dearborn, the critics stand in queues to receive their assignments and give their solemn pronouncements even though it is an open secret that the typical offspring of press and bindery sells about 423 copies net. Meantime, the only art medium with a universal audience, the one conduit for ideas that must be kept unclogged if democracy is to survive is practically without any organized, extensive, general criticism. What little published radio comment there is is apt to be offhand, careless, and feeble.

Note, please, that I say *published* criticism by which I mean to underscore the fact that it is printer's ink, a by-line, the stamp of responsibility, that gives the critic not only his official standing and dignity but his very existence. The act of publication not only creates the profession but engages the critic's pride in what he says and how he says it, which is the chief difference between professionalism and casual opinions given in idle conversation, or the vague faultfindings of, let us say, luncheon orators of both sexes.

The critique is printed, specific, circulated and must stand the test of disagreement and rebuttal. The published critic is himself

criticized. Both the prestige of the individual and his journal are involved, a *modus operandi* that favors standards of integrity, since in the rough-and-tumble of everyday experience nothing is so quickly called by its true name, and so thoroughly scorned, as corrupt criticism. (Stupid criticism is something else.)

Happily our American radio system is quite cleverly balanced to throw off inimical tendencies. If it continues to work as well in the future as it has in the past, we may congratulate ourselves. On the other hand, nothing in recent experience overseas encourages complacency. Radio criticism, in my theory, would merely add one further guarantee that the American air channels remain fluid and unpoisoned. That further guarantee might conceivably grow to be very important. The world gets more, not less, complicated and needs more, not fewer, fire patrols. The uncomfortable possibilities of the future need not here be labored. So long as the antagonisms remain in a state of reasonable check-and-double-check, we may perhaps safely assume that pressure groups are mutually antiseptic. We cannot, however, ignore the threats of collaborations which would not be in the general interest, which would force issues faster than we are geared to meet them. Such possibilities do not impose upon us an obligation to look for the bogey man in every new development, nor would radio critics have to be so many Horatios at the bridge. Nevertheless I urge the point that the radio channels are so important to democracy that as a nation we would be much better off to have, rather than not have, a widespread corps of professional radio watchmen.

CRACKPOTS VS. CRITICS

The radio industry is of course sensitive—sometimes too sensitive—to protests conveyed by telephone and mail. Indeed a single postcard has on occasion exercised ridiculous influence over broadcasters and advertisers alike. Comedians' jokes are blue-pencilled rigorously. The country is dotted with groups quick to pass resolutions. Newscasters reporting a German victory are accused by pro-British listeners of "gloating." If reporting a British success the same newscaster will receive abusive mail emblazoned with swastikas and marginal expletives about "soiled semites." Most of this byplay is kept within the trade. Conceding that a judicious

neglect of lunatics may be wise, it still may well be that an independent body of trained observers would relieve the industry itself of odious decisions. Radio critics could, with far better grace than networks or stations, pour that shame upon bigotry which is democracy's only effective antidote to it.

It is pertinent to recall that a skillful radio propagandist like Father Coughlin was able in his heyday to organize mass picketing against radio stations in Philadelphia, New York, or Chicago at will and to inundate congressmen with protest mail. He badgered politicians and broadcasters with partial success but, I think, the independent critic would have been less easily menaced.

The radio industry at the present time is not apt to regret the general absence of professional critics having, as they feel, their hands already full with amateur ones. Here the industry tends to confuse complaints with criticism. Many of the interests and persons who badger the networks and stations are vociferously critical, yet upon investigation their sincerity is sometimes open to question as they seem willing to settle for fifteen minutes on a coast-to-coast hookup. Much sparring with this kind of "criticism" and with this type of "critic" creates among the broadcasters a calloused attitude. They mingle critics with cranks, promoters, time-chisellers, and paid secretaries.

Industry spokesmen are prone to speak grandiosely of "the one true, the one best, the one really important radio critic"—by which they mean public opinion. Yet the broadcasters themselves are invariably suspicious and in any given "outbreak of public opinion" they will invariably look sharply behind the signals and symbols of clamor to see, if possible, who is pulling the strings.

Operating within the broad outlines of professionalism the radio critic would use criticism as a medium, not as an axe. Here we may properly note a modern phenomenon. A pressure group complains, with some plausibility, that a certain radio program situation is unbalanced and the division of air opportunities is uneven. In this complaint the pressure group and the professional critic may seem in complete agreement. The flaw from the point of view of public interest might very well consist in this danger:

the pressure group is not likely to refuse a convenient opportunity to further the very ends for which it exists and, given its own selfish advantage, it may easily withdraw its criticism and cease firing although the basic conditions of which it complained would remain unaffected. I suggest that the professional critic would be more worthy of public confidence. (This is on the assumption that radio criticism is to be a career in itself, not a stepping-stone to one.)

We might also ponder the thought that democracy is not necessarily furthered if the radio authority and the radio industry react to each other as independent entities rather than as extensions of the public will. Some shrewd kibitzing at the government-industry poker game might be one incidental virtue of radio criticism. It is worth remembering that when regulatory scandals have threatened in Washington the fact of complicity, rather than unilateral guilt, has had to be considered.

THE CRITIC AS A DEBUNKER

While direct comment upon matters of government or industry policy would be privileged to the critic only when translated into actual broadcasts, it is likely that, to cite a hypothetical case, the granting of a station license to dubiously qualified interests on a plea of devotion to public interest might thereafter be an appropriate occasion for close scrutiny of how well, or to what extent, the glib promises were carried out by the new broadcaster. Certainly the critic would, throughout the radio structure, have frequent occasion to note the contrast of lip service versus actual performance. This might not be popular with the interests involved but, contrarily, it might be in the public interest.

I repeat that, on the whole, we have put together and operated an enormously complex and flexible radio system with a minimum of faults, but we cannot overlook the basic characteristics of merchandizing on the one hand and bureaucracy on the other. Sales-management needs to be controlled and politicians are frequently willing, if they are able, to manipulate in the direction of tyranny. The professional critic would be, in his time, a master debunker of proposals that you may be sure would be given innocent labels. Also accurate appraisals of spectacular clamor as in the Orson

Welles, Mae West, and the Mexican "obscene song" cases are now extremely difficult. The chorus of expert opinion that critics would constitute would be valuable in such classic instances as an offset to those who, for selfish reasons, seek to distort and magnify the facts.

RETARDED DEVELOPMENT

Within the American broadcasting industry three trade papers, *Variety*, *Billboard*, and *Radio Daily* publish program comment. Five other trade papers, *Broadcasting*, *Tide*, *Advertising and Selling*, *Printers' Ink*, and *Advertising Age*, do not. Something less than 300 important dailies have radio columnists but very few of these are concerned beyond the inclusion of personality trivia about Kate Smith, Bing Crosby, and Jack Benny.

The radio critic has enjoyed some prestige and popularity in London where he has been regarded as an important circulation asset by publishers. The British Broadcasting Corporation programs were, before the war, subject to criticism often not less penetrating and not less scholarly than the average of stage-show criticism. This is an interesting sidelight that must be understood solely in connection with the circumstance that there is no advertising over the British airwaves and hence no disposition to publisher prejudice against "publicizing" programs.

There were of course two conspicuous deterrents to radio criticism in America during the industry's first twenty years. First, the publishers of newspapers saw no sufficient reason of self-interest for publishing reviews which, if favorable, would render comfort to a competitive advertising medium and, if unfavorable, might embroil the publication with an advertising account, officials of which would be quick to suspect spite. The second, and almost equally strong, deterrent was the general lack of respect for radio as an art, an attitude inevitably conditioned by the early purge-urging advertising excesses of cheap-tinsel-and-loud-music, red-flannel and hillbilly stuff. Newspaper publishers just would not, quite honestly, regard such radio programs as appropriate subjects for serious critiques.

Criticism, of course, is not mere fault-finding, or puffing, but intelligent examination of the whole gamut of how effects can be

obtained and ideas projected. It is a continuing study of finesse and technique.

OFFSETTING POPULARITY SURVEYS

There is a further contribution to radio's welfare that, I think, professional critics might make. Their existence and the force of their opinion might lessen the stranglehold of popularity surveys. Today the popularity survey is practically a substitute for judgment. If the research percentages are high, any kind of a program, no matter how socially questionable, is deemed confirmed in righteousness. If the percentages seem low there is, contrariwise, impatience and a quick willingness to throw out the program no matter how promising. The industry is prone to call this whole situation "response to the known will of the public." Since the surveys are not infallible, the substitution of statistical apparatus for competent judgment seems to some of us a humiliating abdication. There was wisdom in the remark of the late chairman of the FCC, Anning Prall, when he said that any broadcaster lacking an I.Q. adequate to guide him successfully to what was, as against what was not, public interest, did not have the right kind of intelligence to be a broadcaster in the first instance.

Of the American trade publications, *Variety* has devoted the greatest amount of space to reviewing and on the whole has been the most sharply critical and in consequence of this fact has been the most feared, respected and quoted. Its reviewers have sometimes gone beyond the narrow trade concept of criticism's function which usually sums up in the question: "will it help sell soap?" *Variety* has suggested on occasion that selling a lot of soap is not a sufficient excuse for the deliberate choosing of shoddy entertainment and lottery-like come-ons. It recently, for example, sounded warnings of the high element of risk in the commercial exploitation of Biblical text, especially when jazzed up to make it more melodramatic.

But a trade paper, even *Variety*, has its natural limitations, not the least of which is that the general public is not directly reached. Undoubtedly *Variety's* influence is great by virtue of its being nearly alone in forthright expression of opinion (the simple

act of candor is so rare in the world!) but some issues that arise are so transcendently important to democracy itself that other voices, many voices, are needed.

INFLUENCING SOCIAL ATTITUDES

The social (not cocktail) side of American radio is largely future tense although clues to its probable form and nature are already available. Radio in the United States has been, under advertising sponsorship, a spectacular success but it has not necessarily learned the ultimate verdict of history. If salesmanship breaks down or must be fundamentally modified its handmaiden, advertising, will be affected. For example: Some reaction may yet be felt by radio to the persistent habit of asking the purchase of goods not on a strict basis of the quality of the goods, or even the consumer's need for them, but solely as an act of appreciation, a disguised admission charge, for the show. We are perhaps too close to this new phenomenon to adequately assay its implications.

There is a second method of selling goods by radio which does not solicit gratitude, *per se*, for the enjoyment of entertainment but invites the public to participate in a game, a gamble, a spin of the wheel of fortune. A soap company gives away six \$125 diamond rings every week, in the mechanics of which operation a staff in Chicago goes through 60,000 pieces of mail each week to sift the 200 best letters and refer them to the advertising agency. The manufacturer of a stomach tablet promises to pay, without further ado, \$1,000 to any citizen chosen at random from a telephone directory and limited only by the consideration that he answer his own phone when the long-distance operator rings.

The history of American radio in its first two decades has been studded with show-your-appreciation appeals to consumer-listeners and, as a companion piece, the you-too-have-a-chance-to-win stunt. The critic might plausibly suggest that such artificial inducements to expenditure, if unrelated to need, are wasteful and undesirable. It might also be urged that the cash come-on, the free automobile, the grand tour to Bermuda, the gift out of the blue are subtle genuflections to Luck, the lazy man's idolatrous religion, and in the aggregate may widely inculcate dubious social attitudes.

EDUCATION AND RADIO

Already the earlier antagonism of broadcasters and educators has been partly reconciled in favor of a practical kind of collaboration. This collaboration is important. We have a business civilization. With all its possible flaws, it is our way of life, our going concern. Because we are temperamentally receptive to private enterprise we sanctioned a system of advertising sponsorship. But the men who were uniquely qualified to make the radio business hum were in some respects, by their very mentality and work-habits, not qualified to understand the broader humanitarian implications of the medium. That which made radio so quickly and so astonishingly successful in advertising terms was the touchstone that made it too vital and important to educational, i.e. democratic, processes to be left wholly to the uncontrolled, unrestrained, uncriticized exploitation of commercial entrepreneurs.

Given a radio system based on advertising sponsorship, my postulate is this: that such a radio structure can best remain responsive to democratic processes and responsibilities through the regular, integrated operation of three principal correctives to a rampant commercialism which, if unchecked, might lead to monopoly of the medium by the most unprincipled, hardest-hitting, best-financed merchandizers. This would be a further step in the tyranny of the few over the many. The three democratizing factors based on a foundation of competitive private enterprise are, in my theory, as follows:

1. Control, or regulation, not to be identified with censorship. This control factor is exercised in the United States, and with the usual average of bureaucratic inconsistency, by the Federal Communications Commission with an occasional obligato from the Federal Trade Commission.
2. Restraint, or enlightened selfishness, not to be confused with butter melting in the mouth. This restraint factor derives from the radio industry's healthy fear of the control, or chastisement, agencies plus the intangible, public opinion.
3. Published criticism, or responsible, professional, analytic comment.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR RADIO CRITICS

We have seen already that radio criticism is essentially a blank page yet to be written upon. What, we may well ask, should be the qualifications for radio critics? The answer to that is probably: the ability to say why things are good (why they are bad is easy) and familiarity with the nation, the world, the American people and the radio industry. I personally minimize a too intimate acquaintance with specific dramaturgic devices. A man who is over-conscious of, say, filter-mikes or board-fades or echo-chambers might be inclined to see the trees and miss the forest. It would be better to know less of petty details and more of grand sweeps.

It should be obvious that nobody can effectively approach radio criticism from a lofty highbrow perch of contempt or in sole regard to symphonic music. To do so would be equivalent to missing the whole point, of failing to see radio in its relationship to humanity. Nor will an impatient, lazy refusal to spend hours at the loudspeaker conduce to the indispensable background of familiarity necessary to write radio criticism. It is usually said that intimate knowledge of the medium is the second requisite of any criticism. The first qualification palpably is possession of a critical mind.

By *criticism* is meant an essentially urbane approach to programs from any of several possible, or combined, points of view as, for example, the sheer theatrical finesse, educational connotation, propagandistic character or social impact of programs.

At this present stage in radio broadcasting the critic would necessarily be dealing in the main with kindergarten considerations of ordinary showmanship, things that would be fairly clear to any qualified observer. In the wider application of criticism, however, attention would no doubt focus almost immediately on some of the tendencies of radio programs to spoon-feed the nation on intellectual mush almost entirely deficient in every vitamin necessary to a healthy populace capable of sustaining democracy under increasing need for clear thinking. A people enslaved by the drug of romantic escape, made easy through the magical contrivance in everybody's parlor, may well pose some questions

a little more vital than whether the actress playing Brenda Whoozis on the Peanut Scrunchies show has a good tremolo in her mid-afternoon love affair over the kilocycles.

The radio critic, if and when the breed develops, would need fairly exceptional gifts of perspective. Being neither too serious, the glaring fault of pedagogues, nor too flippant, the natural tendency of journalists, the critic would have to have a sense of relationship and proportion developed far beyond that of the early radio editors, who were former radio technicians and hence could hardly hear the programs because of sheer fascination with the mechanics of transmission. Above all the radio critic would face the obvious but important fact—it is easy to dissect the mediocre, difficult to capture the essence of merit.

A qualified corps of radio critics would certainly enhance the dignity of radio programs and help elevate standards by spot-lighting the shoddy, the careless, the incompetent, and praising the opposites. Public praise is the greatest known stimulant to professional pride among all who deal in creative or semi-creative enterprises. Individual radio critics, publicly labelled as such, and themselves subject to the responsibility and integrity of their task, would have a clarifying influence unlike the present pressure-group axe-grinding criticism which promotes confusion and is, by its very motivation, incapable of inspiring anything more than resentful defensive measures from the entrepreneurs.

Perhaps some day we may see under classified ads something to this effect:

RADIO CRITIC WANTED—Must be gentle, understanding, fond of children's programs, devoted to the finer things yet capable of listening to claptrap for hours at a time. Should be socially conscious but no business-hater, should have working familiarity with the classics, the lower middle class, the consumer movement and the Crossley Report. He must be high-minded, yet possessed of humor; he must modify his boldness with discretion; he must know acting, directing, advertising, merchandizing and orchestrating and should know about public interest, convenience and necessity. Finally he should be free of bias, a master literary stylist and willing to work for small wages; also willing to arrange free talent for the publisher's pet charity and relieve switchboard operator at lunch hour.

DEMOCRACY DEMORALIZED: THE FRENCH COLLAPSE

By EDMOND TAYLOR

There are lessons for America in the collapse of a once-mighty democracy. The author of *The Strategy of Terror* believes that French democracy collapsed because democratic morale dropped steadily lower from 1934 to 1940; that this occurred primarily because the majority will was repeatedly frustrated by its own leaders, sometimes from diplomatic or strategical necessity, sometimes from demagogic, sometimes from moral cowardice. The author was head of the Paris bureau of the *Chicago Tribune* from 1933 until 1940. As an eye-witness he observed the fall of France.

THE SO-CALLED 'collapse' of France is a subject of controversy—and sometimes very heated controversy—in this country. It is so controversial that there is not only disagreement on the causes of the 'collapse' but even in the understanding of the event itself.

If the question is approached without any political or ethical bias, it seems to me to present itself in this way: After the surrender of Paris a certain body of French opinion, represented by M. Edouard Daladier and by M. Georges Mandel among others, favored continuation of the war even if it meant the abandonment of all metropolitan territory to the enemy and the flight of the government to a colony or to England. Most of the spokesmen for this point of view had a clear realization that the Battle of France was lost and occupation of the metropolitan territory by the enemy inevitable.

In fact there had been very little difference of opinion between the opposing factions over the military realities of the situation since the beginning of the evacuation from Dunkerque. Though the truth was concealed from the general public it was realized even by the champions of resistance that the occupation of all of France by the German Army was probable, if not ineluctable, and that in view of the training and equipment of the French Army, resistance in a war of movement would imply heavy losses for the defenders. It was not even necessary to speculate upon the very uncertain factor of morale to predict the outcome of the

Battle of France. That outcome was inevitable from the superiority of the German Army in armaments, numbers and tactics. (This triple superiority, aggravated by a strategical blunder on the part of the French High Command, was also responsible for the initial German break-through, preceding the Battle of France, though the low state of French civilian and military morale was a contributory factor.)

This pessimistic view was of course accepted by the partisans of capitulation, headed by Marshal Pétain and M. Pierre Laval. It was the very basis of their policy. The champions of continued resistance, on the other hand, while they accepted the pessimistic view of the Battle of France, rejected it as a basis for policy and argued that both honor and self-interest rendered continuation of the struggle necessary—self-interest because by continuing the war from the colonies France would make possible an eventual British victory over Germany, and thus recover the occupied territory.

It might seem superficially that the difference of opinion between the two factions was essentially a strategical one, but my own conviction is that it was a political one. There is unfortunately no way of establishing this conviction. It is based on my familiarity with the French political milieu, my knowledge of the personal sentiments and convictions of the French leaders who played a decisive rôle in this drama, and the general atmosphere over-hanging the deliberations in the temporary capitals, Tours and Bordeaux, which I covered as a journalist.

"INDIVISIBLE" VS. "ETERNAL"

Though the conflict over the issue of continuing the war was a political one, it was not a conflict between Left and Right. The party of resistance mingled Leftists like Léon Blum or Pierre Cot with liberals like Herriot and reactionaries like General de Gaulle. The party of capitulation linked reactionaries like General Weygand with left-wing pacifists like Paule Faure and even Victor Margueritte. The pacifists, both the ideological and the commercial pacifists, or appeasers, had naturally been lukewarm or hostile to the war from the beginning but the generals had accepted it, all the really indigenous fascists had accepted it, and they had hon-

estly tried to win it. (The accusations of deliberate treason against men like Marshal Pétain and General Weygand I consider as worse than unfair: Stupid.)

The division was not between the Patriots and the Traitors, not even between the Stout Hearts and the Faint Hearts. Essentially it was between two concepts of the Nation, the revolutionary one, whether Jacobin or Bonapartist, and the Legitimist one.

The first concept identifies France with a political abstraction: The Indivisible Republic. For the men who believed in it, defeat could not be final so long as a sovereign French Republic existed somewhere, and in losing France they merely considered that they had lost a battle.

The ideal of the other party—their present slogan—was "Eternal France," a mystical entity existing independently of régimes and frontiers but linked in some supra-logical way with the soil of France and French blood. Historically it might be explained as a survival of monarchist attitudes in the minds of men who no longer believed in the monarchy, but politically it might be more conveniently defined as a kind of preconceptual racism.

Whatever it is, the men who held it considered the survival of some kind of French state *on French soil* absolutely essential, so essential that pride and even honor must be sacrificed to insure it, while the fact that this state would inevitably be dominated by a foreign power did not seem to them particularly grave. With the Republicans, on the contrary, it was vital that the Republic be removed from French soil to preserve it from pollution. On the concrete issue of the last-minute British offer of a federation, the Republicans could accept because it was an extension of the Republic, while the others were bound to refuse since it would swallow up France.

It is very tempting to an observer who has himself a strong democratic and anti-Nazi bias to see something pathological in the defeatist point of view which prevailed in France, and therefore to assume that the collapse of France consisted in the victory of the defeatists over the party of resistance. Strictly speaking, however, the collapse of France must be defined exclusively as the

demoralization which spread throughout the country after the acceptance of defeat as final by its leaders, and one cannot *a priori* assume that the decision of these leaders was unjustified.

Having accepted this limitation in the interests of clear thinking, it seems apparent that even though the collapse of France was not caused by a pathological state of morale, the manner in which it was brought about and the form it took revealed a sickness in the state of French public opinion.

UNITY WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM

Yet, to my mind, it is a great mistake to attribute the downfall of France to a deep schism in opinion. This schism did not prevent France from going into war and its disappearance could not have averted a military defeat. But its existence during the inactive phase of the war did unquestionably inhibit the nation's war effort and paralyze foreign policy, with the result that several possibilities for turning defeat into victory were missed.

This situation seems almost paradoxical: that the disunity in French opinion was not sufficient to make a declaration of war impossible, yet sufficient to keep the war from being waged effectively. Some of the supporters of the Vichy régime have recently put forward a thesis which would resolve the paradox if it could be accepted: that a majority of French opinion was in fact opposed to entering the war; that the country was "rushed" into war illegally by a dictatorial government.

Unfortunately—from the viewpoint of simplicity—this is sheer nonsense. I attended the session of the Chamber of Deputies in Paris at which former Premier Edouard Daladier obtained the war appropriations which constituted the parliamentary authorization to make war, and though I was struck at the time by the government's failure to ask for a vote on a formal declaration of war and attached considerable psychological importance to this detail, the issue was perfectly clear in every deputy's mind. The Chamber by a quasi-unanimous vote expressed full confidence in the government and granted the credits asked for in full realization of the fact that this vote was equivalent to a declaration of war. Further, the unanimity of opinion on the war issue among the deputies seemed perfectly sincere. There were several ovations

for the government and at least three-fourths of the Chamber must have participated in these ovations. The cheering, however, was perhaps a little perfunctory.

There can be no question but that Parliament reflected public opinion with tolerable accuracy. And Parliament was free. A deputy who might fear that he would arouse suspicion if he voted against war could have safely abstained, or at least refrained from cheering.

Though the people as a whole were probably not as unanimous on the war issue as the parliamentary vote indicated, I see no reason for assuming that a poll of public opinion would have shown any substantial degree of popular opposition to the official policy (except, perhaps, among the women who had no direct political influence since they were not voters).

A NATION OF SOMNAMBULISTS

My own efforts to discover the opinion of the Frenchmen with whom I talked encountered a remarkable difficulty: It seemed almost impossible to pin people down to a clearcut statement of their position and if one succeeded there seemed a flagrant discrepancy between the opinion and the behavior of the person interviewed. Frenchmen who said they agreed with the official decision showed not only an absence of enthusiasm but an active horror of war and a depth of despair over the prospect of it which made their professed opinion seem almost incomprehensible. The few Frenchmen I encountered who professed outright opposition to the war expressed also a fatalistic resignation to it very alien to the French political temperament.

Since there is no way of measuring shades of emotional reaction, one is obliged to depend on the subjective impressions of observers on the spot. I think most neutral observers who were in France at the declaration of war will agree in the main with the following personal impression:

"This time there were few patriots, few deserters. Except for the Communists very few Frenchmen thought that the government was wrong to declare war. Yet the vast majority answered the call to arms like somnambulists. . . . The conscripts of 1939 left behind them a peace which had become a nightmare to enter

a war still vividly remembered as a nightmare from the last one. Which was the worse nightmare was not so much a conflict between men of opposing opinions as a conflict of opposing instincts in men. . . . Individuals reacted to the war in a neurotic way, sometimes hysterically, more often stunned and apathetic, always with some awkwardness in their speech or their behavior betraying the inner contradiction."

The impression of a division of sentiment in the soul of the individual, the atmosphere of apathy and unreality, was shared, I imagine, by most neutral observers in France. These symptoms of shock abated somewhat after the first few days of war but they never disappeared entirely. The absence of enthusiasm, not only in the country at large but even in the conversation and behavior of those Frenchmen who professed to be wholeheartedly in favor of fighting the war to the end, was striking throughout the whole winter of 1939-1940. Here is how I attempted to describe the state of opinion in France in the month of February:

"Just as there is very little hatred of the enemy, so there is little enthusiasm for the war. . . . What the mass of the people in France and England think is hard to say. Everyone obviously loathes the war and would like to see peace, but I think that at least in France the feeling is still dominant that any peace negotiated with Hitler cannot be a real peace. Thanks to the wartime dictatorships, I do not see any possibility of the governments' hands being forced by an organized defeatist movement. If a free vote could be taken, I think the majority of the French people would still support the official thesis that war must go on until victory. I think the minority vote would be considerably larger than the governments care to admit. . . . The danger . . . does not lie as it did before Munich, in a movement of revolt against the governmental position, not even in a division of opinion between groups of citizens, but in the irresolution begot by the division within the minds of the men who think that the war must go on, but do not, it seems to me, think so passionately enough."

Thus between September and February the alignment of public opinion had shifted, or my estimation had been revised, since the verbal majority in favor of war had dwindled. Yet as an observer

I remained impressed less by the importance of the minority in favor of peace as by the low emotional potential of the majority in favor of war.

When the final military breakdown occurred, it is possible that the minority in favor of peace at any price in France became a majority—it was impossible for me as an observer to form an opinion on this—but more than ever before I was dominated by an impression of general apathy, confusion and despair. Indeed, in the days immediately preceding the armistice, it seemed that public opinion had ceased to exist in France, that the dominant attitude was one of abstention.

Thus, unless all my personal impressions are totally incorrect, the characteristic symptoms of the political malady with which France was stricken were apathy, absence of enthusiasm, uncertainty of aim. At least until the military disaster there never ceased to be a coherent and substantial majority on paper supporting governmental policy. In fact it is my opinion that this majority had remained intact over a period of years, yet it was a majority without conviction, and not only did it support the policies of its leaders in a lukewarm fashion, but seemingly infected its leaders with its own lack of conviction.

IDEOLOGICAL COLLAPSE

In the conduct of the war this gap between intellectual and emotional conviction in a majority of the French people and its leaders played an important rôle. It is the underlying psychological factor which explains the lack of initiative, paralyzing red-tape and sheer neglect, so frequently and legitimately cited as the causes of France's failure to prepare adequately during the inactive phase of the war. It also explains the success achieved by German propaganda in further sapping French morale. During the war, as before, France gave the impression of lacking any forceful collective will. This, if my premises are correct, was not because opinion was too evenly divided but because the substantial majority which existed had little dynamic value.

Further, while it is not strictly accurate to speak of a political collapse of France because France has ceased to be a democracy, it can be said that there was a collapse of French democrats. It is

this ideological collapse rather than the national fate of France which chiefly interests Americans, and the rest of this article will be devoted to the factors in *democratic* opinion which produced the low morale and final collapse of the party of French democracy. (I am assuming, of course, that French democrats were victims of their own weakness rather than of fate; this assumption may be gratuitous and cannot be proved, but most American readers will probably agree with it.)

In its final terms the problem seems to me as follows: In recent years there has always been a substantial democratic majority in France. This majority has shown a fair degree of cohesion but a marked absence of dynamism. Its low morale is revealed by ineffectiveness in action amounting virtually to complete paralysis at critical moments. It was, for example, chiefly the pressure of democratic opinion which forced the country into war. Yet democratic opinion did not support the war with enthusiasm and when the war led to reverses, which in the judgment of the leaders of the majority were not final, it failed to react in any way, while these leaders without even perfunctory resistance abdicated their leadership and turned over the control of the state to a hostile minority. What then are the causes of this democratic asthenia?

In *The Strategy of Terror* (which was written in France under wartime conditions) I attempted to show the rôle played by three causative factors:

1. German and Communist Propaganda.
2. The ideological confusion produced by such developments as the Soviet-German pact.
3. Lack of confidence of the people in their leaders and lack of deep faith in the ideals professed by these leaders, owing to repeated disillusionments.

Looking back on recent French history with an American perspective, it seems to me today that I exaggerated the importance of the first two factors, due doubtless to the fact that I was so intimately involved in the processes I was trying to describe. The unmistakable successes of German propaganda in France should be regarded as symptoms rather than the causes of a low

morale. The factor of ideological confusion seems also to have been secondary.

The example of England suffices, in my opinion, to show that these factors were secondary. English opinion and morale had been subjected to the same stresses as the French. During a brief visit to London in February 1940, I failed to discover any marked superiority in English morale over that of the French. Yet when I visited England in June after the collapse of France, the amelioration in English morale appeared sensational. Competent observers in London attributed this amelioration to the fact that the country had finally obtained leadership in which it had confidence.

DISTRUST OF LEADERSHIP

Thus, lack of confidence in leadership seems to have been the prime factor in the deficiency of democratic morale in France as in England, but I am not satisfied that the factor is identified with sufficient accuracy by these words. Lack of public confidence in leadership was an objective phenomenon no observer in France or England during the early stages of the war could fail to note. Yet when Frenchmen or Englishmen gave voice to this sentiment, they were expressing a subjective impression. An observer living in France, as I did, was bound to share this subjective bias and to assume, as did the men around him, that there was an objective basis for the sentiment, i.e., that leaders failed to inspire confidence because they had proved themselves unworthy of confidence.

This, however, is just as much begging the question as it is to try to reason objectively about a subjective version of the collapse of France. All that can be objectively stated is that wide sections of the French people felt that for some reason their leaders had repeatedly failed to execute the will of the electorate. They feared that this frustration was likely to continue as long as leadership remained unchanged.

Lack of confidence in leadership expressed itself in the form of two kinds of doubt: doubt as to the military efficiency of the nation's leadership, i.e., doubt of the prospects of victory, and doubt as to the positive benefits to be obtained from victory.

Doubt of the military abilities of French leaders provided a fertile soil for terrorist or defeatist suggestions of German propaganda, but in the early stages of the war these did not appear to produce any tangibly harmful effects. Much more paralyzing was the doubt as to the positive benefits of victory. It was widely felt in France that victory in the present war would not provide any permanent protection against future wars, that the sacrifice of war which the country had already been called upon to make twice in a generation would be exacted every twenty-five years or so.

Innumerable times I heard Frenchmen say: "If I did not believe that this was going to be the last European war, I would not support it. I would do everything I could to sabotage it." There was always something in the speaker's manner suggesting that in his heart he did not really believe he was fighting the last European war. This to my mind is the greatest single reason for the absence of enthusiasm for the war in France.

CONFLICTING FORMULAS

Here we come upon a conflict in opinion because, while there was only one opinion about the horror of war, there were several diametrically opposed formulas which were considered by their proponents to be infallible remedies against the horror of war. Roughly these formulas fell into two broad categories: one based on the principle that European security could only be achieved by destroying Germany as a military power; the other on the principle that security could better be achieved by the suppression of German militarism—and militarism in general—through enforcing democracy and collective security.

This division of opinion reflected an ancient and chronic conflict over foreign policy, which itself reflected a deep conflict in internal politics. It was therefore exceedingly difficult to reconcile by a synthetic compromise capable of arousing enthusiasm in both groups. The existence of a third minority group composed of Communists, Paul-Faure Socialists, and fascist-minded business interests, which favored peace at any price—or almost any price, further complicated the problem and increased the need for enthusiasm in the majority.

The problem facing the government was to whip the majority of citizens who supported the war for different reasons into a coherent group fired with the enthusiasm of the most fanatical elements in it. The majority existed and there were fanatical elements in it, fanatical democrats and fanatical conservative militarists. There was little chance of uniting the fanatical extremist poles of the majority, but it should have been possible by setting certain brakes or safeguards on the fanaticism of one pole to obtain the acquiescence of the other.

Thus the government, to capture the enthusiasm of the Left, might have formulated concrete war-aims based upon the democratization of Germany, the establishment of effective collective security, etc., but at the same time have tempered this democratic wind to the nationalistic conservatives by explicit assurances against bolshevization on the one hand or humanitarian bungling on the other. It is possible to imagine other formulas which would have left the pro-war majority intact while exploiting the enthusiasm of at least one element in it.

Instead, the government evaded the issue of war aims by formulating them in such abstract and general terms that they carried no real meaning to the man in the street—and were intended to carry none. The official statements on the purposes of the war had the effect of reassuring both poles of the majority that the government was not committed to the ideology of the opposite pole. This naturally obtained general acquiescence but failed to arouse any latent enthusiasms. The essential negativism—from the viewpoint of internal politics—of the government's stand on war-aims was emphasized by the strict censorship, decided upon in the name of unity, of any press discussion of the problem. This further damped enthusiasm.

It is not clear what the will of the majority with regard to war aims was, but in any case it was frustrated because it could not even be expressed.

BELLICISTS VS. DEFEATISTS

Much graver than this handling of the internal conflicts of the majority was the government's handling of the conflict between "bellicist" and defeatist opinion. When M. Daladier

appeared before the Chamber on September 2, 1939, to announce the dispatching of an ultimatum to Germany, he appeared as spokesman and leader of a substantial majority which favored war and which expected him to declare it. Yet he did not. Out of deference to the opinion of the defeatist minority, he adopted a procedure which dispensed with a declaration of war and left the issue technically in suspense for another twenty-four hours. The same unwillingness to go to war except as a last resort was likewise implicit in his speech, so that instead of leading his people to a crusade for France and Freedom he seemed to be appealing to them to support stoically an unavoidable catastrophe. Hence it is not surprising that to the French people war appeared as an unavoidable catastrophe—and it is difficult to arouse enthusiasm for a catastrophe. "Nous n'avons pas fait la guerre, nous avons glissé dans la guerre," was a characteristic verbal expression of the general demoralization which I heard during the mobilization period.

Looking back on it from this distance, I see something which escaped me at the time: that the ineffectiveness of Daladier's eve-of-war speech and the general ineffectiveness of French domestic war propaganda in the following months, which failed to mobilize sufficient enthusiasm and secure a sufficient release of national energies, were not so much due to ignorance of propaganda techniques as to political factors. An effective war propaganda depended upon an emotional appeal to an intellectually acquiescent and therefore suggestible majority, with the object of converting their acquiescence into enthusiasm.

The appeal was not made because it would have converted the resignation of the defeatist minority into open opposition—of which the government was terrified. As long as the war remained in the inactive phase, the defeatist elements in France—represented by men like Bonnet, Flandin, Laval—did not abandon hope of negotiating peace while still under arms. The official attitude toward this minority viewpoint was to reject all specific suggestions of negotiations with the enemy, while maintaining an atmosphere in which negotiation might have been possible, by refusing to exploit either the nationalist or the democratic

ideologies as themes of war propaganda (just as in M. Daladier's eve-of-war speech to the Chamber he had taken the steps which made war inevitable in fact, without using the words which made it seem inevitable in the public mind.)

In other words, M. Daladier and other leaders of the bellicist majority sacrificed the effectiveness of their war propaganda—which was an essential part of their war effort—so as to give the defeatist minority no excuse to attack them as war-mongers or bloody tyrants.

FRUSTRATION OF THE MAJORITY WILL

This was typical of the kind of static compromise, based on a negative denominator, between conflicting opinions which had been for years the peculiar curse of the Third Republic. If it can be taken that in a democracy sound policy expresses the will of a majority, limited or braked to some extent by the will of a minority—policies which point in the majority direction but stop short of the maximum majority goal—it might be said that the chronic error of French statesmen was to formulate policies which gave the minority a brake against any forward movement and the majority a brake against any backward movement, the result being that there was no movement at all.

The classic example of this type of policy was the Blum government's acceptance of the diplomatic fiction of non-intervention in the Spanish civil war. In this case the frustration of the majority will was implicit in the terms of the policy. In other cases the same result was achieved by nullifying policy in execution—as in the case of sanctions during the Italo-Abyssinian war by M. Laval, or in the case of aid to Finland by M. Daladier—or simply by changes in political leadership running contrary to the expressed will of the electorate.

In every case there was a nullification of the majority will imposed at the demand of a minority—usually backed by a foreign government—which reinforced minority opinion and morale *vis-à-vis* their internal adversaries but could not arouse enthusiasm—even in the minority—for national policy. Further, the decline in morale following each frustration of the popular will set up a vicious circle. The leaders, sensitive to loss of confidence among

their followers, lost confidence in themselves and were thereby impelled to new compromissions and new abdications.

Thus when M. Daladier, on the eve of war, failed for political and diplomatic reasons to mobilize French opinion for the war, the immediate result was an absence of enthusiasm, an attitude of abstention, which made France seem like a nation of somnambulists. This unsatisfactory state of morale was of course reported to M. Daladier and may have been partly responsible for his lack of vigor in prosecuting the war, which further depressed morale.

The final collapse of French morale, democratic and non-democratic, was due to a series of terrific military blows: the rupture of the frontier defenses near Sedan which annihilated the Maginot *mystique*, the basis of the nation's confidence; the Belgian default, and the invasion of all northeastern France. It is doubtful that a nation which had suffered so cruelly from invasion less than a generation ago, and had deluded herself for so long with the myth that her frontiers were now inviolable, could have withstood such a shock under any conditions. But France's morale, particularly the morale of the democratic majority in France, was anemic from a long and bitter series of frustrations.

SCANDAL AND RIOTS

One of the early events in this series was the Stavisky scandal. It will be recalled that the elections of 1932 had returned a Leftist majority—but of a pale shade of pink. With the Communists in opposition and the Socialists refusing to participate in the government, the majority of 1932 was reflected by cabinets under Radical direction with some Center participation. In February 1934 this governmental formula, as well as the general policy corresponding to it, was suddenly and radically altered, as a result of the Stavisky scandal and the resultant Sixth of February riots in Paris. Though the thesis of the French Left that the Sixth of February was a fascist plot to overthrow the Republic is a controversial one, the intention of the Right parties, conservative as well as fascist, to exploit the scandal for political ends is unquestionable in my opinion. The methods used so to exploit it consisted in a concerted and violent "smearing" campaign in the press,

accompanied by violent street demonstrations organized by the fascist leagues. The press campaign aimed at discrediting the Radical Socialist party then in power by insinuating that its leaders were frustrating police efforts to trace the ramifications of the Stavisky scandal, or even that they were outright accomplices of Stavisky. In a good part of the press the campaign went even farther than that and quite deliberately attacked the parliamentary institution itself and the Republican parties as a whole as being riddled with corruption.

The street riots in Paris occurred almost daily in a crescendo of violence. Composed at first of professionals and fanatics, the anti-government street demonstrations began attracting ever larger numbers of spontaneous followers as the unwillingness or inability of the police to suppress them became increasingly apparent. The downfall of a Chautemps government, under parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressure, and the formation of a Daladier cabinet with less of the Stavisky taint was a triumph for the parties of the Right, but, instead of appeasing them, naturally incited them to greater efforts.

The result was the great riot at the Place de la Concorde on February 6, 1934, when, through a combination of governmental ineptness and police sabotage, a huge mob got out of control and the *gardes mobiles* defending the approaches to the Chamber of Deputies were obliged to fire, inflicting heavy casualties. As the leaders of the mob—the chiefs of the fascist leagues—called for vengeance and armed resistance, the succession of riots became at last an insurrection. It remained confined to a relatively small section of Paris, however, and could have been quelled by a combination of tact and forcefulness. Instead M. Daladier, in order to avoid shedding further French blood, resigned the next day. Eventually Gaston Doumergue, a former president who had been adopted by the Right, formed a union cabinet with a balanced composition of Radicals and Rightists.

VEILED COUP D'ETAT

The successive governments which adhered to this formula followed an economic policy of deflation which represented the views of the Right and was exceedingly unpopular in the country

as proved by the Leftist landslide in the elections of 1936. Even before the government's financial policy had been announced, there was widespread indignation throughout the country at the manner in which the government had come into being. It was apparent that, despite the hysterical outcry in Paris against parliamentary corruption, public opinion throughout the country did not consider that the issue of parliamentary corruption was a really grave one and looked upon the change of cabinets as a veiled *coup d'état*. There can be little doubt that had Daladier chosen to resist, not only would he have been supported by a substantial majority of French opinion, but an armed republican mob would have arisen if necessary to drive the fascist mob off the streets of Paris.

As it was, belief that the Republic was in danger from the Right spread through the country and was chiefly responsible for the Popular Front victory in the next elections and the unfortunate drift toward radicalism.

A further setback to majority opinion was the unofficial but obvious departure from the official policy of upholding the principle of collective security, marked by the resistance of Foreign Minister Pierre Laval to the application of any effective sanctions against Italy during the Italo-Abyssinian war. Here again, though there can be no certainty, I do not think the Leftist victory in 1936 would have been possible if a majority of public opinion had approved the Laval foreign policy.

THE POPULAR FRONT

In the elections of 1936, the Left coalition—Radicals, Socialists, Communists and smaller groups—won a big parliamentary victory and rolled up a popular vote of 5,500,000 as against 4,300,000 for the Right and Center. In view of the confused electoral system used in France, it is possible that the whole Popular Front program was not accepted by all these voters. On the other hand, the minority vote does not represent a total rejection of that program either. It is further my impression that the first wave of social legislation passed by the Blum government increased the majority of opinion in favor of its program.

On the other hand, before even the first Popular Front government could take office a disastrous thing occurred. A wave of sit-down strikes, encouraged if not fomented by the Communist party in violation of the electoral pact, attempted to force the government's hand in the passage of new social legislation. (This in itself was a symptom of the decline of confidence in democratic leadership on the part of the masses.) In Paris the strike became quasi-general and the widespread use of red flags and other revolutionary symbols gave it the aspect of an incipient social revolution rather than of an industrial conflict. The wealthy classes in Paris were plunged into a state of terror which, if ludicrous, was absolutely sincere. Though the movement was in the general direction desired by public opinion, its flagrant disregard of legality was deplored by many supporters of the Popular Front and the first socialist government of France could afford less than any other to see any falsification of the democratic machinery. By their failure to control their own followers the leaders of the Popular Front, which was an authentic if somewhat extreme image of French democracy, welded the minority into a compact opposition bloc dominated by the fanatics of the Right. The result was to increase the threat of civil war which was to hang like a nightmare over all the Popular Front cabinets.

SPAIN DOWN THE RIVER

That was the first act in this political drama. The second came during the Spanish civil war when the issue of supporting the Loyalists to counter-balance Italian intervention on the side of Franco arose. Knowing the tendency of the French to identify themselves with the ideological quarrels of other countries, I think the Popular Front majority in the country can be used as a conservative yardstick to estimate the majority of French opinion in favor of some measure of aid to the Spanish Loyalists. Further, thanks to Communist propaganda which was carried on on a huge scale, I think it can be safely asserted that a large part of the Popular Front majority in the country was strongly, even passionately, in favor of aid to the Loyalists.

Hence, when the policy of non-intervention was adopted by the leaders of the majority, the result was a marked feeling of frustration and a drop in the political morale of their followers which became more pronounced as the one-sidedness of the so-called Non-Intervention Pact became increasingly apparent. The motives of the leaders in adopting this unpopular policy were mainly diplomatic. Strong pressure had been brought to bear on them by the British. However, considerations of internal politics were not absent. As a socialist and a Jew, M. Blum unquestionably feared to give the Right press any excuse for tacking the label "war-monger" on him—as they did anyway. Further, he wished to give the Right some tangible assurance that he was not leading a social revolution, and sacrifices appeared easier in the sphere of foreign policy than in the sphere of domestic policy.

This reasoning might have been justified if the Popular Front had fulfilled its mandate from the people and executed its whole program. Instead, under the impact of an organized flight of capital, a violent propaganda campaign in the Right press and the threat of civil war from armed fascist leagues, the more moderate supporters of the Popular Front began to waver and the government was defeated in the Senate on a request for extraordinary financial powers which the Chamber had accorded. Legally M. Blum could have overridden the Senate if the Chamber continued to support him. Traditionally he should have asked for a dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Instead, without any thorough attempt to sound public opinion which may have veered toward the Right but probably had not, M. Blum resigned, yielding to the pressure of an invisible mob which the indiscipline of his own supporters had helped to raise.

The governments which succeeded him preserved the political fiction of the Popular Front but neither in composition nor policies reflected the electoral majority of 1936. Democratic enthusiasm fell to a low in the history of the Third Republic and there was a further drift toward radicalism—in the polar forms of fascism and communism—both on the right and left wings of the majority, which rendered the political problems of France ever more difficult to solve.

The impact of Munich on national morale was particularly grave because it followed by only a few months the debacle of the Popular Front. It is impossible to assert categorically that majority opinion opposed compromise in this case but there was, after Munich, a widespread reaction of suspicion and a corresponding drop in morale. Here the error seems to have lain not so much in nullifying the majority will as in confusing public opinion by rapid reversal of policy and by flagrant contradictions between word and deed.

FRUSTRATION ON FRUSTRATION

To recapitulate:

In 1934 democratic leadership, through timidity or necessity, abdicated in face of an insurgent minority and turned over power to a compromise formation which proceeded to nullify the majority will—as expressed in the last elections—in both home and foreign policy.

In 1936 majority opinion, in reaction to this development, reasserted itself by electing more vigorous leaders tending to extremism.

In 1937 these new majority leaders capitulated in the face of a threatened revolt, after having through timidity or necessity nullified the popular will in regard to foreign policy. The new governmental formation dissatisfied majority opinion as resembling too closely the discredited leadership of 1932-1934.

In 1938 the neo-Popular Front régime through strategic and diplomatic necessity reversed its standing foreign policy and accepted diplomatic defeat under circumstances which majority opinion regarded as politically suspicious.

In 1939 the country was led into war in accordance with the convictions of the majority, but diplomatic and political considerations were allowed to inhibit the formulation of a war philosophy consonant with majority opinion. Further, the war cabinet did not reflect public opinion in its composition.

In 1940, through strategic necessity, assistance to Finland, demanded by public opinion and promised by the government, was withheld. Public opinion protested so strongly that leadership was changed. Morale immediately improved but collapsed shortly

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afterward under a series of terrific reverses which political leadership was powerless to avert. Democratic opinion and democratic leadership then revealed themselves as too weak to withstand the stress of defeat.

COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRATIC MORALE

In short, French democracy collapsed because democratic morale between 1934 and 1940 dropped steadily lower, while anti-democratic morale rose steadily higher. And this happened primarily because democratic opinion was repeatedly disregarded and nullified by democratic leaders.

Various factors were responsible for this. For one thing the technical defects of the French parliamentary and electoral system and the confusion of French political terminology rendered virtually impossible the clarification of issues without which public opinion is meaningless. In the case of the Popular Front, for instance, the inclusion of the Communist Party in the democratic majority was a source of endless and disastrous confusion, since the Communist conception of democracy was obviously incompatible with that of the rest of the majority. Conversely, Grand Orient Masonry, which had played such a big part in the creation of the Third Republic, played an important rôle in its downfall by constantly preaching capitulation in the name of some mystic principle of harmony (notably during the Sixth of February riots and at the time of Munich).

Sometimes the diplomatic and strategical realities of the European situation made it impossible to follow policies demanded by public opinion. Sometimes demagogic was to blame, i.e., opinion demanded policies which would have contradicted or nullified other policies which it supported with equal fervor.

In nearly every case, however, some lack of moral courage on the part of democratic leaders was at least a contributory factor. This was particularly striking in the cases of men like Daladier, Blum and Chautemps who had been the victims of mob violence and savage campaigns of hate propaganda, organized by a ruthless, unscrupulous and strategically placed minority. In analyzing the weaknesses of these typical French bourgeois and of the French

bourgeoisie in general, the field is open to the psychoanalyst and the philosopher.

But after the military lesson—which supersedes all others—it seems to me that the immediate and practical lesson of the French collapse is this: In a democratic country there is an intimate relation between opinion and morale and the morale is good only when the fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy—majority rule within constitutional and reasonable limits—is observed.

America Faces the War: Shifts in Opinion

By Hadley Cantril, Donald Rugg,
and Frederick Williams

By early October, the course of the war in Europe and the Tokyo-Rome-Berlin Pact had swung American opinion sharply toward greater aid to Britain and a firmer stand against Japan in the Far East. These and other trends of American opinion in connection with the war, from mid-summer to October 15, are described in this second report of the Princeton Public Opinion Research Project, the first of which appeared in the September issue of the *QUARTERLY*. The Project is financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and gathers its data through the facilities of the Gallup poll.

IN THE first report of the Princeton Public Opinion Research Project, American public opinion with respect to the war was separated into three opinion clusters—isolationist, sympathetic, and interventionist—on the basis of respondents' answers to two questions, as shown in Table 1.

What has happened to the proportions of the population who fall into these three opinion groups now that

the American people have sat on the sidelines for another two months watching the Battle of Britain? Chart I clearly reveals that the course of the war has not left Americans unaffected. The isolationist group has been reduced by half its early summer size, while the interventionist pattern (those who think it is more important to help England even at the risk of war than it is for this

TABLE I

Which of these two things do you think is more important for the U.S. to try to do?

At the present time, which of the following should the U.S. do about helping England?


To keep out of war ourselves

Do less or no more than we are now doing ISOLATIONIST
Do more than we are now doing SYMPATHETIC

To help England win, even at the risk of getting into war

Do more than we are now doing INTERVENTIONIST

CHART I. SHIFTS IN ATTITUDE PATTERNS, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1940



country to stay out of war, and who also feel that we are not now doing enough to help England) has swollen until it now includes over one-half the population.

Where has this shift in sentiment occurred? The most significant geographic increase in the desire to help England is found in the Rocky Mountain states. Chart II shows the present sectional variations in isolationist and interventionist sentiment.


The South and Southwest continues to be most belligerent in its attitude, the East Central and West Central states least interventionist. People from small towns have joined the interventionist camp more rapidly than city-dwellers. The bulk of the interventionists continues to be drawn from the middle and upper income people over thirty, while young people from the upper class continue to be most isolationist in their attitudes.

Frames of Reference

When the opinions of individuals who fall into these three clusters are

compared on a wide variety of issues, it is clear that a person's opinions concerning the war are merely reflections of a single or a very few pervasive, deeply rooted frames of reference. Even a cursory glance at Table 2 will show how consistently the interventionists and isolationists differ on the issues listed. If a person believes the United States should not help England, he is also likely to believe, for example, that we should not run any risk of war in the Far East.

Because specific opinions are derived from more basic standards of judgment, the strategy of the Tokyo-Rome-Berlin Pact of September 27, 1940—apparently designed to frighten American public opinion from its desire to help England, by intensifying the threat of trouble with Japan—seems so far to have failed. As the following figures show, the pact and related events more than doubled the number of people ready to risk war to curb Japan, while during the same period the number of those ready to risk war to help England mounted significantly.



Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do: (1) To keep out of war ourselves; (2) To help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war?

TABLE a

Issues	Isol.	Symp.	Inter.	Ratio	Rank order
In order to help England, the law should be changed so England could borrow money from us	14%	41%	64%	4.6	1
Think the U.S. should send more planes to England even though this might delay our own defense	18	45	70	3.9	2
Think England will win the war	23	43	59	2.6	3
Think Germany would start a war against the U.S. in the next ten years	33	54	72	2.2	4
If Germany wins the war, U.S. should stop trade and diplomatic relations with Germany	12	19	25	2.1	5
Think England should continue to fight Germany and Italy, rather than making peace now	43	68	87	2.0	6
Would be personally affected by a German victory	43	63	85	2.0	6
If it appears certain that England will lose unless we send materials, we should give more help	49	91	98	2.0	6
Think it more important for England to win than for their candidate to be elected	29	49	57	2.0	6
Think U.S. should risk war if necessary to keep Japan from getting control of China	9	8	18	2.0	6
Think the U.S. will go into the war	30	34	53	1.8	7
Think Germany will try to get control of the South American countries	48	67	81	1.7	8
U.S. should buy S.A. farm products to keep Germany from getting control of S.A. trade	34	52	59	1.7	8
If clear that Germany is getting control of S.A., U.S. should send army and navy there	47	67	80	1.6	9
Favor increasing army and navy by drafting men 18-32 to serve in armed forces for one year	54	67	79	1.5	10
Willing to pay considerably more taxes to meet cost of national defense program	59	73	87	1.5	10
Would favor U.S. declaring war on Germany now, if sure Germany would attack us after England	41	45	63	1.5	10
Think government control of industry should be increased in connection with national defense	44	54	62	1.4	11
Think Roosevelt would handle our country's foreign affairs better than Willkie	45	58	62	1.4	11
If Germany does try to get control of S.A., the U.S. should do something about it	66	80	88	1.3	12

The percentages indicate the proportion of each of the three groups in favor of the issue listed. The fourth column is the ratio of the interventionist to the isolationist vote on each question. The fifth column gives the rank order of the ratios.

		July*	October†
Keep out		59%	36%
Help England		37	59
No opinion		4	5
Do you think the United States should let Japan get control of China, or do you think we should risk a war with Japan to keep the Japanese from controlling China?			
		July*	October†
Let Japan control		47%	30%
Risk war if necessary	12	29	
Other	16	15	
No opinion	25	26	

Values Behind Opinions

What lies behind the two extreme opinion patterns? Particularly noticeable (Table 2) is the fact that four times as many interventionists as isolationists would be willing to have this country loan money to England, or to send more planes to England even if our own defense program were delayed. Over twice as many interventionists as isolationists feel it is more important for England to

win the war than for their favorite Presidential candidate to be elected. When economic status and age are held constant, we find that more interventionists than isolationists in any economic-age group preferred Roosevelt to Willkie (Table 3).

It is clear, then, that those whom we have classed as "isolationists" do believe that what happens within our own borders is more important to them than what happens abroad.

It is significant, however, that the opinions of isolationists are not influenced by fear that family members would be involved in active war duty. It was reported earlier¹ that a

* The ballot on which this question appeared was sent out to interviewers on July 20; interviewing was conducted over the next ten days.

† The ballot on which this question appeared was sent out to interviewers on September 30; interviewing was conducted over the next ten days.

¹ Rugg, D., and Cantril, H., "War Attitudes of Families with Potential Soldiers," *PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY*, 1940, 4: 327-330 (June 1940).

TABLE 3
Percentage of Interventionists and Isolationists Favoring Roosevelt, with Economic Status and Age Held Constant

		Interventionist	Isolationist
Upper Income Group			
Under 30		42%	26%
30-49		38	25
50 and over		32	22
Middle Income Group			
Under 30		57	48
30-49		56	43
50 and over		49	34
Lower Income Group			
Under 30		69	56
30-49		72	64
50 and over		66	60

month after the outbreak of war no differences were found between the attitudes of persons with family members of military age and persons who have no such family members. This finding still holds, even though the likelihood that the United States may enter the war is felt by the public to be greater now than it ever has been (58 per cent of the total as of September 30). Apparently, then, the lack of relationship between opinions toward the war and the possibility that a family member will become directly involved as a cog in the military machine is not due entirely to the fact that the war is still regarded as remote and impersonal. It seems more likely, as was suggested before, that "acquired social values for many persons may be more highly cherished than more personal values and attachments to loved ones." Hence, if a person identifies himself with these values, they—rather than personal attachments—will determine specific opinions.

For the isolationists, the prospect of a German victory (which they believe is likely) is not particularly disturbing. In answer to the question, "At the present time, do you find yourself worrying more than usual about your own future?" fewer isolationists than interventionists say that their worries are greater now than usual. Only half as many of them as the interventionists believe that Germany would start a war with this country if she were victorious in Europe, or that they themselves would be personally affected by a German victory. The English should give up now, say a majority of isola-

tionists, while only half of them, as contrasted with nine-tenths of the interventionists, think we should help England more, even if it appears certain she will lose the war unless our help is forthcoming. And if Germany wins, twice as many isolationists as interventionists believe this government should continue trade and diplomatic relations with the victor.

On the other hand, isolationists as well as interventionists see their self-interest involved when issues are confined to this hemisphere. Least differences in opinions are found on questions concerning national defense and on the desirability of taking action to stop German penetration in South America. The rank order of the ratio of the differences between the opinions of isolationists and interventionists (Table 2) reveals that differences of opinion become greater as the source of potential involvement becomes further removed from the Americas.

At present people in this country are almost unanimous in their desire for a strong national defense program and in their willingness to make some sacrifice for it; at least two thirds of them extend their psychological space of self-interest as far south as Cape Horn and are willing to defend with arms any encroachment upon it; about 60 per cent are willing to risk war to preserve the values with which they identify themselves and which they see threatened across the Atlantic; while the values of only about 30 per cent extend across the Pacific with sufficient intensity to justify possible military conflict.

PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES

The Brewing Industry's Program of Action

By Carl W. Badenhausen

The Chairman of the United Brewers Industrial Foundation describes the brewing industry's answer to a difficult public relations problem. The author is President of P. Ballantine & Sons, one of the country's largest brewing enterprises.

Most great industries supplying products which fill human wants and needs encounter problems in public relations which, in the main, are similar. Some industries, however, by their nature are faced with special problems. Among these may be mentioned the defense-material industries, and the distilling and brewing industries.

Private industries producing defense material are opposed by a powerful section of public thought which has been led to believe that munitions manufacture should be government-controlled. Another vigorous group feels that prohibition of defense-material manufacture would automatically end war.

A problem somewhat like that of the defense industries confronts distillers, brewers and vintners. Groups which refuse to acknowledge that

their one taste of success—the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution—wrecked payrolls, investments and lives, and brought general disrespect for law and order, are campaigning for a second opportunity to destroy these industries.

Brewing has another individual problem. The product of the brewers, classified as an alcoholic beverage, contains an average of 3.6 per cent alcohol. This moderate percentage is produced by natural fermentation under scientific control. Distillation, an added process, produces the higher percentages of alcohol found in liquors. Because of this, brewers seek public recognition of the moderate nature of beer in distinction to other beverages containing alcohol. Here, the brewing industry encounters resistance on the part of Prohibitionists, who level their

anti-liquor shotgun all-inclusively, intending to bag beer in the pattern of the exploding shell.

Yet another problem is posed by the laws which came into effect in 1933 and 1934 to govern the manufacture, distribution, retail sale and use of beer and ale. Prior to the Eighteenth Amendment, many so-called "saloons" were "tied-houses"—outlets owned or partly owned by breweries. To eliminate the "tied-house," most State laws now forbid any financial association between brewer and retailer. Consequently, responsibility for conduct in a licensed retail outlet rests solely upon the retailer, and thus in his hands is placed the entire future of the billion-dollar industry. Public opinion does not look to the brewer, but rather at the retail outlet, when it decides whether there shall be another Prohibition Era—local, State or national.

To meet these problems peculiar to the industry, a group of brewers and allied supply industries maintain the United Brewers Industrial Foundation. An educational organization, the Foundation's policy is that of interpreting the industry to the public, and at the same time bringing to the industry an understanding and appreciation of the nature of public opinion.

The Foundation was formed in 1936, and is now operating under a complete program of public relations activities adopted in 1938. This article is a brief résumé of the past two years' work of the Foundation, and statistics herein are as of November 2, 1940.

Schooling the Public

The recent proposal of Reginald H. Cole, in charge of enforcement of the alcoholic beverage laws and regulations in Vermont, for a ten-year armistice on the alcoholic beverage issue, poses many difficulties. However, it has the great merit of singling out one of the great faults in transition from theoretical Prohibition under the Eighteenth Amendment to regulation as enabled under the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution. The period of the "armistice" would be used to school the public in the uses and abuses of beverages containing alcohol, and presumably in replacing emotion by knowledge in determining the place of these beverages in American life.

That such educational methods are necessary, if facts are to be the cornerstone of public opinion, was acknowledged by the brewing industry within a few years after the industry was re-legalized.

When the Congress re-legalized light beer on April 7, 1933, and again when the Eighteenth Amendment was formally repealed eight months later, the hope uppermost in the American mind and in the minds of legislators was that the abuses which accompanied Prohibition would vanish automatically.

By and large, an excellent job was done in drawing up the laws of the States to regulate the dispensing of alcoholic beverages—considering that no adequate changeover from Prohibition to legalization had been worked out, that for revenue purposes haste was apparently essential, and that the public had had no

opportunity to divest itself of habits of drinking and lawbreaking fostered by conditions under the Eighteenth Amendment and the criminal gangs which flourished during the "experiment."

Agencies of State governments were given power to issue and revoke brewing, wholesaling, and retailing licenses. Stringent restrictions barred the brewer and wholesaler from having financial interest in retail establishments. Business was re-established and progressed to the point at which legal beer provided a means of collecting taxes which totaled more than a million dollars a day. Part of the slack in employment was taken up, and many industries benefited.

Specific Evils

After three years, however, brewers realized that here and there the public was apparently becoming dissatisfied with the conditions in retail outlets. A survey showed that the public resented conditions in certain types of places which had been licensed to sell beer—and other beverages—at retail.

The public's indignation—manifested in local option elections prohibiting sale of liquors, wines and beer—dealt with matters specifically outlawed by regulation or law: Sunday sales, serving of minors or intoxicated persons, employment of minors, solicitation, treating, disorder, gambling, obscure booths, employment of felons, serving of persons receiving charity, women at bars, music and dancing.

It appeared that these were the evils against which the State legisla-

tures and the public wished to guard, but that when they happened to be associated with beer, beer received the blame for causing them! Thus, with the brewers removed from control of retail outlets, responsibility for the industry's future rested with the retailers alone, and a handful of them were causing public discontent.

These studies brought a clear picture of the industry's task: it must do whatever it could to help the public shed its "Prohibition habits" of breaking laws with which it felt it had no concern; it must educate retailers to their responsibilities or suffer for their misdeeds.

The United Brewers Industrial Foundation undertook to deal with these problems, and the result is the program of which "industry self-regulation" has become an important and expanding part.

Self-Regulation

Self-regulation was first tried in Nebraska in June 1938. Nebraska was selected because conditions there were typical of the national average, and because of Nebraska's reputation as a proving-ground for many important social and administrative experiments.

With the cooperation of brewers doing business in the State, and wholesalers licensed by the State, the Nebraska Brewers and Beer Distributors Committee was formed. An executive committee of brewers and wholesalers was chosen by the membership, which represented 95 per cent of the beer distributed in Nebraska, and an outstanding Nebraskan was engaged as State Director of the Committee.

First, a word about this man, Charles E. Sandall, of York. He had served two terms as United States Attorney, prosecuting bootleggers and law-breakers during Prohibition. He had been a member of the State Senate, and had also served on Nebraska's Supreme Court Commission. He was known throughout the State for his character and energy—and he took the job only when he was convinced that the brewing industry was sincere in what it planned to do.

The Nebraska Program

The Nebraska Brewers and Beer Distributors Committee planned to do this:

1. Educate the retailers and inform the public as to their responsibilities with regard to Nebraska's alcoholic beverage laws and community conditions.
2. Withhold supplies of beer from retail licensees who failed to observe the laws by permitting or encouraging law-violations.
3. Seek the revocation of licenses of retailers who persisted in condoning or committing such violations.

The State was mapped into seventeen districts or trade areas, and in each district the wholesalers became members of a district committee. Their special function was to observe conditions and to assist Mr. Sandall in bettering them where necessary. They were also to refrain from attempting to interfere or intercede should the State Director consider drastic action advisable.

This plan was undertaken on the premise that, although withdrawing beer from law violators would not be

likely to improve the moral tone of offending outlets, the brewing industry would forego sales in order to remove its product from any spot in which beer could be denounced as having a hand in disorder.

Cooperation was offered to and accepted by local authorities as well as the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission. Retail licensees were advised of the Committee's formation. Retailers who failed to cooperate with the public, the industry and the Liquor Control Commission by "cleaning up" violations noted on their premises were quickly to learn that the Committee was no false façade.

When Liquor Control Commission agents were assaulted in a tavern shortly after the Committee's organization, Mr. Sandall informed Committee members and they voluntarily withheld beer supplies from the proprietor. The retailer's license was revoked by the Commission. This undoubtedly would have resulted whether or not the Committee members had acted; nevertheless, it was a test that demonstrated industry sincerity. The Omaha *World-Herald*, in an editorial commenting on the Committee's action, hailed the incident as "the dawn of a new day in the beer branch of the liquor trade."

Retailer Cooperation

Mr. Sandall directed investigation of all outlets called to his attention. Corrections were tried, with gratifying results. It was found that the great majority of retailers, once aware of the burden resting on their shoulders, were only too willing to cooperate. They began to realize that elimination of outlets permitting im-

proper practices would react to the benefit of the retailers observing the laws. Also, they acknowledged that, in the beer retailing business, community sentiment is always right and the customer all too frequently wrong.

Another test came when a retailer who found himself without beer sued for damages, charging restraint of trade. When the case reached trial and the jury learned what the Nebraska beer industry was trying to accomplish, the verdict was returned in favor of the Committee, establishing the first court precedent in the campaign for high retailing standards.

By Committee advertising of the work it was doing, and by spontaneous news stories generated by Committee action, the public was advised of its responsibility—that of conducting itself properly and patronizing only those licensed beer establishments which observed the law.

At the end of the first full year of the Committee's work in Nebraska, Mr. Sandall received from the Chairman of the Liquor Control Commission a letter stating: "We would be negligent, indeed, if we failed to express to you our appreciation of the work your organization has done."

National Program Develops

Having followed closely the experiment in Nebraska for six months, the brewing industry throughout the United States concluded that this self-regulation activity dealt simultaneously with the necessity for informing the public about the industry and for giving industry help to authorities to control or eliminate the

"black sheep" dispenser who had been granted a retail license.

As a consequence, the United Brewers Industrial Foundation adopted self-regulation as part of its basic policy. Beginning in 1939, the self-regulation idea was explained to the industry in other States, and was gradually placed in operation. As the program broadened, Attorneys-General strengthened it when, in response to requests by State officials, they ruled that it is legally permissible in the public welfare for members of the industry to cease selling beer to known law violators.

The States in which the brewing industry now has adopted self-regulation are Nebraska, Kansas, Alabama, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arizona, Arkansas, Maine, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia and Mississippi. As the industry's facilities permit, this number will be increased.

A few of the activities of the industry committees in these States, in pursuance of the "greater respect for law and order" enjoined in the Presidential Proclamation of the Repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, will give some point to this explanation of the brewing industry's program.

Examples of Self-Regulation

In Mississippi, where beer is the only legal alcoholic beverage, a college student was slain in a roadhouse of the "jook-joint" or "honky-tonk" type in Lowndes County, bordering Alabama in the northeast. Petitions were at once circulated for an election to outlaw beer, the inference being that beer alone had caused the tragedy.

As it happened, the State Director of the Brewers and Mississippi Beer Distributors Committee had been aware that a good many things besides beer were dispensed by several roadhouse outlets in the vicinity, and he had previously helped bring about the revocation of two licenses in Lowndes County. He and the distributors of beer in the area now decided that far-reaching action was in order.

The distributors at once stopped sales of beer to nine places, including the one in which the fatal shooting had occurred. Local officials followed with raids and padlock orders. Six of the "hot spots" were put out of business with evidence of law violations. Conditions became better than normal, and when newspapers emphasized that beer was not to blame for the shooting, no action resulted on the local prohibition election petitions.

Beer of 3.2 per cent alcoholic content is the only legalized alcoholic beverage in Kansas. In that State, it is illegal for licensed beer retailers to possess the \$25 Federal tax stamp issued to those handling beer, wine and liquors; the \$20 Federal malt beverage tax stamp alone is legal. Suspicious of the intent of several hundred retailers who had paid \$25 for the illegal receipt, the Kansas Committee's State Director informed Kansas enforcement authorities of the names of the holders of the illegal stamps. Approximately 100 dealers have since exchanged their \$25 stamps for the \$20 variety, or had local permits refused.

In Huntsville, Alabama, an influ-

ential citizen interceded for a retailer who had been cited to appear before the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board as a result of evidence gathered by the Alabama Committee. When the State Director explained his case to the citizen in private, the latter withdrew his support of the retailer, explaining he had not known that "conditions were that bad." The license was revoked.

In Tennessee, fewer than half of the State's counties had set up the legally required machinery for issuing and revoking county retail beer permits. With the cooperation of the State Director of the Committee, many of these counties have now established local control agencies, and 52 counties have adopted suggestions made by the State Director for a "model" license application.

These are examples of the many aspects of self-regulation. The routine is investigation, warning, re-investigation. If correction has not resulted from the warnings, then evidence gathered by the Committee is placed before the proper authorities with a request for hearing and license revocation.

Bearing in mind that the State Committees have been formed progressively, not simultaneously, the work has been slow in accumulating figures which might be considered impressive. Nevertheless, State Committees have conducted a total of 19,507 investigations resulting in:

1,002 Establishments Correcting Violations
45 License Suspensions
72 Padlock Injunctions
485 License Revocations

Building for the Future

The Foundation does not establish a State Brewers and Beer Distributors Committee as a temporary measure. Once a State Committee is set up, it remains an integral part of the brewing industry in its State, always available for cooperation with the public and the authorities.

Cooperation with retailers, too, is an essential part of the program. State Directors hold periodic meetings with community retail groups, explain the program to them in detail, and obtain local pledges of co-operation. Discussion of the retailer's responsibilities is the keynote of these open forums, on the theory that "the law least violated is the one best understood."

The reader may remark another important fact: the utter absence of legislative activity on the part of Committee members or the State Director, and the absence of any political flavor in the program. The elimination of anything that resembles politics is essential in the Foundation's work, and this extends to the State Committees. This is true also of trade practices, which are controlled by other local and national industry organizations.

Behind the work of the Foundation and the brewing industry can be found the philosophy expressed in the Repeal Proclamation, in which it was stated as national policy that "the social and political evils that have existed . . . shall not be revived nor permitted again to exist."

The "Peace" Groups Join Battle

By John W. Masland

After surveying the composition and objectives of the organized peace movement in the United States, the author concludes that if America must again decide whether to join Great Britain in war against Germany, "the internationalists in the American peace movement will not want to keep us out of war and the isolationists will be unable to do so." The author is Instructor in Political Science at Stanford University.

IN A COUNTRY faced with the possibility of war, professional peace workers—those who direct the societies devoted to the preservation of peace—continue to play an important rôle. United in the objective of safeguarding the welfare of America from the consequences of the war in Europe and Asia, they are divided on the means to achieve this end. There has long been an active and well organized peace movement in the United States and its professional leaders have been deeply concerned with the problems of American foreign policy. It is the purpose of this article to examine the reactions of these leaders to events abroad and to consider their influence in determining what path the United States will follow.¹

Approximately fifty national organizations, of varying size and influence, are promoting peace activities. Many operate for that purpose alone, while others, such as the League of Women Voters and the American Friends Service Committee, have wider interests. Some forty of them are associated in one co-ordinating National Peace Confer-

ence. These organizations claim a total of between forty-five and sixty million members. Because of the inclusion of inactive millions of church, club or association members, however, this estimate gives an exaggerated conception of their strength.

The essential part of the peace front consists of less than a hundred professionals who direct these organizations from headquarters in Washington or New York. Various methods are employed to achieve their purposes. Some use the pressure tactics of the experienced lobbyist, while others spread their programs by the printed word, from the lecture platform or across the air waves. The greatest weapons of all of them are the demonstrations of public opinion which they arouse, for through the

¹ The information for this article has been obtained from the various pamphlets, letters and press releases of the peace organizations and from interviews with representatives of the principal organizations in Washington and New York. Acknowledgment is made of grants-in-aid from the Social Science Research Council, New York, and the Council of Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, which made possible the investigations for this and other studies.

mechanisms of their organizations these individuals contribute much to the molding of popular thinking. The public's longing for peace has assured them a wide hearing and has granted them power far beyond their limited material resources. Government officials know their influence, seeking the favor of some while fearing others. We might readily assume, therefore, that professional peace workers should provide an effective means of enforcing popular determination to remain at peace.

Pacifist Organizations

Before attempting to examine this assumption, however, a brief description of the organizations through which the leaders operate is in order. For our purposes they may be divided into two groups. On one side are those which have been motivated by pacifist convictions. They are unalterably opposed to the use of force and have pledged themselves to keep the country out of war. Outstanding in this group is Frederick Libby's National Council for Prevention of War, whose staff members eye the State Department with great suspicion from offices directly across the street. The Council has been particularly successful in cultivating contacts with farm and labor groups. Around the corner is the office of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, founded by the late Jane Addams, now directed by Miss Dorothy Detzer, an uncompromising worker for peace and a top-flight lobbyist.² Almost single-handed she persuaded Senator Nye to introduce the resolution calling

for the investigation of the munitions industry. When it is remembered that the findings of the Nye committee were a major factor in the adoption of neutrality legislation in 1935, the influence of Miss Detzer and her organization is clearly evident.

Wide prominence has been achieved by World Peaceways, which has endeavored to promote peace by creating mass hatred of war through national advertising. In six years of free agency service, engraving and magazine space to the amount of \$800,000 was donated to it, and its advertising circulation at one time reached 25,000,000. The Society of Friends is active on the peace front through the American Friends Service Committee, notable for its European relief work. Its "Emergency Peace Campaign," in which the National Council for Prevention of War and the Women's International League cooperated, was a leading cause of the wave of isolationist sentiment which swept the country in 1936 and 1937 and produced the demand for strict neutrality legislation.

Pacifist thought among liberal members of the clergy is directed by the Fellowship of Reconciliation, of which John Nevin Sayre, John Haynes Holmes and Harry Emerson Fosdick are prominent leaders. Other pacifist organizations include the War Resisters League, a small group which enrolls conscientious objectors, the Committee on Militarism in Education, which has attempted

² See article by Stanley High in *The Saturday Evening Post*, March 5, 1938, p. 8.

to eliminate compulsory military training in colleges and universities, and the Keep America Out of War Congress, the peace front of the Socialist party in New York City.

In defense of the pacifist leaders in the peace movement it should be emphasized that, although frequently smeared with the charge of communism, they have remained free of such outside influence or control. The communist-directed American League for Peace and Democracy, now disbanded, once represented the extreme left wing in the peace movement. But the permanently established isolationist organizations, such as the National Council for Prevention of War and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, have maintained their independence.

Advocates of Collective Security

Of the opposite opinion from the pacifist organizations are those which believe that only through participation in the creation of an orderly international system can the United States obtain the assurance of peace. Several of them, significantly, receive direct or indirect financial aid from the \$10,000,000 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace or the Carnegie-founded Church Peace Union. They include the League of Nations Association, the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, and the Catholic Association for International Peace. For years they promoted American membership in the League, but with the decay of the Geneva institution emphasis was shifted to

fuller cooperation by America with the "democracies" against "aggressors." The leaders of these organizations reflect the conservatism, idealism and especially the pro-British sympathies of Andrew Carnegie and of the present director of the Carnegie Endowment, Nicholas Murray Butler.

Also active in spreading doctrines of collective security have been the national officers of the women's clubs and associations. The American Association of University Women, General Federation of Women's Clubs, National League of Women Voters and the National Board of the Y.W.C.A., to mention the most prominent, maintain local peace sections with whom the national officers cultivate close contact and to whom literature for study groups and advice on current issues are constantly supplied. Eleven of these national women's organizations cooperate effectively through the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, which holds an annual conference in Washington.

The leaders of these organizations constitute the important permanent elements of the peace movement. Since the outbreak of the war in Europe they have been as active as ever and they are still in a position to contribute in large measure to the shaping of public opinion. The war, moreover, rather than shaking them loose from their doctrinal foundations, has solidified their advocacy of the lines of action which they worked out for themselves in the years of tension before the crisis. But, as would be expected from their essen-

tially different philosophies, the two wings of the movement are following widely divergent paths.

Factional Strife

An understanding of long-established attitudes of the peace leaders explains the rôles which they are playing today. Signs of a split into two groups appeared as far back as the 'twenties, when all of them were supporting the League of Nations and other agencies of international cooperation. But even then the pacifists feared the implications of the sanctions article of the League Covenant, seeing the possibility that it might lead to the use of force. As a result of developing differences of opinion an effective unity of effort in the peace movement has never been possible. In 1932 an attempt to work together through an Inter-Organizational Committee on Disarmament ended in failure.

Later, as war became more imminent, responsible leaders realized that differences should be subordinated to a new unity of purpose. In October 1933, with the financial assistance of the Carnegie Endowment, twenty-eight national peace organizations formed the National Peace Conference. The number has since increased to over forty. The Conference has not been another peace organization but is rather a regular joint meeting of representatives of the participating bodies.

For a time success seemed possible; many enterprises were carried out together. In 1938, for example, a campaign was launched for the calling of a world economic conference.

But when an attempt was made to set up local peace councils throughout the country the Conference made painfully slow progress. Established organizations were afraid of the rivalry of new units and much of the energy of Conference members was expended in factional strife. The approach and outbreak of the war in Europe has so magnified the doctrinal differences among the two wings of the peace movement that this latest hope to produce some unity now seems doomed. The area of agreement shared by all members is so limited that its value is negligible. The Conference was founded too late to build a permanent place for itself and it became an early victim of the war crisis.

League Failure

The serious schism in the peace movement, although apparent earlier, dates from 1935. That year marked the beginning of a change in the complexion of the peace movement, a change which has had profound influence upon its subsequent relation to American foreign policy. By that time not only had a determined effort to bring America closer to the League system failed, but the international dream castle in Geneva itself began to crumble. War in Europe to many was now only a matter of time. Then the sensational publicity accorded the findings of the Senate munitions investigation brought a thorough examination of the breakdown of our neutrality in 1917. Reports from Washington that the State Department was considering a possible revision of our traditional war-

time neutrality policy increased the interest in plans for keeping this country out of war. Anti-war sentiment spread across the country with rapidity; it became a political campaign issue. Peace workers were in the thick of it.

Clark Eichelberger, of the League of Nations Association, saw from the first the seriousness of the situation into which many peace leaders were to plunge unheeding. "The American peace movement," he declared in April 1935, "faces its most severe test since 1920." With real concern he pointed out the fundamental inconsistency between a policy of co-operation and one of "redefining the rules of neutrality." "The very discussion of neutrality in itself suggests a surrender of the principle that a nation going to war violates the supreme law of a new world community," said this staunch supporter of collective security. The "logical conclusion" of neutrality was "anarchy over night." Only through cooperation with other nations could we hope to stop an aggressor, and that we must do if we would remain at peace.⁸

Neutrality Laws

Neutrality legislation was the wedge which was to split the peace movement, a wedge driven into the opening already revealed by the reluctance of pacifist groups to support the sanctions article of the League Covenant. At its meeting in June 1935, the National Peace Conference adopted a statement in which both a revision of neutrality policy to reduce the risks of entanglement in foreign

war and American membership in the League of Nations were urged. But the immediate threat of another general European conflagration produced during the summer by the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, plus the evidence of the Senate munitions investigating committee, forced a large number of peace leaders, led by pacifist Frederick Libby of the National Council for Prevention of War, to emphasize the primacy of legislating to prevent American participation in future foreign wars. Their support of Senate isolationists was in part responsible for the passage of temporary legislation by Congress in August 1935, and they continued to urge that more rigid provisions be adopted in the following session.

The differences of opinion between the pacifist-isolationists and the internationalists centered in efforts to secure permanent neutrality legislation during 1936 and 1937, when all organizations worked for one or another of the various proposals before Congress. The National Council for Prevention of War and those which believed with it that the United States should, above all else, insulate itself against the inevitable foreign war supported the Nye bloc's mandatory provisions. The collective security groups were caught in the flood tide of national demand for legislation. If given the choice they would have preferred a discriminatory law, permitting one-sided embargoes, but Congress would have none of it; so they had to make the best of a bad bargain by obtaining maximum dis-

⁸ *League of Nations Chronicle*, April 30, 1935.

cretion for the President in the application of the embargo on all belligerents.

Even greater division in the peace movement was brought in 1937 by the war in the Far East, with the isolationists bitterly denouncing the President for his failure to invoke the Neutrality Act which Congress had enacted. Under the leadership of the National Council for Prevention of War, a joint board of strategy and publicity, established by the officers of six isolationist organizations, carried on a vigorous campaign advocating virtual withdrawal of America from the Orient and a parallel effort to secure passage of the war referendum amendment in Congress. The immediate objectives were not achieved, but this campaign was a major factor in crystallizing the strong isolationist sentiment which was so widespread throughout the country at the time and which was exceedingly embarrassing to the Administration in its attempts to follow a positive policy against Japan.

Although temporarily eclipsed by the isolationists the internationalist wing of the peace movement was far from inactive. Alarmed by the effective tactics of their opponents during the Far Eastern crisis, they realized the need of closer collaboration among themselves. Early in 1938 they therefore formed a joint organization to secure a revision of the neutrality legislation which would permit the application of sanctions against Japan and any other aggressor nation. This new Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts, with headquarters in the New York offices of

the League of Nations Association, was composed of officers of the Association, the World Alliance, Catholic Association for International Peace (all recipients of aid from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), the A.A.U.W., League of Women Voters, Y.W.C.A. and the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. A campaign to secure revision of the Neutrality Act was launched with the publication of a manifesto signed by one thousand prominent persons, including Henry L. Stimson, urging President Roosevelt to unite with "the peace-loving nations" to "deny assistance to a treaty violator and withhold means for the consolidation of any subsequent gains."

Growing Rivalry

As the pace of Europe's mad race toward war quickened, the growing rivalry of the two factions became more determined and vigorous. The lines formed on the issue of the revision of the Neutrality Act, as the informal coalitions of isolationists and internationalists solidified into permanent groups. The isolationists united with left-wing youth and labor units to carry on the Keep America Out of War Campaign. Local committees were organized and mass meetings held on the central theme of strengthening the mandatory features of the neutrality law. This campaign played a part in maintaining considerable popular support of Congressional isolationists.

The internationalists retaliated by increasing the efforts of their joint

committee, which was established on a broader basis and renamed the American Union for Concerted Peace Efforts. Clark Eichelberger, of the League of Nations Association, took over command and a share of the expenses was met by grants from Carnegie endowments. Their objective was the revision of the neutrality legislation to permit American aid to the "democracies," particularly by permitting the President to discriminate against an "aggressor" nation in the application of an embargo.

Taking Sides

It should be clear from this survey how the two factions of the peace movement would line up when Germany's invasion of Poland brought war to Europe once more. All organizations immediately intensified their efforts to demonstrate in Washington that the public accepted their views. The radio, press and local committees were used to produce a flood of letters and telegrams. The internationalists were soon far ahead of the Roosevelt Administration in the degree of help which they would extend to the Allies. Their three-year campaign for discriminatory embargo legislation had been in reality an attempt to convert the growing popular hatred of Hitlerism into a positive demand that the United States place its resources behind the "democracies." The effect of their efforts was to identify the British and French cause as our own.

With the outbreak of the war they accordingly concentrated on a drive to extend to the Allies all aid "short of war." During the special session

of Congress called by the President to secure revision of the Neutrality Act, the American Union coalition leaders cooperated with the Administration by building up popular demonstrations for repeal of the arms embargo. A special "Non-Partisan Committee for Peace through Revision of the Neutrality Act," with headquarters in Washington and locals throughout the country, was set up for this purpose.

The isolationist groups, on the other hand, went to the other extreme. Working together the seven leading organizations urged full support of the Congressional isolationists who attempted to block Administration plans. Repeal of the arms embargo, they shouted, meant war, nothing less. If we should start by permitting our supplies of arms to go to the Allies, sooner or later we would end by sending our boys to fight in Europe. They found new cause for alarm in any utterance of the President which might be interpreted as support of the Allies, and pressed continuously for mediation by the American government at the earliest possible moment, even at the bid of the German government.

Aid to Britain

As the war continued the internationalists increased their efforts to extend full help to the Allies, and now to Great Britain alone, short of actual participation in armed hostilities. The unexpected collapse of France served only to strengthen their conviction of the necessity of immediate aid to Great Britain. The British fleet is our first defense

against Hitlerism, they have insisted, and we must aid the British in maintaining its strength. Their objectives have led the internationalists to close support of the Roosevelt Administration and they have received constant encouragement and direction from official circles.

Under the direction of Clark Eichelberger, the officers associated in the American Union for Concerted Peace Efforts were responsible during the spring of 1940 for the formation of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. At the request of the organizers William Allen White issued the initial invitation for support and has sponsored the campaign as chairman. The Committee's membership now includes many recognized leaders in national life drawn from business, education, letters and the clergy, especially along the eastern seaboard.

Pleas for support by President James B. Conant of Harvard and other prominent persons have been delivered over national radio networks in behalf of the campaign. Newspaper advertising has been used on a national scale. The services of a well-known promotional concern have been engaged to direct the raising of funds and the organization of local committees, the number of which now exceeds 500. Volunteers have been enrolled to circulate thousands of petitions calling upon the President and Congress to make available to the Allies such airplanes and other materials of war which could be spared by our Army and Navy, to expand our industrial facilities to make possible increased ma-

terial aid and to remove legislative restrictions upon such aid. Posters, broadsides and press releases have been widely distributed.

Representatives of the Committee were active at the sessions of both national party conventions in June. During the summer the White Committee was the principal factor in the campaign to build up popular demand for the transfer of American destroyers to the British fleet. Later it concentrated on the transfer of twenty-five "flying fortresses" to Great Britain. The White Committee is not, of course, one of the established peace organizations. It is important to note, however, that the internationalists in the peace movement were responsible for its creation, that it is directed by the staff of the League of Nations Association in New York, and that the organizations of the internationalists have accepted its program and have cooperated with it fully.

Roosevelt Criticized

The isolationists have not been able to match the prominent membership of the White Committee, nor does their campaign attract the same degree of financial aid as its rival. But in their efforts to keep America out of war by creating support for their isolationist doctrines they have persisted in their bitter criticism of the Roosevelt Administration. The isolationists attended the national political conventions in full force and Senator Wheeler attributed his success in securing the adoption of an isolationist plank in the Democratic platform to the activities of Frederick

Libby and Dorothy Detzer and their organizations.⁴ Since then these leaders have carried on a running fire against the President, charging that he has intentionally manufactured an "invasion hysteria" for political purposes. They argue that because of our favorable geographic position we need not fear the aggression of a Hitlerized Europe.

The conscription issue has also found the peace movement divided. The internationalists, already cooperating with Administration plans, accepted the necessity of the selective service legislation from the start, but their organizations saw no need of a special campaign in its behalf. The pacifist-isolationists, as would be expected, have opposed the draft vociferously, declaring that it is not required for defense and that it is a sure way to destroy American democracy. They have not, however, opposed the popular demand for preparedness, but have called for voluntary enlistment and the limitation of our arms for defense only. Some of the pacifist leaders, rather than opposing conscription itself, have restricted their efforts to lobbying for sympathetic treatment of the conscientious objector.

Government Contacts

An interesting sidelight on the study of the activities of peace leaders is the degree to which they have cultivated contacts with high officials in Washington. Each faction, significantly, has its own set of friends. The internationalists, because of their support of principles which approximate those of the

Roosevelt Administration, find the doors of the State Department and of the offices of administration spokesmen in Congress open at all times. These officials are constantly informed of their plans and activities and on many occasions mutual encouragement and cooperation is extended. This was particularly so during the campaigns for revision of the Neutrality Act and the transfer of American destroyers to the British fleet.

In their efforts to "educate" the public to view international affairs as they do, State Department officials have found the internationalists in the peace movement willing and helpful. The isolationists, on the other hand, although free to talk with anyone, avoid the State Department and speak of its staff in contempt. They spend most of their time on Capitol Hill at the elbows of Senate and House isolationists, suggesting new lines of attack upon the Administration.

On the basis of this survey it should appear that the assumption that the organized peace movement may be expected to exert its influence against American intervention in the war is not valid. This would be true of only part of it. The internationalist wing of the movement, now associated with the White Committee, seems to be fitting into the place of the old League to Enforce Peace during the First World War. Its leaders have connections similar to the League and close ties with prominent persons on the east-

⁴ In personal letters to Mr. Libby and Miss Detzer.

ern seaboard notorious for their pro-British sentiments. Once again they are looking beyond immediate hostilities in Europe to a new world community and to American leadership in such a community. They insist, however, that British victory is essential before the goal can be achieved.

Marching As to War

In the meantime they have accepted the thesis that the British are fighting the moral cause of democracy and that we should therefore place our full material resources at their disposal, even our financial resources if necessary. One searches the publications of the White Committee and associated organizations in vain for the slightest questioning of British war aims. They give no tolerance to the accusations hurled against British "imperialism" by the isolationists. Although they refuse to go to the extreme of the isolationists in insisting that the United States must keep out of war at any cost, the internationalists still declare that we should "avoid armed hostilities." But in fostering hatred of Hitlerism and in championing the British as the upholders of international morality, justice and freedom, and in spreading the notion of a new world community which would first require the defeat of Germany, the

internationalists have placed themselves in a position where they inevitably must accept intervention on the side of Great Britain if it is demanded by an administration in Washington. No longer "peace" leaders, they will be advocating war, just as many with similar convictions did in 1916 and 1917. Some have already taken such a stand.

And what of the isolationists? Their pacifism dictates a determination to keep America completely out of the war. They fear the consequences of the Roosevelt Administration's favoritism to the British. Steps which might incite Germany or Japan produce loud protests and they decry conscription and the expansion of our naval and military establishments. Although extremely critical of the late British policy of appeasement, they advocate the same sort of thing for the United States. Their attitude is entirely negative. Lacking the appeal of a positive program, their influence is waning and they are limited to the rôle of critic.

It would seem, in conclusion, that if the time comes when America must once again decide whether it is to join Great Britain in war against Germany, the internationalists in the American peace movement will not want to keep us out of war and the isolationists will be unable to do so.

COMMUNICATIONS

This selective survey endeavors to summarize leading events, situations, and research in the various fields of communications that particularly concern problems of public opinion formation and control. The period covered extends from July through September 1940.

Press, Radio, Films

International Communications

With the beginning of total war in the skies over Great Britain and the virtual end of hostilities on the continent, international communications entered a new phase. This new phase features the newest and the oldest methods of news transmission. On the one hand, cables, wireless and radio telephony were strained as never before to carry details of the nightly bombing raids over London. On the other hand, news from German-occupied territories and other regions under strict censorship moved increasingly through individuals, some of them expelled or in flight, who brought out what reports there were.

The combination of air war and military censorship stretched the thinning network of communications with both Europe and Asia tighter than ever before in modern history. As the war in Europe entered its second year and the war in China its fourth, large areas of the world were

blanketed in discreet official silence, while others were threatened with a physical severance of international communications more complete even than before the use of steam and electricity.

News Transmission from Europe

London occupied the center of world news interest throughout the last three months. In spite of censorship, which increased steadily in severity, and physical circumstances which placed reporters literally under front-line working conditions, news continued to be sent from Great Britain with only temporary interruptions.

Cables, wireless and radio telephony continued to operate in spite of the bombings. The Associated Press office in the heart of London, one block from Fleet Street, was hit, but there was only a forty-seven minute break in transmission to New York. Cable service was suspended

for a few hours on the night of October 16 for unexplained reasons connected with a German raid. Wireless service also suffered short interruptions from time to time. The use of telephone communication with the United States was restricted to newspapers, official banking and government calls.

The chief difficulties were the danger of covering raids and the military necessity of eliminating details from reports which might prove of value to the attacking enemy. One interesting result of this censorship was a widespread impression in the United States that news pictures released for publication showed heavier damage to the city of London than had been indicated in news dispatches. Confirmation of this awaited fuller details about the bombings.

The unoccupied area of France was linked to the outside world only by wireless. Press Wireless continued to send news daily, finding a time allotment of five hours sufficient for a relatively small news file by the two American agencies and five newspapers which maintained regular correspondents at Vichy. The amount of news was cut down after the fall of France both by the shift of military operations to England and by strict censorship.

The occupied area of France, including Paris, remained throughout the quarter in almost complete isolation from the non-German world. A few news stories were sent out by American correspondents through Berlin and subject to considerable delay. The complete prohibition of all communication between the oc-

cupied and unoccupied zones of France was lifted only on October 3, and then only for information about births, deaths and illnesses on standard printed cards. Vichy was reported to have resumed limited telephone communication with Spain and Switzerland, but all mail from Vichy, including diplomatic pouches, was subject to long and unexplained delays.

From Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and other countries occupied by the German army, the flow of spot news has decreased to a mere trickle. Except for occasional supervised tours, taken by American correspondents stationed in Berlin, the only communications between these regions and the outside world have been through refugees or through "rabbits," the foreign reporters' word for channels of communication which lie outside the control of official censors.

The cable connecting Italy with the United States had been cut on June 11, with cable connections to South America severed the following day. For some weeks, telephone facilities were still available, but before the end of the summer news from Italy was restricted to wireless. Rome remained a functioning intermediary in telephone connections with cities in eastern Europe, which also filed news by telephone or telegraph to Berne, Switzerland, where it was forwarded to the United States by Press Wireless. Direct telephone circuits were established for the first time from New York to Berne and from New York to Berlin.

News Transmission from Russia and Asia

Communications between the United States and Russia and Asia remained relatively free from technical disturbances but were vitally affected by increasing censorship. With the closing of the *New York Times* bureau in Moscow, the news agencies provided the only American reporting of events in the U.S.S.R. It was clear that Soviet control of outgoing dispatches had become increasingly strict.

The same situation was apparent in the Far East. In spite of the increased interest in Japanese affairs after the conclusion of the Berlin-Rome-Tokio pact, censorship effectively held down the quantity and the range of news dispatches from Japan. All communications services remained open. Telephone connections with Shanghai, which had brought China into direct communication with the United States for a few weeks before the fighting started in 1937, remained unavailable.

The technical possibilities of modern communications continued to expand as their actual scope was whittled down by war and censorship. The *New York Herald Tribune* took dispatches direct by telephone from its correspondent, Ansel Talbert, in Brisbane, Melbourne, Sydney, Soerabaji and Batavia, during an airplane trip of newspapermen around the Pacific Ocean in August.

Radio News Broadcasting

American broadcasting companies maintained their services from Europe during the quarter. Paris be-

came a blank spot on their map, however, and broadcast news from Vichy came entirely through Berlin under censorship which at times approached the fantastic. Although facilities for news broadcasts from the Far East continued to be available, few programs originating there were given to American listeners. This was believed to be a result not only of censorship but also of the fact that much of the Far Eastern news of special interest in the autumn originated in Berlin, in London or in Washington.

Short-wave broadcasting by foreign stations was affected by the war almost as much as other forms of news transmission. German stations consistently cut short scheduled broadcasts when there was danger that English raiders might use their broadcasts for orientation. Weather conditions affected London broadcasts from time to time, but usually they continued even through the peak of German raids on the British capital. German news schedules, which were formerly broadcast without copyright notice, began to be sent exclusively as private messages to foreign correspondents of Transocean News Service, an official German agency. This restriction, for unexplained motives, effectively cut down the reprinting of this news in foreign countries.

Censorship

Frank Pick, former managing director of the London Transport Board, was appointed on August 12 as director general of the British

Ministry of Information, to succeed Sir Kenneth Lee. His appointment was in answer to a growing volume of criticism of press control in Great Britain. Its initial effect was to liberalize regulations on many points and to speed up the release of official news, but the growing momentum of the air attacks on London made necessary a tightening of restrictions on many aspects of the military news.

In many parts of the world, official censorship of communications passed over into more active measures of control. Herbert L. Matthews, Rome correspondent of the *New York Times*, was ordered on October 7 to leave Italy within ten days because of a dispatch, passed by the censor before transmission, saying that "the Axis is out to defeat President Roosevelt."

In the Far East, these difficulties reached a new high for foreign correspondents. Melville James Cox, Reuter's correspondent in Tokio, plunged to his death from a window of the Tokio police headquarters on July 29 while he was being questioned by officials. Six United States and one British newspaperman were publicly listed by the Japanese-controlled Wang Ching-wei regime as undesirables, and eighty-three of their Chinese colleagues were at the same time warned that they faced arrest if they left the protection of the International Settlement. One of the last independently-owned foreign newspapers in the Far East, the *Japan Advertiser*, disappeared on October 11 when ownership passed from B. W. Fleisher, an American news-

paperman, into the hands of the *Japan Times*, controlled by the Japanese Foreign Office.

JOSEPH BARNES
Foreign News Editor
New York Herald Tribune

Press

To VETERAN newspapermen, the months of July, August and September, 1940, were strongly reminiscent of July, August and September, 1916. Then, as in 1940, a Democratic President was running for re-election. Fear of being involved in a European war was topmost in the minds of the voters, and the national defense and foreign policies were hotly debated issues of the campaign. Especially is there a striking similarity in the attacks upon the administration in power for "failure to adequately build up the national defense."

While the relations of the United States with the Republic of Mexico are less strained than in 1916, there is an echo in the current demands that the Administration protect American property rights (especially oil properties) against "confiscation." There is a difference, to be noted principally inside newspaper offices, in that editorial staffs are much more wary of propaganda than they were a quarter-century ago. "Legitimate" news—the war and the political campaign—demands so much space that there has been less room for press-agent material, except in special departments, such as fashions, the movies and sports. Moreover, there appears to be a conscious effort on the

part of the newspapers to regain public confidence which, admittedly, had declined. At meetings of editors and publishers, for several years past, grave concern has been expressed over public distrust of the newspapers.

National Newspaper Week

National Newspaper Week began on Monday, September 30. The week was devoted to making the American public aware of the value of a free press. *Editor & Publisher*, leading trade journal serving the newspaper field, produced a special "Free Press Number" celebrating the event. Important personages in business, government and the professions contributed articles generally praising the press and pointing out the plight of people in totalitarian countries which have imposed rigid controls on the press.

One of the articles, contributed by Col. R. R. McCormick, of the *Chicago Tribune*, began as follows:

"Defeated all along the line in its direct attack on the freedom of the press, bureaucracy has taken to stratagems, fifth columns and to dropping parachute troops upon press freedom, under the guise of regulating labor conditions, preserving business competition and superintending accuracy in advertising."

Colonel McCormick cited, as examples, government regulations concerning the advertising of issues of stocks and bonds by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and of food and drug advertising by the Department of Agriculture. He also

wrote that the National Labor Relations Board "has held that publication by an employer, which speaks disparagingly of any form of labor activity, including civil wars in the name of labor . . . or reproductions of speeches in the Congressional Record which it does not approve . . . is (*sic*) illegal, and has forbidden it in the teeth of the decision of *Near* vs. *Minnesota*."

President Roosevelt, and Wendell L. Willkie, the Republican candidate, wrote National Newspaper Week letters emphasizing the necessity of a free press in upholding democracy, and most of the daily papers in the country published their letters, which were carried on the wires of the AP, UP and INS.

If there has been any special anxiety concerning their trade in the minds of editors and publishers during recent months it has been over freedom of the press. In the main, they have not had business troubles. Both circulation and advertising lineage were up. Many dailies increased their subscription rates and most of these profited by so doing.

Presidential Campaign

Practically all of the straight Republican and independent Republican newspapers in the country supported Willkie's candidacy for the Presidency. Less than one-half of the newspapers which describe themselves as independent Democratic were supporting Roosevelt. Moreover, approximately one-fourth of the straight Democratic newspapers were opposing the third-term candidacy of

the President. Of newspapers which call themselves independent or non-partisan, about one-half were for Willkie, 40 per cent were taking no sides and only about 10 per cent were for Roosevelt.

These results were found from answers to a questionnaire sent to its clients by *Editorial Research Reports* of Washington, D.C., a non-partisan, fact-finding newspaper service which furnishes editorial background material to 150 newspapers of all shades of opinion and in all sections of the country. Replies were received from more than one-half of the newspapers canvassed, covering 13 of the 15 largest cities, as well as a number of cities under 50,000 population. Forty per cent of the responding newspapers called themselves Republican, 28 per cent Democratic, 32 per cent independent.

These newspapers showed their preferences in the 1940 campaign as compared with 1936 as follows:

	1940	1936
For Republican candidate	63%	51%
For Democratic candidate	18	32
Neutral	19	17
	1940	
Straight Republican:		
For Willkie	100%	
Independent Republican:		
For Willkie	100	
Independent:		
For Willkie	52	
For Roosevelt	8	
Neutral	40	
Independent Democratic:		
For Roosevelt	46	
For Willkie	27	
Neutral	27	
Straight Democratic:		
For Roosevelt	72	
For Willkie or neutral	28	

Of the papers which reported themselves as neutral in the present campaign, none was Republican. Two-thirds were independent and no less than one-third described themselves as straight Democratic or independent Democratic.

All of the newspapers in this group which were for Landon in 1936 favored Willkie, with the exception of one which had not yet announced its position on September 30, the date of the reply to the questionnaire. After the results were compiled, one newspaper which had been supporting Willkie withdrew its support in an editorial. All of the reporting papers which were for Hoover in 1932 were supporting Willkie, but only 60 per cent of the papers which were for Roosevelt in 1936 supported him this year; 22 per cent had switched over to Willkie, while 18 per cent were neutral.

A number of the pro-Roosevelt newspapers pointedly called attention to the fact that pro-Willkie newspapers which gave great prominence to the early Gallup poll, which showed Willkie leading in electoral votes, "played down" subsequent polls which showed Roosevelt in the lead, both in popular and electoral votes.

PM Refinancing

An event in the publishing field which attracted much attention was the announcement of the refinancing of *PM*, the New York tabloid-size daily. This paper, edited by Ralph Ingersoll, is endeavoring to exist on circulation revenue alone. It carries

no advertising. Under the new set-up, Ingersoll remains editor and publisher, but the control passes to Marshall Field, who purchased the shares of all the other stockholders except Mr. Ingersoll. The previous stockholders realized about twenty cents on the dollar.

Wage-Hour Act

Three newspaper publishing companies are endeavoring to obtain a court ruling that newspapers, because of the First Amendment to the Constitution, occupy a "special position" among business and industrial enterprises. These companies produce the Lowell (Mass.) *Sun*, the Easton (Pa.) *Plain Dealer* and the Easton *Express* and *Morning Free Press*. They are resisting an effort of the U.S. Department of Labor to obtain federal court orders to compel them to produce their records under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department is to determine whether the law is being violated by these firms.

A decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago, declaring that the firm of Montgomery Ward & Co. must produce its pay roll records for examination by officials of the Wage and Hour division, has been taken to the Supreme Court. But, *Editor & Publisher* contends, whatever decision is rendered in the Montgomery Ward case should not be accepted by publishers as applying to newspaper publishing firms. It is contended that a specific determination of the government agency's

"control over the press" should be had from the Supreme Court. Until this issue is settled, says *Editor & Publisher*, "it is our counsel that newspapers take every legal step to protect privileges which are precious to their owners, their employes, and their readers, as citizens of the republic, against invasion under a statute which was never consciously designed to apply to newspaper operations. There is no surer way to forfeit a privilege than to waive its principle."

B. P. GARNETT

Editorial Research Reports
Washington, D.C.

Radio

VARIOUS aspects of the national defense effort in connection with radio overshadowed in importance and drama any other activities of the industry during the quarter. Under the Federal Communications Act of 1934, the President of the United States has the right to take over the radio industry in time of emergency. The bogey of governmental ownership or control of radio has haunted broadcasters since the last war, but it became increasingly evident that in all probability the government would not take over radio wholesale, but would work out some adaptation of the existing system. The Army, Navy, FCC, and the NAB all have more or less complete thumb-nail sketches of what they would like to see happen in the event of hostilities, but there has been much jockeying

for power and undercover dissension among them.

There is hope now of some agreement being reached on this important matter, for on September 24 the President appointed a committee to draw up plans for radio in the event of war. Fly, the Chairman of the FCC, is the Chairman of the new "Defense Communications Board," consisting of the Director of Naval Communications, the Army Chief Signal Officer, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (for the Coast Guard), and the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the State Department Division of International Communications. The industry has expressed its disappointment at not being represented, but their fears of governmental interference are somewhat quieted by the Board's statement that it is to have nothing to do with censorship, and is merely a planning agency.¹

Defense Programs

With high patriotism, and perhaps in the hopes that by being cooperative now they may avoid domination later, the industry has been airing innumerable defense programs and programs aimed at bolstering faith in American institutions. Almost all stations are inserting plugs in their schedule to help locate workers for defense industries; some are calling for volunteers for the Army or Navy. A program called "Johnny Get Your Wings" over WMCA, New York, dramatizes life in the air corps. Individual programs in several popular series have been turned over to the Defense Council, and

whole series to sell Americanism have been planned. The National Defense Advisory Commission has taken to the air to report its activities in a series of talks.

Wythe Williams of the Overseas Press Club and a commentator in his own right is organizing an "official" broadcast about defense which will utilize the round table technique with famous correspondents publicizing defense activities. Having White House sanction, it will command free time from the three major networks (rotating from one to another) at a good hour, probably Sunday evenings. Some stations are signing on and off with the "Star Spangled Banner" and the title of a song to be plugged soon over the air is "Is This Love Or Is It Conscription?"

Propaganda from Abroad

Two of the most important questions facing broadcasters are how to deal with propaganda over the air from abroad, and what should be done with foreign language broadcasting at home. The first was highlighted dramatically when Lewis Allen Weiss, Vice President and General Manager of the Don Lee Broadcasting System (West Coast), affiliated with Mutual, ordered Hitler's speech to the Reichstag cut off after forty-five minutes (July 19). He instructed the announcer to read:

¹ Late in October the Army announced a new radio section in its public relations division, probably to be directed or "advised" by Edward M. Kirby, public relations director of the NAB. Preliminary statement of functions was much like that of the "Defense Communications Board."

"The management of this network is of the opinion that it is not in the public interest or in harmony with the attitude of this Government to permit the continuation of this broadcast by Mr. Hitler from Germany. We feel sure that our listeners will concur in our opinion that Mr. Hitler should not be permitted to use our American facilities to justify his crimes against civilization itself."

Local reaction was for the most part enthusiastic, but national network officials shook their heads at the impetuosity of this action, and muttered that this was bringing the reality of station and network control of broadcasting too much out in the open. In retaliation, Germany for a time refused Mutual broadcasters the right to broadcast from Nazi-dominated areas. However, relations were patched up, and by curious coincidence on September 4 Mutual-Don Lee was the only network to carry Hitler's speech.

Foreign Language Broadcasts

Broadcasting in foreign languages within the United States is receiving increasing attention. The NAB recently reported that ninety-three stations carry some foreign language programs, and about fifty are said to be devoting most of their time to this type of broadcast. Thirty languages are used, including Arabian and Gaelic, all the languages of the Central European countries, and Chinese and Japanese. Such stations feel increasingly uneasy about their tasks. Some officials feel that there should be no more broadcasting in foreign languages, because of the danger of

the insertion of harmful material into scripts, and thirteen stations report that they have discontinued such broadcasting since the war. In Chicago, a broadcast sponsored by a local Nazi organization plugging Lindbergh's speech caused so much furor that the station decided to cancel all German broadcasting.

Yet most observers feel that most foreign language broadcasting is strictly pro-democratic, and that the advantages of reaching foreign language groups in their own tongue far outweigh the dangers of occasional subversive broadcasts. A meeting in New York in July of owners and managers of these stations emphasized this point. One difficulty is that stations carrying foreign language programs are, for the most part, small and poor and do not keep adequate records of their broadcasts. Recently the FCC has suggested that they do so, and, with its new grant from Congress to increase facilities for monitoring broadcasts, may be able to check up on it themselves. A new committee of the FCC on foreign language broadcasting is studying the problem.

The importance of broadcasting to South America is also being increasingly recognized, and efforts are under way to increase the power of short-wave stations doing this job. There will probably be a radio director under Nelson Rockefeller to aid in furthering Pan-American co-operation in broadcasting.²

² Don Francisco, president of Lord and Thomas advertising agency, has just taken leave of absence to become the member for radio on Rockefeller's committee.

Father Coughlin

This fall, Father Coughlin will not be on the air for the first time in many years. His "refusal" to broadcast has been variously attributed to: (1) The increasing anti-totalitarian fervor which makes stations afraid to carry him. (2) His statement that he was going to make his broadcasts political, at least when he planned to discuss "basic issues of the election." Willkie's forthright repudiation of his support was said to knock the wind out of his sails. (3) The NAB code which went into effect October 1, providing that time might not be sold for controversial issues, and defining Coughlin's broadcasts as "controversial." At first he tried to line up independent stations, later tried to place recordings at various spots, and finally announced that men "powerful in radio and other activities" forced him off the air. However, the trade papers have lately carried rumors that Coughlin may be able to get back on the air after the election.

Senate Committee Hearings

Protracted hearings before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee (Chairman, Senator Wheeler) were held throughout July and August on the reappointment of Thad Brown to the FCC. Attack against Brown was led by Senator Tobey (Republican of New Hampshire) who introduced evidence far afield from the reappointment question. Early in July the material in the FCC Monopoly Report concerning a stock transaction by CBS was scrutinized with an attempt to prove that Brown, as

chairman of the committee submitting the report, had allowed errors in fact to stand in the report. Counsels for CBS refuted the allegations particularly with respect to Paley's enormous profits. Later the Committee turned to the problem of monopoly by RCA and revived the issue of the Anti-Trust case, settled by RCA in 1932 by a consent decree from the Department of Justice. Alleged bribery of officials in settling the case was denied by Sarnoff. The question of Brown's renomination was never acted upon, but Brown resigned in October to enter private law practice.

Incidental Intelligence

Political broadcasting was causing the industry many headaches, as Roosevelt maintained that most of his broadcasts were in his capacity as President and not as candidate, and therefore should not be paid for. Republicans demanded free time to answer these "non-partisan" discussions, and the hope of revenues from political broadcasting dwindled. Early in the campaign professional broadcasters maintained that Willkie's radio delivery was ineffective, if not actually damaging. Subsequent lessons in radio technique and listening to recordings of his own voice instructed him in the art.

Communists complained of unfair treatment from the networks, but were subsequently allowed to buy time on the air. . . . Time has been extended by the FCC for the filing of briefs against the Monopoly Report issued in June. Hearings will be held on it early in December. . . . CBS has demonstrated color tele-

vision successfully, but says that equipment will not be ready for sale until January. . . . Under the Havana Agreement on the allocation of radio frequencies, most stations in the United States will have to shift to a new wave length. The treaty, under discussion for many years, was held up by Mexico's inaction. "Push button tuning" sets will have to be revised to get the new wave lengths. . . . The NAB convention, August 4-7, reaffirmed the Code of Ethics and the backing of Broadcast Music Inc., a new organization sponsored by broadcasters, which will attempt to break the monopoly of ASCAP in the music publishing field. Under the Code, aid to Britain has just been declared "controversial" and broadcasts on it are to be carried free by member stations, and to be answered by an opposing point of view.

JEANETTE SAYRE
Harvard University

Films

A SUB-COMMITTEE of the House of Commons has recently issued a report which must have caused a great deal of uneasiness in the Films Division of the Ministry of Information. The Report recommends abandonment of feature production by the Ministry, independence for the film industry, curtailment of documentary production, concentration on the production of new five-minute instructional films, and greater attention to objectives in drawing up film programs.

In speaking of production the Report refers to "the pre-occupation . . . with the feature film and the full-length documentary film as the principal modes of propaganda by film." It points out two important difficulties involved in using the feature film as propaganda: (1) the great length of time necessarily required for the production of a full-length feature film; (2) the highly speculative character of feature film production.

Evidences of difficulty between the Ministry and the private producers appear in a section calling for the independence of the film industry: "Repeated efforts on the part of the Films Division to persuade commercial producers to adopt its subjects were unsuccessful. . . . No doubt the lack of persons at the head of the Films Division who were familiar with the film trade was partly responsible. No doubt, too, the producing trade, though it has shown itself desirous to help in every way, is by tradition intensely individualistic and bears hardly with the interference and control of a Government department. In the circumstances the Sub-Committee consider that the Films Division should not waste its time trying to devise subjects which will usually be rejected, but should ask producers of feature films to allocate a definite proportion of their production to films of distinct national value. The producers should choose their own themes and carry them out in their own way. The Ministry's function should be confined purely to a general approval of

the treatment of the subject by agreement."

Documentaries Unsatisfactory Propaganda

The report finds that the documentary film, as it has been used by the Ministry of Information, is not a satisfactory medium for propaganda. From the remarks of those in England who have objected to this section of the report, it would seem that there has been a tendency on the part of the Sub-Committee to assume that all documentary films are necessarily like those produced under the Ministry. They point out several very successful documentaries on the war program and call for improved co-operation from the Government.

It is on the subject of "message" that the report makes its most important contribution to thinking on the subject of propaganda films. "In the view of the Sub-Committee the work of the Films Division in the Home field has been largely ineffective through the lack of clearly defined objectives on the part of the Ministry. Up to the end of December last, it was stated in evidence, this Division had not been presented with a clear conception of the message or messages which were to be conveyed to the public by means of films. At that date the Division was placed under a new Director and an attempt was made to obtain guidance upon policy. Nothing, however, more precise than a general policy of reassuring the public emerged and with the exception of the three anti-gossip films no film, until quite recently, has been shown in this country

which could be described as having a specific purpose in view."

Elsewhere the Report states: "The aim should be not merely the enhancement of patriotic spirit but its direction into channels of activity. What is needed is to break down the psychological barriers to the fulfilment of particular national requirements." In pursuit of this "specific purpose" the Sub-Committee urges the expanded use of the pointed five-minute films.

FHA

Over the past six years the Federal Housing Administration has built up what is probably this country's most extensive and successful system for showing educational films in theaters. The Administration has financed the films itself and has shown them in more than 10,000 theaters and to over 100,000,000 persons. Now it is withdrawing from the field of production but will maintain its distribution system for educational films on housing which it approves. For the most part it expects that these films will be paid for by industrial groups who are willing to subsidize non-advertising films for prestige purposes.

"Power and the Land"

The new Joris Ivens film, *Power and the Land*, produced for the Rural Electrification Administration, will soon be released by RKO. This 34-minute film tells the story of a family on a farm in Ohio and what their life was like before and after electricity came to their farm. The narrative for the film has been written by Stephen Vincent Benét.

Washington Contact

Leo Rosten has been appointed Chief of the Motion Picture Section in the Division of Information of the National Defense Commission. For the past two years Rosten has been studying Hollywood under research grants from the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.

The creation of the Section is said to be a government move resulting from the rush of inquiring producers and distributors to Washington. The

film industry is reported anxious for a direct tie-in on preparedness, and the Motion Picture Section will perform the liaison function between the industry and the Defense Commission.

The motion picture industry has recently set up its own committee to work on defense problems under Francis Harmon of the Hays office.

JOHN DEVINE
*American Film Center
New York City*

The Psychology of Newspapers: Five Tentative Laws

By Gordon W. Allport and Janet M. Faden

Harvard's eminent social psychologist, assisted by Miss Janet Faden, a student in psychology at Radcliffe College, charts some significant paths in a new field: the psychology of newspapers. Their work is based on an exhaustive study of the treatment which Boston newspapers accorded revision of the Neutrality Act.

ONLY in recent years have psychologists commenced seriously to study communications. Distinguished beginnings have been made in the areas of radio and cinema; but as yet the psychology of newspapers has received but little attention. We are not forgetting the large array of brilliant memoirs, critiques, and histories of journalism, replete with sparkling *aperçus* of a psychological order. But these intuitive insights, dazzling as they often are, lack the wider application and additive power of sustained research.

Desiring to investigate the psychological relation between newspapers and their readers in the two-fold process of expressing and forming opinion, we sought an event that would have the following characteristics: (a) it should involve a major issue of public policy and be typical of opinion formation in our democracy; (b) the event should have a datable beginning and end; (c) the alignments in opinion should be, so far as possible, of an *ad hoc* nature so that relatively few of the variables involved would be hidden in the dim recesses of personality and in past habits of partisanship. The issue selected as fulfilling these criteria in

sufficient degree was the Neutrality Act that gripped the attention of America in the fall of 1939.¹

Since our interest lies exclusively in the relation between certain representative newspapers and their readers, we shall not discuss the historical and political aspects of the Neutrality Act, nor the processes of newsgathering and news dissemination, nor the internal structure of the papers employed in our analysis. Our purpose is simply to draw from the analysis tentative psychological principles that are subject to confirmation or disproof by later investigators. If confirmed, these principles will become valid general laws, thus aiding in the establishment of a systematic psychology of newspapers.

This investigation is based upon a complete sample of weekday and Sunday editions of English-language newspapers published in Boston.²

¹ The investigation here reported was completed with the aid of a grant from the Committee on Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University.

² The *Boston American*, the *Boston Globe*, the *Boston Herald*, the *Boston Post*, the *Boston Record*, the *Boston Transcript*, the *Boston Traveler*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*.

One may estimate that fully two million people in New England were exposed to no other newspaper influence during the entire episode. Their combined circulation for weekday editions is 1,605,748, for Sundays 1,280,461. The period extends from September 1 to November 9, 1939, inclusive. Beyond these extreme dates these eight newspapers made little mention of neutrality legislation, but on most of the dates between these limits newspaper interest was high (see Table 4).

Principle I

THE ISSUE BECOMES SKELETONIZED. The actual situation confronting the people of the United States on September 21, the date when Congress convened in a special session, can be stated briefly. Neutrality legislation enacted in August 1935, amended and re-enacted in February 1936 and in May 1937, was still in effect. The provisions of this legislation were deemed by the Administration both inappropriate and inadequate to the foreign and domestic policy being pursued in 1939. Under strong pressure from the Department of State, the House, on July 3, 1939, passed an amended version of the Administration's plan by a vote of 200 to 188; but four weeks later the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by a slender vote buried the legislation and Congress adjourned. War between the Allies and Germany broke out on September 3. The President, making good his promise, called the special session to consider further the need for revision. A bill drafted by

Administration forces was finally enacted in early November, containing certain provisions not in the previous neutrality acts.

The most prominent change was the repeal of the arms embargo and substitution of a "cash and carry" provision, but there were other changes as well: (a) all reference to civil strife was deleted from the 1939 Act; (b) Congress was given equal right with the President to find that a state of war exists and that invoking the Act is a "necessity" to preserve peace or to protect the lives of American citizens; (c) belligerent vessels were to be excluded from our ports if found guilty of using the American flag as a "ruse de guerre"; (d) with few exceptions American vessels were prohibited from carrying passengers, goods, or materials to any belligerent state; (e) the "transferred risk" provision of the earlier Act was extended beyond arms and ammunition to cover all articles going to a belligerent consignee, but the application of the provision to neutrals who would trans-ship the goods was repealed; (f) the President was authorized to define by proclamation all combat areas.³

³ Although the repeal of the arms embargo was indeed the heart of the Act, it should be noted that these additional provisions play havoc with American shipping and give the government rigid control over a large amount of American economic activity, permitting it to regulate travel, the movement of ships and of capital in an unprecedented manner. Cf. F. Deák, "The United States Neutrality Acts, Theory and Practice," *International Conciliations*, 1940, No. 358 (pamphlet of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

All of these new provisions were subjects for debate in Congress and therefore legitimate topics for newspaper report and editorial discussion. Furthermore, since all previous legislation was to be repealed, even those items taken over from the acts of 1935 and 1937 were open for reconsideration. Yet with this wide scope for debate on the manifold issues of neutrality, the newspapers published very little that did not deal directly with the repeal of the arms embargo.

Extent of Simplification

The extent to which this simplification took place in the Boston papers was estimated as carefully as possible. Excepting the *Christian Science Monitor*, approximately 86 per cent of the space devoted to the Neutrality Act in the news columns dealt only with the repeal of the arms embargo. Of the total space devoted to the Act in the editorial pages (again exempting the *Monitor*), likewise 86 per cent dealt only with the question of repeal. In the *Monitor* the estimate for both news columns and editorials between September 1 and October 11 is 70 per cent; between October 12 and November 9, 55 per cent. Unlike other Boston papers the *Monitor* was much concerned with the probable effects of the shipping clauses in the Act on industry and finance.

A still greater simplification of the issue was reflected in letters to the editor. Although calculations are of necessity rough, it may safely be estimated that fully 95 per cent of the content of all the letters published in all the papers dealt only with the question of repeal.

The conclusion is inescapable that in presenting issues of public policy newspapers simplify and skeletonize the situation to meet the reader's demand for sharpness and definiteness of structure.

The evidence indicates further that editors and newswriters try to resist this demand to some extent, attempting to give as comprehensive and adequate a representation of events as they dare; while the readers (judging by those who state their views in letters to editors) insist upon selecting, sharpening, and pointing the issue still further to suit their desire for simplification and definiteness.

Explanation

For an explanation of skeletonizing, we may turn to two related theories:

(1) Big-time news stories—so writes Charles Merz—are always stories of a *fight* (man against nature, man against man, or opinion against opinion).⁴ Fights are possible only when issues are clearly defined and when antagonisms are sharply drawn. Newspapers must dramatize and select in order to produce in their readers the emotional integration required for a good fight (or enjoyment of a good fight). According to this theory it is obvious that the legalistic documents coming from Capitol Hill have no place in newspapers until they are stripped of statutory complications and the issue is sharply enough focussed for partisanship.

⁴ Charles Merz, "What Makes a First-Page Story?" *New Republic*, 1925, 45, 156-158.

(2) The reader, like any organism, requires an economy of thought. William James spoke of the need of human beings for simple pathways to find their way through the tangled complexities of life. Clichés, stereotypes and *idées fixes* are useful and necessary. Too many sides to an issue are confusing and fatiguing. Too many possibilities for action tend to impede all action. The newspaper abets the reader in conclusion-jumping.

Though the safeguarding of neutrality may require multifarious provisions, these must be reduced to salient and manageable dimensions before the public opinion can take form. In the mind of the common man the pressure to solve the problem, to escape from the pains of indecision, tends to produce a speedy solution based on only a few of the manifold variables concerned. The solution thus reached acquires plausibility by virtue of repressing from consciousness unwelcome complications and rationalizing contrary evidence. Freed from conflict and doubt, the individual holds to his solution tenaciously, becoming bitter toward those whose equally hasty and inadequate solution differs from his.⁵

It is noteworthy that the skeletonizing of the issue lasted only during the period of fight. After Congress had voted the Act, including the cash and carry provision, papers turned their attention almost for the first time to other features of the legislation. Shipping clauses, transfer of risk, and the definition of combat areas suddenly became of interest.

There seemed to be a waking up to the impact that the whole Act would have upon the interests of the United States. But this waking up took place only after the Act itself had become a law, after the fight was over. In skeletonizing the issue, newspapers had postponed discussion of all but one of the important provisions of the Act until nothing could be gained from public debate on these provisions.

Principle II

THE FIELD OF INFLUENCE IS WELL-STRUCTURED. When a person sinks into his armchair and unfolds a newspaper, he is influenced not merely by isolated words, phrases, or articles; in a significant sense he is *reading his paper*. The copy of the *Transcript* or *American* in his hands becomes an indivisible and homogeneous stimulus-field to be "lived into" for half an hour after his evening meal. The impact of the paper upon him must, therefore, be expressed in terms of "pattern" or "configuration." It is never fair, however, for a social scientist to invoke the concept of "pattern," and then to run away and leave the problem as if it were solved, for "pattern" is to a considerable degree a matter of definable inter-relationship. In the present investigation several aspects of the patterned stimulus-field are susceptible of relational analysis. These aspects may be discussed under the headings

⁵ The appeal of slogans may be explained in a similar way. See M. Sherif, "The Psychology of Slogans," *J. abn. soc. Psychol.*, 1937, 32, 450-461.

of (a) editorial policy, (b) letters to editors, (c) news coloration, (d) columnists, (e) propaganda devices, (f) the design of each paper.

Editorial Policy

A newspaper's pattern of influence is built around its editorial policy. In Table 1 are listed in brief form the policies and practices of the eight papers respecting the salient issue of repeal.

It will be noted that the *American* and *Record*, though vigorously opposed to repeal, printed few editorials on the subject. The reason, as we shall see, lies in their preference for editorializing, not in editorial columns, but in feature-news articles.

The question whether the selection of news for publication reflects editorial policy is answered in part in Table 2. The entries are based upon a classification of all articles pertain-

TABLE 1

Editorial Policies Respecting Repeal of the Arms Embargo

	<i>Direction of policy</i>	<i>Intensity of policy</i>	<i>No. of editorials in 70-day period</i>	<i>Av. length of editorials in column inches</i>
Herald	Pro-Repeal	Strong	32	12.47
Traveler	Pro-Repeal	Strong	21*	14.86
Globe	Pro-Repeal	Mild	20	7.39
Monitor	Pro-Repeal	Mild	24*	13.69
Transcript	Anti-Repeal	Strong	28*	16.93
American	Anti-Repeal	Strong	10**	17.00
Record	Anti-Repeal	Strong	12*	17.75
Post	Anti-Repeal	Mild	21	9.87

* No Sunday editions.

** Sunday *Advertiser* included.

TABLE 2

News Items in Relation to Editorial Policy

	<i>Repeal</i>	<i>Anti-Repeal</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Ambivalent</i>	<i>Total</i>
FAVORING REPEAL					
Herald	53	48	16	50	167
Traveler	37	32	24	40	133
Globe	42	40	16	42	140
Monitor	84	32	31	61	208
Total	216	152	87	193	648
AGAINST REPEAL					
Transcript	29	26	15	53	123
American	30	32	5	42	109
Record	17	54	34	35	140
Post	39	36	14	40	129
Total	115	148	68	170	501
Grand Total					1,149

ing to the Neutrality Act in the eight papers for 70 consecutive days. A large proportion of the news articles dealt with reports of debates and speeches. The analyst judged whether the content of the article was predominantly in favor of repeal, against repeal, ambivalent (both views represented) or neutral.

Note on Reliability. Five papers were analyzed by one investigator and three by a second (Miss Beatrice Schwartz, to whom the writers are deeply indebted for her assistance). In order to determine the analysts' reliability, a mixed sample of thirty papers was studied by both. The agreements of the two investigators working independently are as follows:

(a) Inclusion. Of the total number of news items recorded by either analyst, 66.7 per cent were listed by both; 33.3 per cent by one only. The discrepancy is due chiefly to the failure of one or the other analyst to include minor articles in which neutrality legislation received but incidental mention. Of the total number of editorials recorded, 62.5 per cent were identical. The failure here likewise occurs in the case of editorials in which neutrality legislation received only casual mention. For Columns (syndicated features) the percentage of common inclusion was about the same, 63.2, and for similar reasons.

(b) Amount of Space. For the news items listed by both analysts the agreement in column inches was high, 90.7 per cent. (The percentage of agreement was computed by dividing the difference between the two measurements in column inches by the larger of the two measures recorded.) For editorials the agreement was 92.3 per cent; for columns only 67.1 per cent, due to the difficulty of determining when a columnist was talking about neutrality and when about related subjects.

(c) Orientation. (Is the item pro-repeal, anti-repeal, neutral, or ambivalent?) For news stories the investigators agreed in their placements of items within this fourfold classification in 86 per cent of the cases; for

editorials in 90 per cent of the cases; for columns in 70 per cent. (From these figures it would appear that editors took a much clearer stand on the question of repeal than did columnists.)

(d) News Coloring. All news items were judged either as "direct," or "colored," the latter category being defined as the intrusion of the reporter's or editor's personal views. The analysts agreed in 95.9 per cent of their entries. This figure, however, is affected by the scarcity of cases illustrating news colorings.

In summary, it appears that in newspaper analysis of the type here reported the problem of inclusion-exclusion is the most serious. Two investigators working over the same territory do not agree as to whether one-third of the total material belongs or does not belong in the study. Yet, once having agreed on items for inclusion, measures of column inches, of tone and orientation of the articles, conform satisfactorily. The writings of columnists seem to be the hardest for the analysts to agree on.

The important result of this tabulation is the finding that most papers do to a certain extent select news items favoring the editorial policy of the paper, and reject those that are opposed (note italicized figures). Only the *Transcript* and the *Post* were exceptions to this trend; only the *Monitor* and *Record* were serious offenders.

Letters to Editors

Table 3 answers the question whether letters selected for publication by editors agree with the paper's editorial policy. C. J. Friedrich contends that by and large the letters published by newspapers are a fair sample of the letters received by editors.⁶

⁶ C. J. Friedrich, "Letters to the Editor as a Means of Measuring the Effectiveness of Propaganda," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 1937.

TABLE 3
Letters in Relation to Editorial Policy

	Pro-Repeal	Anti-Repeal	Neutral or Ambivalent	Total
FAVORING REPEAL.				
Herald	57	37	2	96
Traveler	44	35	5	84
Globe	41	47	1	89
Monitor	9	3	1	13
Total	151	122	9	282
AGAINST REPEAL.				
Transcript	56	61	5	122
American	—	—	—	—
Record	1	25	0	26
Post	12	40	1	53
TOTAL	69	126	6	201
Grand Total				483

We have no way of knowing whether or not the letters published are in fact representative of the letters received, but it is true that in the case of all papers excepting the *Globe* (the *American* printing no letters at all), the preponderance of letters published conforms to the editorial policy. If editors do not actually make a one-sided selection or publish fake letters, then we must conclude that the majority of letter-writers address a paper that agrees with their own views.

News Coloring

Out of a total of 1149 news articles analyzed, there were only 58 (5 per cent) that seemed to the investigators to be colored by reporters' or copy-writers' views. Though the instances found generally tended to confirm the paper's editorial policy, only the *Monitor* had an excessive ratio—half of all the cases occurring in this one paper; and these may be condoned in part by the fact that the

correspondent's name was often attached to the report. A *Herald* news item on November 5—not quoting any source—averred that repeal of the embargo would "have an electrifying effect on airplane building"; and the *Transcript* (opposed to repeal) on September 2 permitted a news writer to say that "most Americans seem to regard repeal of the embargo as the first step toward United States involvement in foreign war." On the whole, however, this kind of coloring of the news was rare.

Perhaps news coloring, as is so often alleged, lies in the character of headlines. That possibility was not systematically explored, but for an

31, 71-79. Against Friedrich's contention we have the testimony of newspaper men concerning the practice of stuffing the *Vox Pop* with fake letters written by staff members, generally in praise of the paper's stand or else intentionally provocative of controversy. The brief, ignorant communications to the tabloids are said to be in most cases productions of staff writers imitating naïveté and illiteracy in the style of "John Banana"—the typical tabloid reader.

eleven-day sample two papers were compared. During this period the *Transcript* had 4 con, 3 pro, and 7 neutral or ambivalent headlines; the *Herald* 3 con, 2 pro, and 9 neutral or ambivalent. Although these results are negative, the sample is too small to support any general denial that headline writing is a mode of coloring the news.

Another possibility of coloring must be considered. Might not speeches favoring the policy of the paper be reported at the beginning of news articles on the assumption that, being in a more prominent position, they would be more widely read? Using the same sample of eleven days, it was found that on nine of these days the *Transcript* did in fact give the favored position to anti-repeal speeches in its front page news articles. Averaging the eleven days showed that this paper printed 59 per cent of its abstracts of anti-repeal speeches in the first half of its leading news articles, but only 27 per cent of its abstracts of repealists' speeches. On eight of the same eleven days the *Herald* gave chief prominence to repealists' speeches, and for the whole period placed 54 per cent of its abstracts of pro-repeal speeches in the first half of the article, and only 39 per cent of its abstracts of anti-repeal speeches in this favored position. Thus, in the sample studied, *the favored position is given to news items agreeing with the editorial policy.*

Columnists

Do the opinions of syndicated columnists fit the configuration of the

paper? In respect to level of literacy, style of writing, and general outlook on politics, no doubt they do. But so far as the specific issue of neutrality legislation is concerned, the tie between editorial opinion and column opinion is not found to be close. Boake Carter, the most frequent contributor to the *Globe*, was opposed to repeal though the *Globe* editors were mildly favorable. Paul Mallon in the *Herald* was vigorously opposed, while his paper vigorously advocated repeal. (As a rule, however, Mallon and the *Herald* unite in condemning Roosevelt and his works.) Making a variety of quantitative comparisons, which need not be reported here in detail, we do not find that (excepting in the *Monitor*) columnist opinion and editorial opinion show more than chance agreement—a result which so far as it goes speaks well for the freedom of columnists to write as they choose.

Propaganda Devices

The *American* and *Record*, Hearst papers, elude many of the straightforward comparisons to which the other papers readily lend themselves. Although intensely opposed to repeal, they had few editorials on the subject, and no columnists who treated the problem at all. The *American* published no letters from readers, and the *Record* only those written with telegraphic brevity. These papers have a method all their own. Their editorializing is indirect, being concealed chiefly in local feature stories.

The process worked as follows. The "National Legion of Mothers of

“America” was sponsored; the precise relation of the organization to the Hearst papers was kept obscure. Its local headquarters were, however, the editorial offices themselves. One news item vaguely assures us that the League is “motivated solely by patriotism”; another that it is composed of “the commonplace mothers, the type familiar in story and song . . . but grimly determined to fight any attempt to send their sons to fight on foreign soil.” That the Legion was primarily a creation of Hearst is seen by the fact that while the Hearst *American* carried 522 column inches concerning the Legion and the Hearst *Record* 314 column inches, the *Post* carried only 6 column inches. The remainder of the Boston papers gave it equally scanty attention or else none at all.

Almost daily, articles and pictures gave publicity to the Legion. To draw attention to it a pledge was placed at the head of the editorial column each day “to oppose sending American soldiers to fight on foreign soil; to support a program for adequate national defense; to oppose any attempt to destroy the American form of government.” Powerful emotional symbols were used: for example, pictures of women signing peace ballots, surrounded by their children. Only occasional mention was made of the stand of the Legion against repeal, the great majority of the articles and pictures dealing only with the determination of mothers to keep their sons from the horror of foreign war; the general formula being, “I am the mother of six sons,” or “I lost a son in the last war,” and

“I want to keep American blood from ever again drenching foreign soil.” The issue was drawn in such a way as to make repeal seem synonymous with war. No logical argument was given to support this identification. The fallacy of diverting the argument from repeal to war was indulged in repeatedly. The tender idolatry of mother love was made to serve the Hearst anti-British policy well, though the entire process was concealed.

Design of Each Paper

It is difficult to define the pattern of a newspaper's influence in quantitative terms. Each paper has a distinctive atmosphere.⁷ The following follows a brief, somewhat impressionistic account of these atmospheric patterns.

The *American*. The preceding story of the Mothers' Legion illustrates the indirect, propagandistic character of this tabloid. Few editorials definitely stated the paper's stand on the embargo issue; few even spoke of the Neutrality Act. Such editorials as were published made lavish use of boldface and large-case

⁷ “Atmosphere-effects” are gradually coming into the purview of psychological and social science, although methods for their study are difficult to devise. Qualitative depictions of total situations (e.g., case studies) are the commonest procedure, but recent experimental work on “social climate” represents an original and important trend in the same direction. Cf. K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, S. K. Escalona, “Studies in Topological and Vector Psychology I,” *Univ. Iowa Stud. in Child Welfare*, 1940, 16, No. 3.

type—a simple perceptual device of propagandists employed by no other paper excepting the *Record*. The *American* ran many general editorials on the need for keeping out of war—this theme building a background of isolationist sentiment into which embargo-retention was set. Besides the exploitation of the Mothers' Legion, there was a short-lived feature series on a "Paul Revere Club," which, by varying the idolatry slightly, gave the same type of support to the editorial policy. Pictures were profusely used. Only the *Record* compares with the *American* in its simplified, one-sided presentation of the case. The logic was: stay out of war because patriotism and mother love require it, and (the fallacy by diversion) defeat the embargo-repeal in order to stay out of war. The simplicity of the formula is unequalled.

The *Record*. The design of this paper is likewise Hearstian. Published in the evening, it is essentially a night-prowling, ultra-tabloid version of the *American*.

The *Monitor*. Since this paper is widely known and admired for its high standards of journalism and general decency, it came as a shock to discover that the *Monitor* presented almost as one-sided a picture of neutrality legislation as did the *American* and *Record*. There was gross selection of pro-repeal news items (Table 2); its columnists and correspondents agreed completely with the editorial policy; its dispatches, though many of them are signed, were colored to a notable extent. We read, for example, in a

news item, "A great part of the public feels in its heart that the importance of passing the bill is in showing America's solidarity with France and England."

On the other hand, though guilty of one-sided presentation, this paper over-simplified its stand less than any other. It elaborated rather than skeletonized the topic; its appeal, even if prejudiced, was highbrow. Complex thoughts were complexly expressed; thus, "trading with the belligerents on a cash and carry basis is the lesser of two unneutral conceptions of neutrality." Shipping clauses were of greater interest to this paper than to any other. Although the reader was protected from uncongenial views, the congenial view was adequately presented and ably argued.

The *Transcript*. Recently rejuvenated, but still suffering from small circulation, the aristocratic *Transcript* adopted a vigorous policy opposing repeal, lashing out against the Administration along the way. It was surprising to find its editorial language only a little less blood-thirsty than that of the *American*. The *Transcript* published more editorials and letters devoted to the neutrality issue than any other paper, a reflection no doubt of the international interests of its cultured readers. Yet for all its vigorousness of opinion, this paper made an effort to serve as a forum, publishing more antagonistic letters than any other paper. Between October 16 and 28 it conducted a poll among its readers. The returns on six of the first eight days showed a substantial majority in favor of repeal, but on the four

final days the returns solidified around the policy of the paper and favored retention. Totaling the ballots, the *Transcript* found 59 per cent of its readers agreeing with the position held by the paper. The poll ceased abruptly after two days of unusually favorable returns. One has the feeling that the *Transcript* was caught between its desire to serve as a sounding board for public opinion and its own fierce partisanship.

The *Herald*. Like the *Transcript*, the *Herald* devoted a large amount of space to the Neutrality Act and was vehement in its editorial policy, favoring repeal as strongly as the *Transcript* opposed it. Editorials stressed the need for quick action, and the loss of prestige that Americans in general and the Senate in particular would suffer if the question remained long undecided. In the *Herald* there were few verbally colored news items, though the position of items in the news columns tended to favor repeal and a large majority of letters published from the readers favored the paper's stand on repeal (57 "pro," 37 "con"). The sole columnist differed from the editors in respect to repeal, but continually attacked the Administration, a policy congruent with that of the editors. The pattern of the *Herald* consistently represented the non-isolationist, pro-business and quick-action point of view.

The *Traveler*. An afternoon version of the *Herald*, this paper likewise fought for repeal, but more vociferously and less temperately than the *Herald*. "Every true American," it declared, "is unneutral." De-

fense was the big issue stressed by this paper; into it repeal was set. Editorial language was strong. Germany and Russia were "anti-God nations." Opponents of repeal were branded "high pressure groups resorting to half-truths, hysteria, distortion." The leading columnist, like the editor, was vehemently anti-Communist. Although editorials, columns, and letters were stacked for repeal, news items were more equally divided and the AP dispatches were direct and uncolored.

The *Globe*. This organ, definitely a "home" paper, was mild in its editorial stand. The slightly "pro" arguments placed emphasis chiefly upon the need for national unity in a time of crisis. The famous Uncle Dudley editorials were, as usual, literate rather than fiery. Although no cartoons were used to enliven the discussion, many columnists said their say excitedly. Lippmann and Thompson vigorously demanded repeal; Carter, retention. Slightly more "con" letters were published than "pro." On the whole, the *Globe* seems to be an old-fashioned democratic paper, playing no big bassoons of its own but hospitably representing the many-sided expressions of current opinion.

The *Post*. At first it was difficult to determine on which side this paper stood. Only by counting the number of "pro" and "con" editorials was it possible to reach a decision. On October 2 the *Post* declared that "opposition to removal is overwhelming," but on October 28 that repeal "will not increase the dangers of our involvement in war." Most of the thirteen cartoons published in the *Post*—

more than in any other paper—were neutral or ambivalent, neither definitely pro nor con. Forty of the fifty-three letters from readers were opposed to repeal, a larger ratio than for any other paper excepting the *Record*. The *Post* either reached a decidedly isolationist group or else selected its letters deliberately to accord with its editorial position. The *Post* is a morning paper reaching the less well-educated portion of the population, a fact which probably accounts for the brevity and relative scarcity of editorials, and for the uncomplicated treatment of the subject. On the whole, one feels that the *Post* was relatively indifferent to the issue of repeal and that its stand was dictated by the clientèle it reaches rather than by any conviction of its own.

Principle III

EMOTIONAL RESTRAINT IS GREATER AMONG EDITORS THAN AMONG READERS. It is a commonplace of newspaper psychology that an editor's decisions are governed by the caliber of his readers. But it is not frequently remarked that when an editor departs from his readers' standards, it is generally in the direction of greater restraint, caution, and judicial temper. The evidence for this assertion lies in a comparison of news and editorials with the *Vox Populi*.⁸

It has already been pointed out that whereas 86 per cent of the news columns and editorial space was devoted only to the issue of repeal, fully 95 per cent of the letters published dealt only with this question. Editors skeletonize; but readers do so to a

still greater extent. Qualifications and ramifications are conspicuously absent. When public opinion is expressed in letters, it has a point like a stiletto.

Letter writers are emotional. They can say, as did a reader of the *Globe*, that repeal is the "first step toward our entering this bloodthirsty, hideous and murderous war." Expressions of equal intensity were not found in the editorial columns of this paper. Letter writers speak of "poisonous legislation," "a waltz with tombstones," "blood money," "a mother's heart." Only the *American* and *Record*, and possibly the *Traveler* and *Transcript*, ever match the emotionalism of these symbols. The editorial language of other papers is sedate, speaking merely of "honorable neutrality," "the shortest path to peace," or else "the surest road to war." Readers who are responsible to no one can voice their feelings with far less restraint than can editors. They have fewer inhibitions in the use of language, and seldom show an appreciation for the rhetorical force of understatement.

Symbols

It is likewise evident that the word symbols employed by anti-repealists

⁸ C. J. Friedrich points out that so vigorous in emotional expression are letters to the editor that the correspondence department is often called the "Safety Valve." "Our investigation," he writes, "shows that most letters are 'agin' something or somebody." See his "Letters to the Editor as a Means of Measuring the Effectiveness of Propaganda," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 1937, p. 74.

are more emotional than those employed by repealists. A possible explanation may lie in the fact that fear and hatred of European nations and of the Administration—both prominent motives of the anti-repealists—gave rise to feelings of marked frustration, engendering in turn more violent verbal expression. People who were content to drift with the tide toward repeal and to trust the Administration did not feel frustration nor the corresponding need for aggression.

This line of thought enables us to explain why correspondence to Congressmen overwhelmingly opposed repeal whereas public opinion polls favored it. It seems that people will write letters (and strong ones) when they are antagonistically inclined toward a current trend in public policy; they are less inclined to write when they are satisfied with the course events are taking.⁹

Gleek reports that for one New York Congressman 79 per cent of his mail favored retention of the arms embargo, 21 per cent for repeal; for a California Congressman the ratio was virtually identical.¹⁰ In the Boston papers, on the other hand, 53 per cent favored retention and 47 per cent repeal. It is probable that the difference lies in the extra installment of "inspired" correspondence directed to Congressmen by Father Coughlin and Gerald Winrod. But even in the "uninspired" mail bags of Boston editors the ratio of published letters (if they are representative of the total number received) tended to favor retention (53:47),

while the Gallup polls showed a majority in favor of *repeal* (60:40). It is probable that this feeling of greater emotional tension, due to fearfulness, hate, and a dread of the trend of the times, engenders the excess letter-writing. People who are content to drift with the current tide write fewer letters.¹¹

Principle IV

INTENSITY OF INTEREST VARIES IN TIME. Thanks to the poll technique, studies in the change of opinion are increasing in numbers. The Gallup polls record the rise in opinion favoring change in the Neutrality Law permitting England and France to buy war supplies in the United States. In favor of such change, on

⁹ The principle seems to hold equally for radio fan-mail. Listeners write letters following sad and frustrating programs relatively more often than following gay and pleasing programs. See H. Cantril and G. W. Allport, *The Psychology of Radio*, 1935, p. 96.

¹⁰ L. E. Gleek, "96 Congressmen Make up Their Minds," *PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY*, 1940, 4, 3-24. Gleek likewise analyzed the key symbols around which the supporters of retention and repeal built their arguments. Applying Gleek's classification to our own sample of letters, we find the symbols used in approximately the same ratios. The order of frequency of the symbols employed by Boston writers seems to correspond more closely to Gleek's order for New York writers than for Californian—a bit of evidence, perhaps, for an east-coast and west-coast regionalism in the symbols of public opinion.

¹¹ The point gains firmer support from Friedrich's investigation. He shows that more negativist letters ("I don't like this") are received than activist ("Let's do this or that"). *Loc. cit.*

September 3, 1939, were 50 per cent of the respondents; on October 3 (before the President's speech) 57 per cent; after the President's speech, 62 per cent; on October 10 (after the first week of Senate debate) 60 per cent. Finally, after enactment of the bill, 66 per cent expressed themselves as satisfied with the legislation.¹²

Jacob is inclined to discount the effect of specific appeals, of isolated events, upon the basic course of public opinion. The President's speech he found acted only as a temporary hypodermic, jarring opinion of a wavering fringe until counteracting appeals or events swing them back again." Jacob is probably correct in holding that, for the issue we are here considering, the impact of influences is too complex for detailed analysis.

Yet our data show clearly that there is variation in the intensity of interest, each surge being somewhat short-lived. Table 4 presents the number of column inches devoted to neutrality legislation in news, editorials, syndicated columns, and letters. The highest five figures in each column (in one case, six) are marked by daggers. This method of selection serves to bring out the periodicity, and shows that the peaks of interest are timed approximately as follows:

- (a) Sept. 21-22: the days following the convening of Congress and the President's message.
- (b) Oct. 2: the commencement of the Senate debate.
- (c) Oct. 28: the day following the Senate's vote for repeal. (No increase for columnists or letter writers.)

- (d) Nov. 3: the day following the House's vote for repeal. (No increase for editorial, column or letter writers.)

Although interest was relatively high all through the period, it was markedly irregular, each surge being followed by a sag. Most significant is the fact that more space was given at the beginning of the period of Congressional activity than at any other time.

Gleck reports a similar phenomenon in letters to Congressmen. On September 19 the high mark was reached. Describing the course of mail after this date, Gleek writes, "From this peak on the 19th, it dropped rapidly to slightly above normal in two weeks' time, fell even lower in the closing stages of the Senate debates, rose sharply but to no great height on October 27 as the bill went to the House, and then fell away steadily."¹³

Since the course of interest was downward rather than upward, we find no evidence of the principle suggested by G. B. Watson that in times of "crisis" public opinion becomes increasingly divided (sharp bi-modality appearing).¹⁴ In the case we are discussing, the issue seems to be as decisively drawn at the beginning as at the end of the period. Watson's principle may well hold for "crises" in which the emergency itself be-

¹² P. E. Jacob, "Influences of World Events on U.S. 'Neutrality' Opinion," PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, 1940, 4, 48-65.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁴ G. W. Watson, "Orientation," *The Social Frontier*, 1937, 4, 20-26.

TABLE 4

Total Column Inches Devoted to Neutrality Legislation
in Eight Boston Papers

Date	News	Edi- torials	Column- ists	Letters	Date	News	Edi- torials	Column- ists	Letters
Sept.					Oct.				
1	85	0	0	0	6	269	0	64	95
2	167	7	43	19	7	136	7	89	103†
3*	25	0	0	0	8*	83	6	40	40
4**	125	16	3	3	9	314	11	15	26
5	183	74	25	0	10	340	24	49	26
6	279	50	27	0	11	405	24	35	43
7	148	61	0	0	12	305	31	33	46
8	162	18	9	23	13	221	1	39	48
9	109	8	99	70	14	471	36	57	72
10*	49	7	66	66	15*	119	0	36	36
11	218	22	86	8	16	296	25	66	44
12	169	6	64	40	17	303	47	38	46
13	180	17	0	6	18	199	9	65	46
14	234	93	69	52	19	196	21	43	46
15	337	70	92	47	20	228	8	1	11
16	131	16	72	57	21	190	13	32	25
17*	221	0	54	54	22*	79	0	12	12
18	216	68	113	81	23	320	12	30	38
19	228	98†	80	72	24	250	45	51	62
20	345	59	71	59	25	270	33	45	50
21	821†	137†	117†	80	26	256	0	38	17
22	899†	131†	116†	94	27	313	20	48	64
23	315	30	69	77	28	567†	102†	23	15
24*	184	0	10	10	29*	121	0	0	0
25	410	77	92	76	30	263	80	73	85
26	390	5	97	87	31	210	12	36	42
27	258	26	127†	143†	Nov.				
28	283	31	58	79	1	244	14	35	42
29	493	26	40	52	2	225	0	19	26
30	259	28	64	90	3	591†	77	24	24
Oct.					4	426	44	40	31
1*	220	11	8	8	5*	218	0	7	7
2	607†	111†	143†	102†	6	234	79	62	26
3	452	53	48	53	7	138	11	12	23
4	438	66	136†	127†	8	81	26	0	4
5	368	38	124†	109†	9	27	0	19	14

* Sunday

** Holiday

comes more acute (strikes, war, depression), but seems not to apply to pending legislation which, after debate (the arguments all being predetermined) can only be passed or rejected.

Principle V

PUBLIC OPINION FATIGUES AND PRESSES TOWARD CLOSURE. Public opinion, it has variously been said, is *fickle, inert, and crowdish*. On the basis of our evidence we add one further epithet: public opinion is *fatigable*. To us it seems likely that all these four attributes reflect one fundamental psychological tendency —*the desire of the average man to be freed as quickly as possible from the tension of worry and annoyance in matters of public policy*.

It will be recalled that in the hot days of the summer of 1939, neutrality legislation perished in conference, the public being wholly apathetic to its fate. Neither the Administration's insistence upon the importance of revision, nor threats of a special session succeeded in keeping the subject alive. It was impossible to arouse feeling concerning dangers not yet existent. (Within the past few years public opinion in the democracies has many times shown the same sluggishness in the face of unrecognized dangers.)

When it was at length aroused by the outbreak of war and by the special call to Congress, interest mounted in a crowdish way, almost to a frenzy. The climax coincided with the assembling of Congress. Although from the point of view of the democratic process the issue was now

merely *opened* for debate, opinions had already been formed and expressed; newspapers had already shot their heaviest ammunition. Interest soon started to lag; people wanted a closure. Occasionally in the ensuing five weeks there were upsurges of interest, but these rapidly diminished in intensity. From Table 4 it appears that there was considerable desire after the Senate vote to regard the matter as closed. Five days later the House vote caused but a minor amount of excitement, and within four days more the issue was virtually dead. Sixty-six per cent of the citizens polled declared themselves pleased with the outcome—more, be it noted, than favored repeal during the debate. The extra recruits must have been people who were glad simply to have the issue out of the way for good and all.¹⁵

One of Ross's laws of social psychology comes to mind: the more intense a craze, the sharper will be the reaction against it. Applied to the present situation, one might say that *for the average man the more intense the feelings aroused by an issue involving public opinion the stronger will be the demand for closure*. It is necessary to escape from tension as soon as practicable.

¹⁵ It should be added that public opinion is probably no more fatigable than the editors. In their anxiety to find something new, editors often drop a good story before it is dead. After printing the first chapter they fail to follow through, fearing that the readers' interest has waned. For this reason the fatigability of public opinion cannot be measured precisely by the declining curves of newspaper space.

The principle probably holds only for the average man, not for the zealot. It is well known that waves of interest in governmental reform are notoriously short-lived for the population at large; yet they do constitute a lasting tide of concern for a handful of professional reformers. So far as the average man is concerned, it appears that democracy will have to be content with brief periods of participation. After his short surges of interest in the public welfare, he must be expected to turn back to his vocational and domestic routine.

In summary, the evidence reported in this study is interpreted as supporting five generalizations which are offered here as tentative laws in the new field of the psychology of newspapers: (1) issues are skeletonized; (2) any given newspaper's field of influence is well-patterned; (3) readers are more emotional than editors; (4) public interest as reflected in newspapers is variable in time; (5) public interest rapidly fatigues and presses for an early closure.

Gallup and Fortune Polls

This section contains a compilation, topically arranged, of poll results released by the American Institute of Public Opinion and by *Fortune*. It is complete for the time periods covered except for a special *Fortune* survey described at the end of the section. The AIPO results cover the period from July through September 1940. (Previous AIPO questions were reported in the July 1938, October 1939, and March, June, and September 1940 issues of the *QUARTERLY*.) The *Fortune* questions are those which appeared in the July, August, and September issues of the magazine. (Previous *Fortune* questions were reported in the March, June, and September 1940 issues of the *QUARTERLY*.) Under each topic, all of the Institute data are given in chronological order, then all of the *Fortune* material, also in chronological sequence. Dates appearing in connection with AIPO questions are those carried in the date lines of Institute releases to subscribing newspapers; dates following *Fortune* questions indicate the issue of the magazine in which the information appeared. Institute questions are designated by AIPO; *Fortune* questions by FOR. "DK" stands for "don't know"; "no op." for "no opinion." In considering this poll data, the reader should bear in mind certain salient points of reference set forth on pages 75 and 76 of the March 1940 issue of the *QUARTERLY*. The *QUARTERLY* wishes to express its appreciation to George Gallup and the American Institute of Public Opinion and to the editors of *Fortune* and Elmo Roper for their cooperation in making these survey results available in convenient form to other students of public opinion.

Part One: Domestic Issues

I. POLITICAL

PARTY PREFERENCE

In politics do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, Socialist, or Independent? (Aug. 3, '40—AIPO)

Dem. 41% Rep. 38% Indep. 20% Socialist or other 1% No. op. 4%

% INDEPENDENTS:

New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
30%	21%	23%	21%	10%	21%

Same. (Sept. 24, '40—AIPO)

Dem. 44% Rep. 35% Indep. 20% Socialist and all others 1%

% INDEPENDENTS:

Maine	19%	Rhode Island	41%	New Jersey	22%
New Hampshire	22	Connecticut	30	Delaware	25
Vermont	25	New York	23	Maryland	16
Massachusetts	31	Pennsylvania	16	West Virginia	8

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Ohio	22%	Virginia	12%	Oklahoma	5%
Illinois	22	Kentucky	8	Colorado	20
Indiana	15	Tennessee	8	Wyoming	12
Michigan	30	North Carolina	9	Montana	31
Wisconsin	32	South Carolina	2	Idaho	27
Minnesota	22	Georgia	9	Nevada	16
Iowa	12	Florida	12	Utah	22
Missouri	19	Alabama	11	Arizona	15
Kansas	9	Mississippi	2	New Mexico	20
Nebraska	23	Arkansas	6	California	19
North Dakota	9	Louisiana	6	Oregon	7
South Dakota	12	Texas	8	Washington	33

PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES

If President Roosevelt runs for a third term on the Democratic ticket against Wendell Willkie on the Republican ticket, how would you vote? (July 11, '40—AIPO)

Same (New York voters) (July 20, '40—AIPO)

Willkie 51% Roosevelt 49% No opinion 14%

If the Presidential election were held today, would you vote for the Republican candidate, Willkie, or the Democratic candidate, Roosevelt? (Dates as shown—AIPO)

	Roosevelt	Willkie	No op.
July 27, '40: Pennsylvania	48%	52%	13%
July 30, '40: California	54	46	14
Aug. 1, '40: Texas	85	15	9
Aug. 4, '40: National	51	49	13
Aug. 6, '40: First voters, 1940	54	46	
Upper middle income	50	50	
Lower income	63	37	
Aug. 13, '40: Cities over 500,000	57	43	
Aug. 22, '40: New Jersey	49	51	
Aug. 25, '40: National	51	49	12
Aug. 27, '40: Upper income	29	71	
Middle income	47	53	
Lower income	66	34	
On relief	75	25	
Aug. 31, '40: Maine	36	64	
Sept. 7, '40: National	51	49	
Sept. 12, '40: Labor union members	64	36	12
A.F.L. members	62	38	
C.I.O. members	75	25	

	Roosevelt	Willkie	No op.
Sept. 15, '40: Missouri	53%	47%	
Kentucky	55	45	
West Virginia	55	45	
Maryland	56	44	
Delaware	55	45	
Sept. 17, '40: New York	52	48	
Pennsylvania	52	48	
New Jersey	54	46	
Sept. 26, '40: Cities over 500,000	61	39	
2,500-500,000	55	45	
Towns under 2,500	51	49	
Farm voters	53	47	
Mid-West farmers	46	54	
Upper income	32	68	
Middle income	52	48	
Lower income	71	29	
On relief	80	20	
Voters 21-24	59	41	
Voters 25-29	59	41	
Voters 30-49	56	44	
Voters 50 and over	54	46	

Same. (*Electoral vote forecasts*) (Dates as shown—AIPO)

SEPT. 7, '40	Roosevelt	Willkie	SEPT. 19, '40	Roosevelt	Willkie
No. of States	28	20	No. of States	38	10
Electoral votes	247	284	Electoral votes	453	78

Same. (*Independent voters**) (Sept. 24, '40—AIPO)

	Roosevelt	Willkie	No op.		Roosevelt	Willkie	No op.
National	51%	49%	18%	Illinois	46%	54%	19%
New York	49	51	22	Michigan	53	47	19
Pennsylvania	62	38	20	California	52	48	16
Ohio	52	48	19				

* For extent of independent vote see Party Preference section above.

	Roosevelt	Willkie
Total	68%	32%
Reps.	27	73
Dems.	96	4

(No op. 16%)

Intensity factors (Sept. 29, '40—AIPO)

Among Willkie supporters, 77% indicated that they were positive about voting for Willkie, that nothing could change their opinions; 23% said they favored him at present, but might change their minds. Among Roosevelt supporters, 73% were positive about their vote, while 27% said they might change their minds.

No op.

Ninety per cent of Willkie supporters said they were reasonably certain of voting on election day; 10% were doubtful. Among Roosevelt supporters, 84% were reasonably certain of voting; 16% were not sure.

Do you think it would be a bad thing for the country if (opposing candidate) is elected? (Sept. 29, '40—AIPO)

ROOSEVELT VOTERS:

Willkie election "bad thing"	40%
Not "bad thing"	34
Undecided	26

WILLKIE VOTERS:

Roosevelt election "bad thing"	67%
Not "bad thing"	20
Undecided	13

If Roosevelt does run for re-election, do you think you would vote for or against him as you feel now? (July '40—FOR.)

For	Against	Don't know	Wouldn't answer	Won't vote
49.0%	31.4%	11.2%	2.1%	6.3%

If Roosevelt does not run for re-election, which party do you think you would be most likely to vote for, as you feel now? (July '40—FOR.)

Republican	35.7%	Don't know	21.5%		
Democratic	33.7	Wouldn't answer	1.7		
Other	0.6	Won't vote	6.8		
		Rep.	Dem.		
New England	49.4%	26.8%	East South Cent.	5.4%	47.6%
Middle Atlantic	47.7	25.7	West South Cent.	12.1	58.9
East North Cent.	40.5	26.6	Mountain States	29.3	26.7
West North Cent.	47.4	22.2	Pacific Coast	35.9	42.5
South Atlantic	16.5	51.3			

If Roosevelt does run next fall, do you think you would vote for him or for Willkie? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

	Roosevelt	Willkie	Roosevelt	Willkie	
Total	44.3%	40.8%	New England	40.6%	47.2%
South Atlantic	66.5	16.4	Pacific Coast	37.0	51.1
East South Cent.	64.8	11.1	Middle Atlantic	35.9	52.6
West South Cent.	62.8	15.9	West North Cent.	33.1	57.6
Mountain States	39.3	39.3	(Other, won't vote or wouldn't answer 8.0%; don't know 6.9%)		
East North Cent.	38.8	45.1			

(If for Willkie) Which of the following most nearly represents your opinion of Willkie? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

He is the best man Republicans have and is likely to win the election	57.2%
He is the best man Republicans have but he probably won't beat Roosevelt	14.1
Someone else would have been a better choice, but Willkie will be better than another term for Roosevelt	21.5
Don't know	7.2

Willkie
10
78No op.
19
16Willkie
32%
73
4
(%)ing for
present,
about

(If for Roosevelt) Which of the following most nearly represents your opinion of Willkie? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

He is the best man Republicans could have chosen, but it is better for the country to keep Roosevelt in office	68.1%
He may be all right as a person, but Republicans made a mistake not to have chosen a different candidate	12.8
He is thoroughly unsuited for office, his election would be a calamity	5.8
Don't know	13.3

THIRD TERM

Would you favor a constitutional amendment prohibiting any President from serving a third term? (July 2 and 23, '40—AIPO)

	July '40	Dem.	Rep.	Sept. '38	Nov. '38
Favor	41%	23%	65%	48%	42%
Oppose	59	77	35	52	58

PARTY PLATFORMS

Have you read the Republican party platform? (July 14, '40—AIPO)

	All voters	Republican voters	Democratic voters
Yes	26%	31%	22%
No	74	69	78

Do you think many voters pay attention to political platforms today? (July 14, '40—AIPO) Yes 27%
No 73

Should the platform of a political party be drawn up by the convention or by the man nominated for President? (July 14, '40—AIPO) Convention 67%
Nominee 33

POLITICAL DEBATES

Wendell Willkie proposed that he and President Roosevelt hold a series of debates, both speaking from the same platform. Do you think the President should accept the proposal? (Sept. 5, '40—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	49%	51%
Reps.	69	31
Dems.	28	72
(No op.	14%)	

POLITICS AND THE WAR

If England is defeated between now and election time and it looks as though the United States might have to fight Germany, which candidate would you prefer for President—Willkie or Roosevelt? (Sept. 3, '40—AIPO)

Roosevelt	58%
Willkie	42
Undecided	10

Which party, if it were elected to office next fall, do you think would be more likely to keep us out of war? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

Democrat	Republican	Both same	Neither	Don't know
28.4%	26.5%	20.8%	9.9%	14.4%

POLITICS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

Which party do you think would do the better job of strengthening our country's national defenses—the Republicans or the Democrats? (July 14, '40—AIPO)

	Republicans	Democrats	Little Difference
Total	38%	38%	24%
New England & Middle Atlantic	43	33	24
East Central	41	32	27
West Central	37	36	27
South	23	58	19
West	34	39	27
Democratic voters	5	71	24
Republican voters	69	8	23

Which party, if it were elected next fall, do you think would do the better job of building up our national defense? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

Democrats	Republicans	Both same	Neither	Don't know
39.1%	26.5%	19.8%	0.6%	14.0%

WALLACE

Do you think Henry Wallace has done a good job or a poor job as Secretary of Agriculture? (July 23, '40—AIPO)

	Good	Poor
Total	73%	27%
South	81	19
Mid-West	68	32

KNOX AND STIMSON

President Roosevelt has named two Republicans, Frank Knox and Henry Stimson, to be Secretaries of Navy and War in his cabinet. Do you approve or disapprove of his action? (July 4, '40—AIPO)

	App.	Disapp.
Total	71%	29%
Reps.	57	43
Dems.	85	15

2. GOVERNMENTAL POLICY

WAR EMERGENCY

In view of the present international situation, which of the following do you think our government should and should not do now? (July '40—FOR.)

	Should	Should not	Don't know
Spend whatever is necessary to build up as quickly as possible our army, navy, and air force	93.6%	3.1%	3.3%
Set up a nonpolitical board of leading men in industry with power to control industrial production in case we get into war	68.5	9.1	22.4
Exempt all industries producing military necessities from the forty-hour-week law in order to speed up production	57.1	26.0	16.9
Start compulsory military training for all young men between 18 and 20	52.6	37.9	9.5
Form a new Cabinet made up of both Democrats and Republicans	41.9	29.1	29.0

BUSINESS

During the next four years do you think business should be regulated to a greater extent by the Federal government? (July 25, '40—AIPO)

Yes	33%
No	67
No op.	17

LABOR

Do you think labor unions should be regulated to a greater extent by the Federal government? (July 25, '40—AIPO)

Yes	75%
No	25
No op.	18

3. SOCIAL

ISMS AND FIFTH COLUMN

Without mentioning names, do you think there are any fifth columnists in this community? (Sept. 14, '40—AIPO)

Yes	48%
No	26
DK	26

Do you believe that Germany has already started to organize a "Fifth Column" in this country? (July '40—FOR.)

Yes	71.0%
No	6.8
DK	22.2

Which one of these comes closest to what you think the government should do about Communist sympathizers? Nazi sympathizers? (July '40—FOR.)

	Communist	Nazi
Nothing, or no more than it is now doing	3.4%	2.7%
Keep track of them so that they could be rounded up if necessary	16.6	13.1
Keep track of them and also prevent them from agitating and organizing	32.9	28.2
Deport them or put them in jail	37.8	46.1
Don't know	9.3	9.9

MOVIES

Would you rather go to a motion picture theater showing a single feature or to one showing a double feature? (Aug. 8, '40—AIPO)

		Single	Double		Single	Double
22.4	Total	57%	43%	On relief	42%	58%
16.9	Aged 6-12	23	77	New England	43	57
9.5	Aged 12-17	42	58	Mid-Atlantic	55	45
29.0	Aged 18-24	60	40	East Central	62	38
	Aged 24 and over	68	32	West Central	57	43
	Upper income	75	25	South	58	42
	Middle income	63	37	Rocky Mountain	62	38
	Lower income	47	53	Pacific Coast	56	44

Part Two: The War in Europe

1. AMERICAN ESTIMATES

FRENCH DEFEAT

Some are saying the French let the British down and others are saying the British let the French down. What do you think? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

British let the French down	27.8%	Neither	28.1%
French let the British down	13.0	Don't know	19.7
Let each other down	11.4		

GERMANY AND SOUTH AMERICA

Do you think that the people of South America, as a whole, are as anxious as we are to keep Germany out of the Western Hemisphere? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

Yes	48.5%
No	33.9
DK	17.6

NEWS AND PROPAGANDA

Recently the English claimed that they shot down 387 German planes in one week and lost only 94 of their own. Do you think this report is accurate? (Sept. 10, '40—AIPO)

Yes	19%
No	58
DK	23

Recently the Germans claimed that they shot down 427 English planes in one week and lost only 99 of their own. Do you think this report is accurate? (Sept. 10, '40—AIPO)

Yes	3%
No	86
DK	11

2. AMERICAN EXPECTATIONS

WHO WILL WIN

Which side do you think will win the war? (July 7, '40—AIPO)

Allies 32% Axis 35% Undecided 33%

Same. (Sept. 10, '40—AIPO)

England 43%	Germany 17%	Undecided 40%
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Regardless of what you hope, which side do you think will win the war in Europe, as it looks now? (July '40—FOR.)

Germany	The Allies	Neither	Don't know
40.1%	30.3%	1.7%	27.9%

As things look now, do you think that Germany will conquer the British Isles? (Regardless of what you hope.) (Aug. '40—FOR.)

Yes	37.5%
No	39.8
DK	22.7

U.S. INVOLVEMENT

As things look now, do you think the U.S. will actually get into the war? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

Yes	37.0%	No	44.8%
Yes, if England holds on	2.5	Don't know	11.4
Yes, if England collapses	4.3		

INVASION OF U.S.

Mr. Bullitt, our ambassador to France, says that if Great Britain is defeated the Germans will invade the United States. Do you think they will? (Sept. 14, '40—AIPO)

Yes	42%
No	45
No op.	13

IMPLICATIONS OF GERMAN VICTORY

If Germany should win the war, which of these statements do you believe would be true, which false? (July '40—FOR.)

	True	False	Don't know
She will try to extend her influence in South America	77.7%	6.0%	16.3%
She will interfere seriously with our vital interests in foreign trade	73.8	10.8	15.4
A victorious Germany would mean the end of religious freedom in Europe	65.6	16.6	17.8
She will try to seize territory on our side of the ocean	63.1	22.0	14.9
A German victory would be followed by world revolution and confusion	57.3	19.3	23.4
She will actually attack us on our own territory as soon as possible	45.2	38.6	16.2
Germany will join with Japan in an effort to dominate the world	42.6	26.5	30.9
Fear of German attack would make us give up most of our liberties to dictatorship here	27.7	52.0	20.3
It will bring Europe under a strong and efficient government	23.6	55.4	21.0
In the long run it will make for a more peaceful Europe	10.2	72.9	16.9
It will bring about a fairer distribution of the world's wealth and resources	7.3	70.5	22.2

3. U.S. POLICY

NATIONAL DEFENSE

See Part Three: National Defense

AID TO ALLIES

Do you think we are giving enough help to England, or do you think ways should be found to give England more help than we are at present, but short of going to war? (July 18, '40—AIPO)

	Total	Republican voters	Democratic voters
Give more help	53%	50%	56%
Enough help now	41	44	38
Give less help	6	6	6

If the Allies need more money for running the war, would you be in favor of the United States and other American republics buying the British, French and Dutch possession in the area of the Panama Canal? (July 21, '40—AIPO)

Do you approve or disapprove of our government selling fifty of our destroyers to England? (Aug. 17, '40—AIPO)

App.	62%	61%
Disapp.	38	39
(Alternate wording)		

What do you think the U.S. should do about selling supplies to the nations at war? (July '40—FOR.)

Sell only to the Allies, and on credit if necessary	35.2%
Sell only to the Allies, and only for cash	23.7
Sell to either side for credit	0.6
Sell to either side for cash	16.7
Sell nothing to any warring nation	15.1
Don't know	8.7

If England and France run out of cash and want to buy more supplies here, should we provide them with the cash by buying some of their territory on this side of the ocean? (July '40—FOR.)

Do you think we should do more than we are now doing to help England against Germany? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

Yes	34.2%
No	57.4
DK	8.4

(If yes) Which of these things do you think we should do to help?

	Yes	No	Don't know
Furnish materials and supplies	98.2%	0.3%	1.5%
Encourage Americans to volunteer to fight for England	26.9	66.9	6.2
Send our air force	21.2	71.8	7.0
Send our navy	20.4	73.5	6.1
Send our army	14.7	79.0	6.3

U.S. PARTICIPATION

If the question of the United States going to war against Germany and Italy came up for a national vote within the next two weeks, would you vote to go into the war or to stay out of the war? (July 7, '40—AIPO)

	Go in	Stay out		Go in	Stay out
June 2, '40	16%	84%	South	23%	77%
June 14, '40	19	81	West	16	84
July 7, '40	14	86	Upper Inc.	10	90
New Eng. & Mid-Atl.	14	86	Middle Inc.	14	86
East Cent.	10	90	Lower Inc.	16	84
West Cent.	11	89			

Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the U.S. to try to do—to keep out of the war ourselves, or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war? (Sept. 22, '40—AIPO)

	Stay out	Help England		Stay out	Help England
May '40	64%	36%	SEPT. '40:		
June '40	64	36	New Eng. &		
July '40	61	39	Mid-Atl.	48%	52%
Aug. '40	53	47	East Cent.	52	48
Sept. '40	48	52	West Cent.	57	43
	(No op., Sept., 5%)		South	30	70
			West	46	54

Which of these comes closest to expressing what you think the U.S. should do now? (July '40—FOR.)

	Total	New	Middle	South
	Eng.	West	West	West
Enter the war at once on the side of the Allies	7.7%	4.7%	3.3%	12.2%
Help the Allies and go to war only if the Allies seem sure to lose	19.2	15.5	14.3	23.5
Help the Allies but never enter the war	40.6	60.1	35.4	43.5
Take no sides	26.0	14.9	41.8	17.3
Help Germany		0.2		
Don't know		6.3		

If a major foreign power actually threatened to take over any of the following places by armed invasion, would you be willing to see the U.S. come to the rescue with armed forces? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

		August, 1940		August, 1940
Canada:	Yes	87.8%	Bermuda:	Yes 60.3%
	No	6.8		No 19.1
	Don't know	5.4		Don't know 20.6
Mexico:	Yes	76.5	Brazil:	Yes 54.7
	No	12.5		No 24.9
	Don't know	11.0		Don't know 20.4
Hawaii:	Yes	74.0	Dutch	Yes 17.1
	No	12.5		No 54.7
	Don't know	13.5		Don't know 28.2
Philippines:	Yes	65.5	East Indies:	Yes 7.8
	No	20.3		No 3.9
	Don't know	14.2		Don't know 44.2%

IN EVENT OF AXIS VICTORY

If Germany and Italy should win the war, which one of these two things comes closer to what you think the U.S. should do? (Aug. '40—FOR.)

Arm to the teeth at any expense to be prepared for any trouble	88.3%
Stop spending so much for armaments and try to get along peacefully with them	7.8
Don't know	3.9

If Hitler wins, should we: (Aug. '40—FOR.)

Find some way of continuing our European commercial business with Hitler's new Europe	44.2%
Make every effort to develop business only with countries not under Hitler's control	40.0
Don't know	15.8

PANAMA CANAL AREA

If Germany defeats England, should the United States take immediate possession of the English, French, and Dutch territories in the area of the Panama Canal? (July 21, '40—AIPO)

Yes, if necessary 87% No 13% No op. 13%

If Germany defeats the Allies, should the United States fight, if necessary, to keep Germany out of the British, French and Dutch possessions located in the area of the Panama Canal? (July 21, '40—AIPO)

Yes 84%
No 16%

SHIPS FOR REFUGEES

It has been suggested that the U.S. send American passenger ships to England to bring English refugee women and children to the U.S. to stay until the war is over. Would you approve or disapprove of sending our ships if Germany and Italy agree not to attack them? (Aug. 17, '40—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng. & Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
App.	63%	64%	59%	64%	67%	60%
Disapp.	37	36	41	36	33	40

FOOD FOR EUROPE

If there is starvation in France, Holland and Belgium this winter, should the United States try to send food to those countries in our ships? (Sept. 1, '40—AIPO)

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Total	38%	62%	South	37%	63%
New Eng. & Mid-Atl.	37	63	West	38	62
East Cent.	41	59	Farm voters	35	65
West Cent.	38	62	If some went to Germans	22	78

Part Three: National Defense

CONSCRIPTION

(Voters aged 21-25) Do you think every able-bodied young man 20 years old should be made to serve in the army or the navy for one year? (July 9, '40—AIPO)	Yes	52%
	No	48

Same. (July 28, '40—AIPO)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	July 28, '40:	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Dec. '38	37%	63%	Young people 15-20	67%	33%
Oct. '39	39	61	Voters 21-29	62	38
June 2, '40	50	50	Voters 30-49	69	31
June 23, '40	64	36	Voters 50 and over	68	32
July 28, '40	67	33	Men voters	70	30
			Women voters	64	36
			(No op. 7%)		

Same. (Aug. 11, '40—AIPO)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>		<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>		<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Total*	66%	34%	Women			Voters 21-30	62%	38%
Democrats	73	27	voters	63%	37%	Maine	77	23
Republicans	60	40	Labor union			N.H.	74	26
Men voters	68	32	members	71	29	Vt.	74	26

GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

717

	Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No
Mass.	71%	29%	Iowa	58%	42%	Ark.	67%	33%
R.I.	72	28	Mo.	64	36	La.	72	28
Conn.	69	31	N.D.	71	29	Texas	80	20
N.Y.	68	32	S.D.	66	34	Okla.	72	28
N.J.	69	31	Neb.	69	31	Colo.	57	43
Penna.	65	35	Kan.	56	44	Wyo.	70	30
Md.	69	31	Va.	73	27	Mont.	64	36
Del.	62	38	N.C.	68	32	Idaho	73	27
W.Va.	65	35	S.C.	72	28	Utah	57	43
Ohio	58	42	Ga.	79	21	Nev.	70	30
Ind.	55	45	Fla.	75	25	N.M.	63	37
Mich.	58	42	Ala.	76	24	Ariz.	71	29
Ill.	64	36	Miss.	87	13	Calif.	68	32
Wis.	60	40	Ky.	72	28	Ore.	74	26
Minn.	57	43	Tenn.	72	28	Wash.	67	33

* No op. 8%

Do you favor increasing the size of our Army and Navy by drafting men between the ages of 18 and 32 to serve in the armed forces for one year? (Aug. 11, '40—AIPO)

Yes	71%
No	29
No op.	5

Same. (Aug. 29, '40—AIPO)

Yes	No	No op.
71%	29%	5%
62	38	11

If the draft law is passed, will you, personally, have any objection to spending a year in some branch of military service? (Aug. 29, '40—AIPO)

Men 21-24: No objection 68%; object 32%
 Men 16-21: No objection 81%; object 19%

NATIONAL GUARD

Do you think the National Guard should be called out for one year of military training? (Aug. 15, '40—AIPO)

Yes	85%
No	15
No op.	9

PREFERRED BRANCH OF ARMED FORCES

If the United States were attacked by some foreign country, which branch of the armed forces would you prefer to serve in? (July 9, '40—AIPO)

	Army	Airforce	Navy	Others
Men aged 21 to 46	44%	29%	24%	3%
Men under 30	34	34	29	3
Men 30-45	50	26	22	2

PROGRESS IN ARMAMENT

Are you satisfied with the progress that the present Administration is making in re-arming our country? (Aug. 18, '40—AIPO)

	Yes	No	DK		Yes	No	DK
Total	61%	23%	16%	East Cent.	27%	42%	31%
Democrats	35	37	28	West Cent.	37	33	30
Republicans	29	42	29	South	27	42	31
New Eng. & Mid-Atl.	34	41	25	West	33	39	28

Do you happen to know whether or not the production of tanks has already been substantially increased? (Aug. 18, '40—AIPO)

Don't know	75%
Believe Yes	19
Believe No	6

Are you satisfied with the present rate of production of airplanes, tanks, warships and guns for our national defense program? (Aug. 18, '40—AIPO)

Yes	32%
No	40
DK	28

Same. (Sept. 21, '40—AIPO)

	Total	Yes	No	No op.
Democrats	46	36	18	
Republicans	32	48	20	
				19%

(Asked of the 41% who were dissatisfied) Whose fault do you think it is? (Sept. 21, '40—AIPO)

Administration, Roosevelt, the government	14%
Congress, the politicians	11
Industry and business	3
Public apathy, the people themselves	2
All others	3
No reply	8
	—
	41%

NOTE

Because of space limitations, it has been necessary to exclude from the preceding tabulation The *Fortune* Forum of Executive Opinion (based on a selective sample of business executives), which appeared in the September 1940 issue of *Fortune*.

BOOK REVIEWS

HERRING, PENDLETON, *The Politics of Democracy: American Parties in Action*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1940. 468 pp. (\$3.75)

Some American liberals today are rediscovering the virtues of our political vices. The vacuity, ambiguity and bombast of party platforms, the machine manipulations of elections, the distortions of legislative apportionment, the windy oratory of candidates, the use of money in elections, the parcelling out of jobs to hold the armies of professional politicians together—all such phenomena, which in a less disturbed world they usually condemn, now seem slight defects in our process of government when measured by the force and frauds of dictatorship.

Professor Herring's book belongs to this school. It is primarily a group of essays in interpretation and evaluation. Instead of rattling the bare bones of party structure, it takes these skeleton facts for granted and seeks to clothe them with human flesh. This requires an inquiry into more than mere party phenomena. Accordingly, one finds woven into the account the place of organized pressure groups as they work through party and non-party channels, as they tie into the propaganda and the public opinion-making process, as they

obtain legislative favor and as, together with partisan pressures, they impinge upon the administrative bureaucracy. It is in dealing with the last mentioned phase of the process that Herring makes his freshest contribution.

While there are some gestures in the study indicating that the temper of scientific catholic tolerance lifts the author "above the battle," his basic concern throughout is "to show that through the toleration of attitudes and proposals our political process provides the milieu within which a science of society may be developed and intelligence may be applied to our common problems" (p. ix).

The "evils" in the political process against which the "reformers" have raged are after all manifestations of the frailties of a human nature with which we will have to live until that nature and its political manifestations change. While reforming zealots are to be "cheered" on, still they are cautioned that our system cannot guarantee the "good life" or an "economy of abundance." They must also realize that "the application of critical standards too high for human attainment does tend toward an unhealthy sense of frustration which may lead to disillusionment and even

cynicism" (p. x). After all, "The quest of American politics must be unity and agreement" (p. 360).

Upon such major premises the analysis ranges over a wide area of political activity. The practices of party politicians, pressure-group leaders and propagandists, of business and labor activity in the process, the structural machinery of party and group action, the rise and demise of third parties, of left- and right-wing demagogues, the making of windy, weasel-worded platforms and the mob theatricals of conventions, the use of money to win elections and spoils to cement allegiance—are all explained with friendly tolerance. For under this system the competing groups, expressing diverse economic, geographic, ideologic and cultural interests of one hundred and thirty million people, find their way to "adjustment."

This concept of "adjustment" is the key word of the book. It is therefore unfortunate that it is nowhere critically defined with reference to the special context within which it is continuously used. It seems to mean in much of the analysis any peaceful compromise in the political process. To take a concept from individual psychology, and make it the central idea in a book given over to the discussion of group interaction, may obfuscate the issues unless its meaning in that different context is made clear and the use is consistently adhered to.

From the standpoint of the reviewer a great deal of "compromising" does not produce "adjustment."

If this concept means the process by which a human being secures emotional satisfaction through the experiences afforded by his environment, then Herring adduces no proof that our political system assures "adjustment."

If the concept means the peaceful adoption and application of public policies in a process of group pressures, then the fact of peaceful acquiescence to the compromise is proof of "adjustment." We have had no civil conflict since 1865; ergo, our political system will, if we can but follow Professor Herring's example of kindly tolerance of its irrationalities and (excuse the word) vices, give us "adjustment."

But if "adjustment" means something different than the mere absence of the use of force in the political process, then the reviewer questions the basic hypothesis upon which the whole argument of the book is built. From his standpoint, many of the institutions and political practices which Professor Herring condones as appropriate to the frailties of human nature are barriers to "adjustment," for they so weight the compromises as to leave insecurity, tragedy and frustration to millions of our fellow citizens, and they therefore dangerously postpone changes long overdue.

In the last two chapters Herring shows some appreciation of these difficulties. There he notes the tragic fate of the dust-bowl farmers and concedes that a timely answer must be given. He even declares "the suspended judgment of the poor in a land of plenty will be precipitated,

and the pattern it takes will be fatal" (p. 430). The reviewer is unable to reconcile these expressions with the Burkian historical conservatism which continuously colors the main argument of the book. Herring makes it clear in his praise of our check-and-balance system and the difficulties of amending our Constitution that he fears a political system which would readily respond to the majority of the electorate. Yet if the concept of political democracy which the volume purports to defend has any clear meaning, it is that of majority rule.

CHARLES MCKINLEY
Reed College

FRANKLIN, JAY. 1940. New York: Viking Press, 1940. 319 pp. (\$2.75)

Jay Franklin has written a campaign document for a "year of momentous decision for the American people." He discusses the men of the New Deal frankly but sympathetically. He was one of them for some years. With a penetrating insight into the motives, objectives and behavior of the New Dealers, he analyzes the most important of the New Deal measures. The problems with which he is concerned are precisely those issues which should be decisive in the 1940 campaign—youth, old age, labor, agriculture, business, unemployment and so forth. That the solution of these problems has been postponed is evident.

The inner consistency of the New Deal lies in the fact that it has been a stop-gap. Just what has been pre-

served, why it was preserved, or from what it has been preserved, is not so obvious. But that the Roosevelt Administration stepped into the breach in time to forestall revolution the author is not convinced, although there were "a few weeks [in 1932] when our ways of thinking about things changed with startling rapidity."

The concept of ideas as "weapons" permeates the whole of this book. The author is as much concerned with the people's reactions to particular programs as with their content and consequences. He examines especially the techniques of the opposition in its attempts to defeat the New Deal program and to discredit its personnel. Symbol manipulation is disclosed as a singularly effective device. Out of all this the author proposes a coordination of public opinion. He fails, however, to develop the process through which this "sovereignty of public opinion" may function. "The only professional reform which is clearly indicated," he writes, "is the elimination of the vicious custom of pleading a 'secrecy of the confessional' privilege for newspapermen as to the source of their information."

RAY F. HARVEY
New York University

CHILDS, HARWOOD L., *An Introduction to Public Opinion*. New York: John Wiley, 1940. 151 pp. (\$1.75)

It is wholly unlikely that Dr. Childs wrote this volume especially to deflate the current over-emphasis

on the phenomenon labelled "propaganda"; the scope of the work is too extensive for that. Nevertheless, the net effect of reading it will be a re-adjustment of our sights.

This book should be prescribed like a good bottle of medicine for all persons who sit on forum panels, all egocentric publicists and travelling lecture-series wiseacres, not a few United States senators, and the many other articulate individuals who, without pausing to gulp or swallow, can tell us how we get our ideas and beliefs. Most of the time these gentlemen mention the mystic word, "propaganda." If some of them will pay heed to the author's thoughtful exposition and argument as he plumbs the problem of public opinion, they will come away chastened. The realization that an understanding of *public opinion* is prerequisite to coping with their pet bogie-man, *propaganda*, ought to be a salutary one.

It seems to have been old-fashioned in the past half-dozen years to grapple with the problems of public opinion. It dated one with James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell and the earlier Lippmann. The pack was off in jubilant cry on the heels of "propaganda." But Dr. Childs has given years of thought to how attitudes are formed, integrating a knowledge of his own discipline, political science, with social psychology, economics, and journalism. At a critical time when the inky emissions of the interventionists and the isolationists blacken the sky like a Kansas tornado, he pulls us back to the broad

basic questions of opinion; and, in the process of revaluation, propaganda, public relations and other sub-species take their right place in the opinion-making framework.

"What is Public Opinion?" and "Formation of Opinion" are two of the best essays in the book, since they are likely to get the feet of many teachers and writers back on *terra firma*. In answering the question, "Why do people express the opinions they do?" Dr. Childs does not advance any new and startling discoveries, but he summarizes expertly the influences that make for opinion and calls attention to things the praters on propaganda have overlooked.

A high-minded approach is evident on all questions in which the public is involved. The whole problem of public opinion, in all its ramifications, is viewed in light of the public interest and Dr. Childs will not even make a single reservation in the case of industrial public relations. Possibly some public relations experts who publicly support his view will shake their heads dubiously or negatively in private, arguing that "it's an idealistic and unrealistic approach." Here, however, Dr. Childs has broken new ground. Writing from the coign of vantage not occupied by interested persons or active practitioners, he is the first trained student of public opinion who has analyzed public relations in a really objective and informed spirit.

This reviewer finds a great deal to praise in this volume. Only two points of criticism seem pertinent. While in complete sympathy with

the author's effort to remove subjective connotations attached to the word propaganda, he feels nothing is to be gained in assuming that "education is merely one type of propaganda." If that is so, then everything is propagandistic (or ideological) and even philosophy must reorient its thinking and rewrite its pages in the new terminology.

Dr. Childs proposes the setting up of a federal commission to make periodic audits of unfair propaganda and suggests that, should such a commission have authority these days, it would busy itself with making "penetrating analyses of propaganda designed to involve us in the European war." But would it? No government in power ever likes the press. Would any government in power like an administrative agency found guilty of exposing the government's own propaganda? Probably not. Could it resist perverting the purpose of such an agency? Would not the dynamic activities of such an agency subordinate the press and other communications agencies still in private hands? Would not more difficult problems than we now face arise? These questions require answer.

RALPH D. CASEY
University of Minnesota

ROSE, C. B., JR., *National Policy for Radio Broadcasting*. New York: Harper, 1940. 289 pp. (\$3.00)

This is an up-to-date analysis of radio broadcasting in the United

States undertaken by a Committee of the National Economic and Social Planning Association. An excellent background of factual information is provided. The book deals with both the technical and commercial structure of American broadcasting, the problems of program content, and of freedom of the air, and has a final section on "national policy for broadcasting."

The dominant position of the networks is accepted as inevitable, and, given safeguards, as even desirable. These safeguards imply a more responsible concern for public service, cooperation between networks to secure elimination of unnecessary duplication, better program balance and coordination, and more attention to the serious defects of present coverage (32.4 per cent of the rural population is at night-time outside the primary service area of any broadcasting station). The huge profits derived from advertising are seen as involving danger of a transfer of initiative from the broadcaster to the advertising agencies in determining program policy. The report points out, and rightly, that responsibility for what goes on the air rests squarely on the shoulders of the broadcasters.

An important section is devoted to study of the uneasy relations between the industry and the FCC. Credit is given to the industry for putting its own house into some sort of order after the chaos that existed only thirteen years ago. At the same time, the function of the FCC as trustee for the public is stressed, and

its hitherto passive rôle is criticised. It has signally failed to give any meaning to the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" clause. Solution of the problem of social control of radio broadcasting is found in the devising of machinery "whereby a fully informed and aware public may express its opinion and bring its influence to bear."

It is a pity that means to this end are only sketched in outline, for here lies the crux of the whole matter. The suggested formation of a Listeners Council is hardly adequate as machinery for voicing public needs. It would be a poor match for an industry as highly organized and with such huge interests at stake as radio today. A far more comprehensive plan is needed. Moreover a prior step is necessary to arouse the listening public to a proper sense of its responsibility. There is room for research, for publication, and continuing discussion of the vital problems raised by radio. Research in mass communication needs developing on a far more comprehensive scale. This aspect of the problem is only lightly touched on and seems to require greater emphasis.

The report, however, stands as perhaps the best and most up-to-date handbook on radio for the general reader that has yet been published. While guarded in its conclusions, it stimulates thought and its selection of outstanding problems is well considered.

C. A. SIEPMANN
Harvard University

MACDOUGALL, CURTIS D., *Hoaxes*.
New York: Macmillan, 1940. 336
pp. (\$3.50)

This fascinating testament to human credulity consists of a description of several hundred successful large- and small-time hoaxes. The subject matter ranges all the way from college students' practical jokes to the recent Musica-Coster frauds. Famous hoaxes such as the Invasion from Mars, the Cardiff giant, the Mummy of John Wilkes Booth, and the Loch Ness Monsters are described, as well as less notorious frauds like Henry L. Mencken's bathtub joke and the preposterous stories of Louis Stone, otherwise known as the "Winsted Liar." Strange beliefs, fashionable delusions, common superstitions, swindles and humbugs; all are paraded for the entertainment of the reader.

In the first eleven chapters the author illustrates, one at a time, the principles which he states lie at the basis of human gullibility. These principles include Indifference, Ignorance and Superstition, Suggestion, Prestige and the Will-to-Believe for such reasons as financial gain, vanity, chauvinism, prejudice and the thirst for vicarious thrills. Unfortunately, MacDougall attempts little in the way of an analysis of the cases he presents or of the psychological principles which these cases are said to illustrate. To explain why some people believe that red kernels of corn will prevent hemorrhage by saying that they are superstitious, is to say that some people are superstitious because they are. Though

this cannot be doubted, it is hardly revealing. Terms like suggestion, ignorance and prestige explain little until their own nature is clarified. This book does not furnish such clarification.

In the last nine chapters the author presents a wide variety of hoaxes classified as to type. He cites numerous examples of historical, governmental, religious, scientific, literary, journalistic and public relations hoaxes, as well as a number of hoaxes intended to expose other frauds. The book is concluded with examples of the long life and rapid propagation of these large-scale lies.

Though the scholar might wish that MacDougall had analysed more and generalized less, though the student might be disappointed by the absence of a bibliography and by the presence of undocumented facts, nevertheless, both would be likely to admit with the layman that this was one of the most interesting books they had read in some time.

FRANKLIN V. TAYLOR
Princeton University

LYND, ROBERT S., *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939. 268 pp. (\$2.50)

This brave book by Robert Lynd has not diminished in urgency since it was first delivered as the Stafford Little Lectures at Princeton in the spring of 1938. Lynd has posed an aspect of scientific thinking that has often been obscured in the standard

accounts of systematic intellectual inquiry. We are well acquainted with the techniques of verification, for these have been cogently described in many handbooks. But is there a technique of choosing important problems on which to use the techniques?

Lynd's answer is traditional, but the setting in which he poses the problem is not hackneyed. He believes that social scientists should choose problems relevant to the security of the values which they endorse. Had Lynd been a professional philosopher, the book would have abounded with quotations about the "good," and the book would have reposed peacefully on the shelf of homilies on the goodness of the good. Lynd is not by profession a specialist on what his predecessors have added to the historical stream of definition. Rather, Lynd is a social scientist who believes in the importance of adding facts to general definitions of good intentions. He reviews with approbation some of the facts which have been gathered by modern specialists on social science. But he finds them lacking in focus. He finds the facts scattered and of limited usefulness for the problems that he considers urgent. Lynd tries to make clear what he means by describing the cultural pattern of America, and by stating some "outrageous" hypotheses about what is probably true, and can in part be determined by expert research.

To some extent Lynd is rebelling against a method of thinking about science that has been uncritically carried over from the physical to the social sciences. This pattern searches

for invariant relations among variables. It is not content with any formulation that is not universally true at all times and places. For many reasons this mode of thinking is but partially adequate to the task of social science. Most of our useful variables are complex patterns that change rather quickly, through comparatively short periods of time, as part of the total development of the cultural context of which they are a part.

If our basic factors change, how then are we to choose relevant ones to study? Part of the answer is explicitly given by Lynd. We must decide what events to treat as values, and study facts that will help us to provide for their occurrence in the impending future. Now there are two closely related operations involved in this process, one of which Lynd has not made explicit. It is one thing to describe the kinds of events to be valued by the social scientist. It is another thing to consider the probable course of events, irrespective of such preferences. The future cannot be foretold with more than approximate probability. At any given time, we need to consider alternative pictures of probable development, and to make our plans on the basis of them.

Lynd is future-conscious; but he does not make the nature of his intellectual operations explicit. He assumes that we are moving from a decentralized to a centralized form of social organization, and this a plausible picture. But there are vital questions about rate as well as direction that are left in the vague. Hence

the shotgun character of the "outrageous hypotheses" that are proposed at the end of the book.

Lynd has a strong intuitive sense of the forms of thought appropriate to a managerial phase of societal development. Karl Mannheim has made this kind of thinking evident to those who are equipped to follow his work. For Americans, Lynd goes a long way toward exemplifying some of the implications of what this standpoint implies for those who use their minds professionally in the study of the human sciences.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL
Washington, D.C.

BIRD, CHARLES, *Social Psychology*.
New York: Appleton-Century,
1940. 564 pp. (\$3.50)

KLINEBERG, OTTO, *Social Psychology*.
New York: Henry Holt, 1940. 570
pp. (\$3.00)

Here are two books with identical titles published in New York in 1940. They contain very nearly the same number of pages and sell at approximately the same price. Although the similarity does not completely end at this point, it almost does; certainly the sophomore student or the interested layman would include the above attributes as those most patently common. Although around one half of each work is concerned with a common subject matter, this subject matter is treated mostly from different sources and the implications drawn by each author are as often contradictory as not. And about half of

each book is concerned with subject matters the other touches upon only incidentally. All this simply goes to show that there is as yet no agreement concerning the subject matter, the methods and the relationships to other sciences of what McDougall considered to be the basic social science, namely social psychology.

Bird's work is the more carefully "scientific," if by science we mean reliance only on laboratory experiment and refusal to draw implications from other sources. By and large it presents a digest of the works of academically trained laboratory psychologists on problems of social incentives, the measurement of social attitudes, suggestion, propaganda, crowds and leadership. There is some use of sociological data here but none of the data of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and social anthropology which are of such tremendous importance for the social psychology of the present social crisis. The investigations reported are on the whole rather sterile. Their implications are rarely clear and often contradictory. Bird is further so careful not to go beyond the bounds of his evidence that the impression left is one of almost dismal confusion—a few problems thrown up and some tentative answers to some of them. The inclusion of three last (relatively unrelated) chapters on the "social issues" of age, delinquency, and war does little to correct this impression.

Klineberg's work draws relatively lightly on the laboratory experiment and heavily on psychoanalysis and social anthropology. And these are the sciences—whether experimental

or not—which have the greater pregnancy of implication for the modern social order or disorder. He deals, further, with the comparative studies from animal psychology and social pathology which are certainly pertinent to the field. The problems discussed are more vital. For these reasons the reviewer believes that Klineberg's work will be of more value to the student and layman. He further believes that the book follows the trends which modern social psychology must take. In this, however, the reviewer is conscious that he is expressing a temperamental bias.

Since both books are designed as college texts, neither will have particular influence on current public opinion. In furthering the science of public opinion analysis each may play a rôle. Bird's compilation of methods and results of attitudes measurement was certainly worth undertaking, even if the results to this reviewer seem negative. Klineberg's justified emphasis on the rôle of both psychoanalytic and cultural determinants in social attitudes will encourage a more fundamental methodology of attitude study.

J. F. BROWN
University of Kansas

FRIEDRICH, C. J., and MASON, EDWARD S. (editors), *Public Policy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. 391 pp. (\$3.50)

With this volume, the Harvard University Graduate School of Public Administration is initiating a

series of contributions to the science of administration by members of the staff, fellows, and associates in public life who had once been identified with the School. The scope of the volume is indicated by Dean Williams in his preface; it embraces studies of public questions from the standpoint "of the lawyer, the economist, the political scientist, and the administrator. . . ." The editors have understood their problem to be primarily the compromise of the theoretical and practical approaches to their subject. Those who, like Professors Friedrich and Mason, are much concerned about the improvement of the democratic process of government will also discern other bisecting lines of division implicit in the treatment.

One of these, familiar to political scientists, is the dichotomy between politics and administration. It is lucidly and ably discussed by Friedrich in his introductory essay. Although the reviewer is averse to accepting Friedrich's dismissal of Goodnow's distinction between politics and administration as "misleading" and a "fetish," he recognizes that this short essay constitutes a clear argument for scrapping the "politics-administration" hypothesis. Briefly, Friedrich asserts that the central problem of public policy is one of responsibility. And, in common with every informed admirer of the democratic way of life, he believes that democratic government furnishes the nearest approximation to the correct method of policy-making *provided* "all the different devices are kept

operative and new ones developed as opportunity offers."

Public Policy, from page 25 to page 280, is a series of case-studies of particular policies: prices and employment, industrial markets, industrial control, trust funds, labor market control, and so forth. In all, there are seven chapters of this type, written by specialists and therefore extremely valuable to political practitioners, who are charged with the "responsibility" of devising policies and applying them with reference to the matters covered.

The three remaining chapters, written by Sims, Fainsod and Watkins, respectively, treat of general matters. They will appeal to a wider audience. Of these, the first discusses "Social Scientists in the Federal Service"; and in it Dr. Sims again emphasizes the sad fact that there is no place in the Federal service for the "political scientist"; at least at the present time. He also calls attention to the looseness in nomenclature and stipulated qualifications for entry into the service. Fainsod's chapter on the nature of the regulatory process and Watkins' on Constitutional dictatorship are well done but do not cover much new ground.

Roy V. PEEL
Indiana University

ERNST, MORRIS L., and LINDEY, ALEXANDER, *The Censor Marches On*. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1940. 346 pp. (\$2.50)

Students of the perennial problem of liberty vs. authority will find

The Censor Marches On generally old stuff. But it should provide interesting reading for the casual observer of social phenomena, and may stimulate some to take up the cudgels for human freedom.

Ernst and Lindey are old soldiers in the battle. Ernst himself has been identified with a considerable number of the court cases which the book discusses, and he brings to his writing a conviction and earnestness born of long struggles with the forces of darkness. The details of the cases themselves are widely known and have been widely discussed—the single-minded, life-long pursuit of erotica by Anthony Comstock, the famed liberal decision of Judge Augustus N. Hand in the case of *U.S. vs. One Book Entitled Ulysses*, the Mae West-Charlie McCarthy radio dialogue, the difficulties encountered by the film *Spain in Flames*, a left-wing version of the Spanish Civil War, and many another similar situation. Not the least valuable sections of the book are the appendices, which include, for example, the long-secret motion picture code of the Hays organization.

In the chapters dealing with "The Case Against Censorship," the authors make a spirited attack on the

whole fabric of restrictive laws in this country. Without much difficulty the welter of confusion and contradiction which characterizes them is laid bare. Judge overrules judge; the postal authorities disagree with the customs inspectors; a book is banned in Boston but goes untouched in Philadelphia; a play which is a smash hit in New York is padlocked after the opening night in Chicago. Illegality is as much a matter of place as it is of content, and even in the same place it becomes a matter of time.

A review of the past twenty-five years indicates that there has been a steady "strategic withdrawal" by the Pecksniffs and Grundys. But the authors take small comfort from this fact. For sex itself is no longer the burning issue that it was at the close of the Victorian era. It has been replaced in the popular mind by struggles between communism and fascism, between the democrats and the authoritarians. And whereas the man who felt called upon to save society in the last generation set about purifying public morals, in the next he may be concerned with purifying political thinking.

STUART H. VANDYKE
Syracuse University

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Compiled by BRUCE LANNES SMITH

In each issue, THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY publishes a continuation of an annotated bibliography which appeared in 1935 in book form (Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography*. Minneapolis: Published for the Social Science Research Council by University of Minnesota Press, 1935. 450 pp.).

PART I. PROPAGANDA STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUE

COUNCIL AGAINST INTOLERANCE IN AMERICA. *An American Answer to Intolerance: Experimental Form, 1939* (Teacher's Manual No. 1, Junior and Senior High Schools). New York: Council Against Intolerance in America, 1939. 116 pp. Manual for teachers, dealing with "Recognition of Prejudice," "Study of Propaganda Devices," "Reaffirmation of American Ideals," and "Accurate Knowledge in Propaganda Domains" (e.g., scientific data on topics that are frequently misrepresented by propagandists). Includes a 15-page bibliography.

DUDENBOSTEL, H. G., compiler. *Public Relations: A Select List of References*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Division of Bibliography, 1940. 36 pp.

McKENZIE, VERNON. *Here Lies Goebbels!* London: Michael Joseph, 1940. 319 pp. Study of Europe's current propaganda wars by well-known British journalist. Packed with suggestions for improving British propaganda technique, both in Europe and America.

TAYLOR, EDMOND. *The Strategy of Terror*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1940. 278 pp.

Paris correspondent of Chicago Tribune reports on morale-breaking devices employed during the current war by the British, the French, and the Germans. Among the devices are whispering campaigns, employment of professional defeatists, persons clothed in heavy mourning, persons who start controversies over the authority of religion, the State, and the police. Included also is a first-hand appraisal of strategic and psychological factors that are believed to have influenced the French government at Munich. For biographical sketch of the author, see Frank Cleary Hanighen, *Nothing but Danger* (New York, 1939), p. 50.

Methods of Collective Management Closely Related to Propaganda

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEFENSE. *Total Defense: Report of Committee on Economic Defense*. Washington, D.C., 1940. 15 pp.

This group of prominent educators and public figures advocates developing "a cooperative program with all the countries in the Western Hemisphere," including an inter-American trading corporation; distribution of goods to needy people in all American countries—using some device such as the stamp plan; re-training of workers for necessary industrial and agricultural readjustments; "collective bargaining" between the inter-American trading corporation and the countries of Europe, to replace the present business bargaining by individual persons, firms and countries.

BAUER, JOHN. *National Welfare and Business Stability: The Permanent Functions of Public Spending*. New York: Harpers, 1940. 182 pp. Dr. Bauer is a specialist in public utilities. Book is a plea for consistently and permanently cushioning business lags by a Federal policy of public works planned to provide jobs when private industry slackens. Bibliography, pp. 179-80.

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Translator states that author is "an ex-naval officer who served in the little-known but vitally important 'Mixed Bureau' at Folkestone during the war . . . he knows espionage from A to Z."

CHASE, STUART. *Idle Money, Idle Men*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940. 299 pp.

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DAVIES, ERNEST "National Capitalism": *The Government's Record as Protector of Private Monopoly*. London: Gollancz, 1939. 320 pp. Monopolistic tendencies in England since the Conservative government took power in 1931. Bibliography in text.

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Brings together in a handy form information which previously could be obtained only by much research. Information is given for some 200 different commodities and nearly 140 countries or areas, and the tables are so compiled that the complete production of any country can be seen by a glance at a single page.

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country preparing for, fighting, and emerging from a war, "for undergraduate courses." Dr. Mendershausen, formerly of the University of Geneva, is now at Colorado College, and with the National Bureau of Economic Research.

NEWMAN, BERNARD. *German Secret Service at Work*. New York: McBride, 1940. 264 pp.

SHRIDHARANI, KRISHNALAL JETHALAL. *War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and Its Accomplishments*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939. 351 pp.

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PART II. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED BY THE NAME OF THE PROMOTING GROUP

National Governments and International Agencies

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Catalogues much material on propaganda campaigns of public agencies. Note especially such establishments as Committee on Public Information, Federal Council of Citizenship Training, Advisory Committee on Education by Radio, etc. Note also the collection of "Gift Motion Pictures and Sound Recordings."

Political Parties

DONNELLY, THOMAS CLAUDE, editor. *Rocky Mountain Politics*, foreword by Arthur Norman Holcombe. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1940. 304 pp. Study of the political, economic and social forces that determine voting behavior in the Rocky Mountain region, by a group of Rocky Mountain political scientists. Pressure groups, press and public opinion in each State are among the topics covered. Bibliography, pp. 292-95.

LISTENER, A. (pseud.) "The Political Use of Broadcasting," *Political Quarterly*, 11:234-48 (April 1940).

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(Occupational, Religious, etc.)

BRETHERTON, RACHEL, compiler. *Market Research Sources, 1940: A Guide to Information on Domestic Marketing* (U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Series, no. 110). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940. 236 pp.

BROOKS, ROBERT ROMANO RAVI. *As Steel Goes . . . : Unionism in a Basic Industry*. New Haven: Yale University, 1940. 275 pp.

Trade unionism in steel. By Williams College economist. Bibliographic notes, pp. 261-68.

"The Case for Advertising: Review of the Accomplishments of American Advertising, Together with an Interpretation of Relevant Developments Now Shaping in the Field of Public Policy," *Nation's Business*, July 1940, pp. 35-56.

CHAPPELL, BERT V. "A Department of Finance Public Relations Program," *Municipal Finance*, 12:20-22 (May 1940).

A city official of Portland, Oregon, describes the public relations program he directs, which includes the use of lectures, modernized reports, Kodachrome motion pictures, and press campaigns.

CLARKE, WILLIAM FRANCIS. *The Folly of Bigotry: An Analysis of Intolerance*. Chicago: Non-Sectarian League for Americanism, 1940. 137 pp.

A series of addresses on causes and possible cures of U.S. and foreign intolerance movements, by vice-president of Non-Sectarian League for Americanism.

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"The Fifth Column in Public Service: A Three-Point Program for Keeping Subversive Elements Out of Utilities Plants and Out of Unions of Utilities Workers," *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, 26:3-9 (July 1940).

GALENSON, WALTER. *Rival Unionism in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940. 317 pp.

Heavily documented study of recent U.S. trade unionism. Bibliography, pp. 305-7.

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Further rules for ad-writing are stated by this author of a dozen books on the subject.

GOULD, LESLIE A. *American Youth Today*, foreword by Eleanor Roosevelt. New York: Random House, 1940. 307 pp.

An officer of the American Youth Congress examines the problems of youth today and discusses the organization and aims of the Youth Congress. Includes its Creed and Constitution. Bibliography, pp. 287-88.

LEGGET, R. F. "Advertising in Canada," *Queen's Quarterly*, 47:209-18 (Summer 1940).

MOORE, BRUCE VICTOR; and others. *Values of Psychology in Industrial Management* (Personnel series, no. 43). New York: American Management Association, 1940. 36 pp.

PREScott, H. M. "Toward a More Pleasing Service," *Bell Telephone Quarterly*, 19:87-96 (April 1940). Suggestions for improving the public relations of the telephone company.

RADIO LEAGUE OF THE LITTLE FLOWER. *An Answer to Father Coughlin's Critics by Father Coughlin's Friends*. Royal Oak, Michigan, 1940. 164 pp.

SCOTT, J. F. "Streamlined Public Relations," *American Savings and Loan Review*, 60:174-80 (April 1940).

SPIVAK, JOHN LOUIS. *Shrine of the Silver Dollar*. New York: Modern Age, 1940. 180 pp.

Father Coughlin's objectives and methods, described by U.S. journalist. "I have no way of knowing whether, deep in his soul, the Reverend Charles E. Coughlin has renounced his religion but, after digging around his various corporations with their incomes of several millions of dollars, I have concluded that he has certainly learned a trick or two of the

'highest banking and stock manipulations.'"

STEIN, EMANUEL; DAVIS, JEROME; and others. *Labor Problems in America*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940. 909 pp.

Symposium for college courses by a group of U.S. professors. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

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By two veteran Canadian agencymen. "Technical Publicity Association Marks 35th Anniversary: Oldest Organized Group of Industrial Advertising and Marketing Men Celebrates with All-Day Seminar," *Industrial Marketing*, June 1940, pp. 23-32.

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WILK, KURT. "International Organization and the International Chamber of Commerce," *Political Science Quarterly*, 55:231-48 (June 1940).

WOOLPERT, ELTON D. Series of articles in *Public Management*, January through July 1940, outlining an elaborate public relations program for city governments.

PART III. PROPAGANDA RESPONSE TO BE ELICITED

BARTON, BETTY; and BLACK, FLOR- ENCE. *Rural Routes to Community Understanding of Public Welfare Programs*, foreword by Gertrude Springer. New York: Social Work

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Publicity Council, 1940. 19 pp. mimeo.

Based on day-to-day experiences of the authors in dealing with Board members, country newspapers, etc.

CHAMBERS, MERRITT MADISON. *The Community and its Young People*. Washington, D.C.: American Youth Commission, 1940. Pamphlet.

"For community leaders and for public-spirited parents and youth everywhere, this pamphlet takes the discussion of youth problems to the grass roots. It suggests what can be done to improve vocational opportunity, education, health, and recreation for the community's youth."

COLBY, MERLE ESTES. *Handbook for Youth*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940. 316 pp.

Comprehensive and accurate manual of "all the available helps for American youth in solving their problems of to-day," in the fields of job-hunting, security, education, recreation, health, home life, farm careers, reading matter, youth organizations, etc.

DE KRIJF, PAUL HENRY. *Health is Wealth*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940. 246 pp.

By well-known popularizer of biology and the medical sciences, who pleads the cause of the millions who cannot afford to pay a physician. Includes "Fundamental Principles of a Non-Controversial National Health Program," as drawn up by a nationally known group of physicians.

MELVIN, BRUCE LEE. *Youth—Millions too Many?: A Search for Youth's Place in America*, fore-

word by Eleanor Roosevelt. New York: Association Press, 1940. 220 pp.

Social consequences of U.S. youth's ebbing faith in democracy and the free enterprise system are traced in these constructive suggestions by U.S. social scientist affiliated with the WPA Research Division, who has written three monographs on the youth problem. He points out the grave danger of internal weakness and disorder the country will face if the attention of the U.S. public is shifted too far from "the lack of opportunities and the unpromising conditions of its young people to the danger from abroad."

RIES, JOSEPH. "The Health Educator on the Radio," *American Journal of Public Health*, 30:641-44 (June 1940).

STEVENSON, GEORGE S. "Ways of Developing and Utilizing Psychiatry in Community Health and Welfare Programs," *Mental Hygiene*, 24:353-65 (July 1940).

By Medical Director, National Committee for Mental Hygiene.

U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION. *Agricultural Education: Organization and Administration*, revised edition (Vocational Division Bulletin no. 13; Agricultural series no. 1). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940. 50 pp.

PART IV. THE SYMBOLS AND PRACTICES OF WHICH PROPAGANDA MAKES USE

BIRCHALL, FREDERICK T. *The Storm Breaks: A Panorama of Europe and the Forces That Have Wrecked Its Peace*. New York: Viking, 1940. 366 pp.

"For eight years Mr. Birchall was head of the European service of the *New York*

Times. . . . The book is a series of pictures and personality sketches, written, as Mr. Birchall puts it, for 'the plain man and woman.' His subjective style is known to readers of the *Times* . . . emphasis in this volume is on descriptive reporting rather than analysis."—Emil Lengyel in *New York Times Book Review*, February 25, 1940, p. 3.

BLATZ, WILLIAM EMMET. *Hostages to Peace: Parents and the Children of Democracy*. New York: Morrow, 1940. 208 pp.

The home is "the nursery of Mars," breeding war in every generation. But child guidance, nursery practices, and parental counselling may be used as means of eliminating some of the terrors of childhood and thereby promoting a rational, peaceful, democratic adult life in future generations. By well-known psychiatrist, Professor of Child Psychology, University of Toronto.

DAVIS, ALLISON; and DOLLARD, JOHN. *Children of Bondage*. Washington, D.C.: American Youth Commission of the American Council on Education, 1940. 327 pp.

A sociological and psychoanalytic study of personality development of Negro youth in two cities of the Deep South (Natchez and New Orleans). Though the background material was supplied by interviews with over 200 Negro adolescents, this is not a statistical survey. Instead the authors, by concentrating their attention on 8 individual case histories, have combined sociology and psychology to produce a vivid human document as well as a study of scientific and social importance. The aim here is to analyze not only the effect of caste but also of class upon the formation of personality.

FARRINGTON, BENJAMIN. *Science and Politics in the Ancient World*. New York: Oxford University, 1939. 243 pp.

Study of political forces which defined the channels within which scientific work might proceed in the Greco-Roman world. By Professor of Classics, University College, Swansea. Bibliography, pp. 235-38.

FREUD, SIGMUND. "An Outline of Psychoanalysis," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, vol. 21, no. 1: 27-84 (January 1940).

Freud's own summary of his work, written just before his death. A succinct

statement of the hypotheses he took to be established facts, the hypotheses he took to be probable, and the hypotheses he took to be doubtful, in the science he founded.

GOSLIN, RYLLIS; and GOSLIN, OMAR PANCOAST. *Our Town's Business*. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1939. 355 pp.

In 1937-1938 hundreds of women's clubs throughout the country participated in a program of what may be called civic education, sponsored by the National Federation of Business and Professional Women and built on the theme of "Our Town's Business." Omar and Ryllis Goslin, authors of *Rich Man, Poor Man*, took part in the preparation of study materials for this program, and it was from that work that the idea of the present book grew. It follows "lines of the utmost simplification," in text and pictorial chart, seeking to clarify basic economic facts.

HOLLAND, KENNETH. *Youth in European Labor Camps: A Report to the American Youth Commission*. Washington, D.C.: Amer. Council on Education, 1939. 303 pp. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

HOLMSTROM, JOHANNES EDWIN. *Records and Research in Engineering and Industrial Science: A Guide to the Production, Extraction, Integrating, Storekeeping, Circulation and Translation of Technical Knowledge*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1940. 302 pp.

Deals with many phases of the problem of communication in the engineering and industrial fields. By British engineer and economist.

HUNT, FRAZIER. "A Lesson in Propaganda: An American War Correspondent Warns Us Against Those Who Are Cry-Babying Us into War with Atrocity Stories," *Scribner's Commentator*, September 1940, pp. 85-88.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES CONFERENCE (11th, Prague, 1938). *University Teaching of International Relations*, edited by Sir Alfred Zimmern. Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1939. New York: Columbia University, 1939. 353 pp.

"If this was not the first international conference as yet held on this subject, it was certainly the first to be held under official auspices and probably the most representative and the most frank and outspoken."—Preface. Reports were received from more than a dozen countries.

KETNER, F. "Some Recent Books on the Attitude of Pope Pius XI and His Predecessors towards the Socio-Political Currents of Their Time," *International Review of Social History*, 4:510-15 (1939).

LAJOS, IVAN. *Germany's War Chances as Pictured in German Official Literature*. London: Golancz, 1939. 160 pp.

By Hungarian professor of constitutional law. "Essential portions of this book are derived from Fritz Sternberg's *Germany and a Lightning War*" (London: Faber and Faber, 1938).

LEACOCK, STEPHEN BUTLER. *The British Empire: Its Structure, Its Unity, Its Strength*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940. 263 pp.

Panorama of the structure and history of the British Empire; by Canadian political scientist. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

LOEWENSTEIN, KARL. *Hitler's Germany: The Nazi Background to War*. New York: Macmillan, 1940. 176 pp.

Author, who was for many years a leading lawyer and teacher of constitutional law in Germany, is now Professor of Political Science, Amherst College.

MACCORMAC, JOHN. *Canada: America's Problem*. New York: Viking Press, 1940. 287 pp.

Mr. MacCormac, a Canadian, was formerly the *New York Times* correspondent at Ottawa. Emphasizes the view that "Canada's English-speaking population [is] still so British that disloyalty in Canada [means] not disloyalty to Canada but only to Britain." Foresees U.S. "imperialism on a grand scale" in the Western Hemisphere if Germany wins in Europe.

MEIERS, MILDRED; and KNAPP, JACK. *Thesaurus of Humor*, second edition. New York: Crown Publishers, 1940. 605 pp.

Humor of the world arranged and classified for ready reference.

ROBINSON, THOMAS H.; and others. *Men, Groups and the Community: A Survey in the Social Sciences*. New York: Harpers, 1940. 965 pp.

College text on general social science by Colgate University professors. Includes chapters on "Communications," (pp. 80-103) and "Propaganda" (pp. 104-44). Bibliography at ends of chapters.

ROTH, CECIL. *The Jewish Contribution to Civilization*. New York: Harpers, 1940. 420 pp.

By a Jewish scholar. Jewish contributors to modern civilization in the field of letters, art, music, science, medicine, public activity, economics and philanthropy.

RUSSELL, OLAND D. *The House of Mitsui*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1939. 328 pp.

A dominant family in Japanese shipping, heavy industry, munitions, mining and banking. The author, a U.S. journalist, was formerly Tokyo correspondent of *New York World*.

SCHMAUCH, WALTER W. *Christmas Literature through the Centuries*. Chicago: Walter M. Hill, 1938. 418 pp.

Extensively documented narrative on Christmas broadsides, pamphlets, poems, stories, hymns and other symbols, from Elizabethan days to the Twentieth Century. Bibliography in text and pp. 391-405.

SITTERSON, JOSEPH CARLYLE. *The Secession Movement in North Carolina* (James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science, vol. 23, no. 2). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1939. 285 pp.

Bibliography, pp. 250-72.

WISE, JAMES WATERMAN; and LEVINGER, LEE J. *Mr. Smith, Meet*

Mr. Cohen. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1940. 182 pp.

An attempt to interpret U.S. Jews factually to average Americans. Indicates why they came here, what they are most interested in, what they do best, what organizations they join, what they teach their children, etc. Mr. Wise is a New York public relations man, Dr. Levinger a Cleveland historian and research worker. Bibliography, pp. 179-82.

WITKE, CARL FREDERICK. *We Who Built America: A Saga of the Immigrant*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939. 547 pp.

By U.S. historian. Bibliographic footnotes.

PART V. CHANNELS OF PROPAGANDA

Agents Who Specialize in Managing Propaganda

BOOKER, EDNA LEE. *News is My Job: A Correspondent in War-Torn China*. New York: Macmillan, 1940. 375 pp.

For some 20 years the author has been a foreign correspondent in Shanghai.

BROCK, HENRY IRVING. "Thomas Nast, Symbol-Maker," *New York Times Magazine*, September 22, 1940, pp. 6 ff.

Biographical sketch commemorating 100th anniversary of birth of American political cartoonist, inventor of Democratic donkey and Republican elephant.

BUTLER, NICHOLAS MURRAY. *Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflections*, vol. 2. New York: Scribner, 1940. 474 pp.

CHAMBERLIN, WILLIAM HENRY. *The Confessions of an Individualist*.

N.Y.: Macmillan, 1940. 320 pp. Autobiography of well-known correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

CHUGERMAN, SAMUEL. *Lester F. Ward: The American Aristotle*.

Durham, North Carolina: Duke University, 1939. 591 pp.

Biographical materials on this well-known U.S. sociologist are included in this extensive critique of his theories. Bibliography, pp. 559-60.

HELLMAN, GEORGE SIDNEY. *Benjamin N. Cardozo: American Judge*. New York: Whittlesey House, 1940. 339 pp.

By a personal friend of long standing, with access to family archives and letters.

HOUGH, HENRY BEETLE. *Country Editor*. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1940. 325 pp.

Autobiography of editor of *Martha's Vineyard Gazette*.

JONES, ERNEST. "Sigmund Freud, 1856-1939," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, vol. 21, no. 1: 2-26 (January 1940).

By a fellow analyst, founder of the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*.

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES. *In-Service Growth of Social Studies Teachers* (10th Yearbook of the Council), edited by

Burr W. Phillips. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1939. 187 pp. Nine essays by educators on means of aiding the personal and intellectual development of social studies teachers. Bibliographic footnotes.

POWDERLY, TERENCE VINCENT. *The Path I Trod: The Autobiography of Terence Vincent Powderly* (Columbia Studies in American Culture, no. 6). New York: Columbia University, 1940. 460 pp. Leader of Knights of Labor.

SELVER, PAUL. [Thomas Garrigue] *Masaryk*, introduction by Jan Masaryk. London: Michael Joseph, 1940. 326 pp. Scholarly biography. The author has for years been a friend of the family.

SMALLZRIED, KATHLEEN ANN. *Press Pass: A Woman Reporter's Story*. New York: Dutton, 1940. 340 pp. Autobiography of a U.S. woman journalist (South Bend, Indiana, *News-Times*).

SMITH, SAMUEL DENNY. *The Negro in Congress, 1870-1901*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1940. 160 pp. Survey of the careers of the twenty-two Negroes who served in Congress during that period. Dr. Smith is Associate Professor of Social Studies, Mississippi State College for Women. Bibliography, pp. 145-51.

STOKES, THOMAS L. *Chip Off My Shoulder*. Princeton: Princeton University, 1940. 561 pp. Autobiography of a Washington correspondent, 1939 Pulitzer prize winner.

WINKLER, JOHN K.; and BROMBERG, WALTER. *Mind Explorers*. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1940. 378 pp. Breezy account of psychologists and psychiatrists of the last hundred years. Mr. Winkler is a U.S. journalist and biographer, Dr. Bromberg a psychiatrist. Bibliography, pp. 367-69.

Agencies Used in Disseminating Propaganda

ALLEN, JOHN EDWARD. *The Modern Newspaper: Its Typography and Methods of News Presentation*. New York: Harpers, 1940. 234 pp. Attempts at modernization of the American daily newspaper; a sequel to the author's *Newspaper Make-Up*. Mr. Allen is editor of *Linotype News*.

American Foundations and Their Fields, vol. 4, compiled by Geneva Seybold. New York: Raymond Rich Associates, 1939. 218 pp. 1939 edition of surveys originally made by Twentieth Century Fund, 1930, 1931, and 1934. "An especially valuable departure is the analysis of the investment portfolios of the various foundations"

ARCHER, GLEASON LEONARD. *Big Business and Radio*. New York: American Historical Company, 1939. 503 pp. History of the corporate control of U.S. radio, based on document files of the corporations. Dr. Archer, a lawyer and historian, is President of Suffolk University.

ARNETT, TREVOR. *Recent Trends in Higher Education in the United States, with Special Reference to Financial Support for Private Colleges and Universities* (Occasional papers, no. 13). New York: General Education Board, 1940. 80 pp.

BARBOUR, P. L. "International Radio in the Three Americas," *Inter-American Quarterly*, January 1940, pp. 32-9.

BRADBY, EDWARD, editor. *The University Outside Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. 332 pp. Essays on the development of university institutions in fourteen countries, by a group of prominent educators under the

editorship of Mr. Bradby, who is General Secretary of International Student Service. Supplements *The University in a Changing World*, edited by Walter M. Kotschnig and Elined Prys (London: Oxford, 1932), which dealt mainly with European universities. Bibliographic footnotes.

BRANSCOMB, BENNETT HARVIE. *Teaching with Books: A Study of College Libraries.* Chicago: American Library Association for the Association of American Colleges, 1940. 239 pp.

Under a Carnegie Corporation grant, a number of U.S. college libraries were studied to determine how much the students and faculty use them, how to make their facilities more useful and better understood, and how to select their books. The author is Director of the Libraries and Professor of Early Christian Literature, Duke University. Bibliographic footnotes.

CAMPBELL, WALTER STANLEY (pseud. of STANLEY VESTAL). *Writing Magazine Fiction.* New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1940. 292 pp. Practical rules, and some model stories for study. The author is Director of Courses in Professional Writing, University of Oklahoma. Bibliography, pp. 291-92.

"The Cinema and the Training of Public Taste," *Intellectual Cooperation Bulletin*, no. 6, pp. 220-67 (April 1940).

Documentary News Letter. London: Published monthly by Film Center, 34 Soho Sq., London W-1, 1940.

A number of the writers associated with this letter have also been associated with the British General Post Office Film Unit, one of the best-known government public relations organizations.

Education and Economic Well-Being in American Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Educational Policies Commission, 1940. 227 pp.

Report of a commission appointed by the National Education Association and the American Association of School Administrators. Chapter 10, "Securing Public Understanding and Action," outlines a public relations program for educators.

ELLIOTT, EDWARD CHARLES; and **CHAMBERS, MERRITT MADISON.** *Charters of Philanthropies: A Study of the Charters of Twenty-Nine American Philanthropic Foundations.* New York: Purdue University and Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1939. 744 pp.

GRAHAM, ROBERT X., compiler. *Bibliography in the History and Backgrounds of Journalism: History, Biography, Analysis of Press, Adventure and Reminiscence, including also Authoritative Books on World Affairs by Newspaper Workers.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1940. 16 pp.

HORNUNG, JULIUS LAWRENCE. *Radio as a Career* (Kitson Career Series). New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1940. 212 pp.

Thorough survey of radio vocations, for students and counselors. The author is a specialist in radio operation. Bibliography, pp. 211-12.

KERBY, PHILIP. *The Victory of Television.* New York: Harpers, 1939. 120 pp.

Describes the television studio and shows how a play is staged and acted and how its performance is managed in the control room. Author is on staff of NBC.

KOBRE, SIDNEY. *Backgrounding the News: The Newspaper and the Social Sciences.* Baltimore, Md.: Twentieth Century Press, 1939. 271 pp.

"The purpose of this book . . . is to explore the possibilities of welding the

rapidly developing social sciences to the newspaper." Blue-prints are drawn up for "a more socially adequate newspaper." Bibliography, pp. 263-66. Mr. Kobre is an experienced newspaper man, trained in the social sciences.

LAMBERT, R. S. *Ariel and All His Quality: An Impression of the BBC from Within*. London: Gollancz, 1940. 318 pp.

The author was for ten years a member of the BBC staff, editor (1929-1939) of its publication, *The Listener*. He finds that "BBC has chiefly succeeded in fitting itself to be an instrument of government—for intellectual and cultural purposes—in the totalitarian state of the future."

LAZARSFELD, PAUL FELIX. *Radio and the Printed Page: An Introduction to the Study of Radio and its Rôle in the Communication of Ideas*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940. 354 pp.

Office of Radio Research, a foundation-supported organization directed by Dr. Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, has conducted unusually detailed and controlled interviews (based upon large samples of the population of Erie County, Ohio) to determine value of radio and newspaper stimuli in changes of attitude. Perhaps the most complete study available on the characteristics and preferences of radio audiences.

Litho-Media: *A Demonstration of the Selling Power of Lithography*. New York: Litho-Media, Inc., 1939. 205 pp.

A mammoth book presenting examples of the numerous applications of lithography, with brief essays by some three dozen advertising authorities.

LOVEJOY, CLARENCE EARLE. *So You're Going to College*, including *The Lovejoy College Rating Guide*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940. 384 pp.

Data on U.S. colleges, including cost, endowment per student, size of library,

number of scholarships, proportion of self-supporting students, financial aids for students, numbers of Ph.D.'s, numbers of alumni in *Who's Who*; compiled by Columbia University's Alumni Secretary. Bibliography, pp. 341-51.

MCGILL, EARLE. *Radio Directing*, foreword by H. Clay Harshbarger. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1940. 370 pp.

Comprehensive manual, including instructions for studio arrangement, sound effects, casting, rehearsal, production, glossary of terms, and a script for student use. The author, instructor in New York University's Radio Workshop, has had wide experience as a CBS director and producer.

MACNEIL, NEIL. *Without Fear or Favor*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940. 414 pp.

Activities of metropolitan newspapers are described by assistant managing editor of *New York Times*.

NAFZIGER, RALPH O. *International News and the Press: An Annotated Bibliography*, foreword by Ralph D. Casey. New York: Wilson, 1940. 193 pp.

Covers channels of news communication, organization of news-gathering, rôle of the press in international affairs and rôle of the press in foreign countries, since about 1900.

O'DEA, MARK. *Advertising as a Career: A Vocational Guide for Youth*, second edition. New York: The Author, 1939. 128 pp.

PORTERFIELD, JOHN; and REYNOLDS, KAY, editors. *We Present Television*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1940. 298 pp.

Eleven experts describe television equipment, programs, personnel, financing.

PRYOR, WILLIAM CLAYTON; and PRYOR, HELEN SLOMAN. *Let's Go to the Movies*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939. 183 pp.

Popular account of movie-making.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. *Two Million Public Affairs Pamphlets*. New York, July 1940. 12 pp.

The Committee has sold 2,000,000 copies of its pamphlets, covering 46 topics. Promotion also includes newspaper layouts, bookstore displays, and "Public Affairs Weekly," an NBC broadcast.

"Second Inter-American Radio Conference (Santiago, Chile, January 18-23, 1940)," *Pan American Union Bulletin* 74: 467-71 (June 1940).

SOBEL, BERNARD, editor. *The Theatre Handbook and Digest of Plays*. New York: Crown Publishers, 1939. 908 pp.

Encyclopedic handbook, in which alphabetically arranged articles deal with theatrical history and techniques, digests of famous plays, and biographies of theatrical personalities. See such topics as "Acting," "Censorship," "Direction," "Motion Picture," "Press Agency," "Psychoanalysis in the Drama," "Radio Writing," "Television." Annotated bibliography, pp. 867-96.

SPENCER, DOUGLAS ARTHUR; and WALEY, H. D. *The Cinema Today* (Pageant of Progress series). New York: Oxford University, 1940. 191 pp.

Deals mainly with technique of making pictures, but contains a chapter on "The Film Industry and the Film as a Social Force." Mr. Spencer is Past President, the Royal Photographic Society; Mr. Waley, Technical Director, British Film Institute. Bibliography, p. 187.

U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE. *Development of Television* (hearings April 10-11, 1940, on SR 251, requesting the Committee on Interstate Commerce to investigate the actions of the Federal Communications Commission in connection with the development of television; 76th Con-

gress, 3d session). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940. 81 pp.

WASHBURN, CARLETON WOLSEY. *A Living Philosophy of Education*. New York: John Day, 1940. 583 pp.

Comprehensive statement of experience and theories of President of Progressive Education Association. Includes views on physical and emotional development of the child; on mental hygiene, subject-matter fields, educational administration, practice and teaching of democracy, and personal habits of the teacher.

WEHLAU, KURT. *Das Lichtbild in der Werbung für Politik, Kultur und Wirtschaft: Seine geschichtliche Entwicklung und gegenwärtige Bedeutung* (Zeitung und Leben, vol. 64). Würzburg-Aumühle: K. Triltsch, 1939. 158 pp.

YAZAKI, DAN. "The Wartime Publishing Industry in Japan," *Contemporary Japan*, 9:595-605 (May 1940).

YEAGER, WILLARD HAYES. *Effective Public Speaking for Every Occasion*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940. 444 pp.

By Professor of Public Speaking, George Washington University. "A more advanced treatment of the subject than is contained in elementary texts such as *The Principles of Effective Speaking*, of which the writer was co-author with W. P. Sandford."

ZACHRY, CAROLINE BEAUMONT; and LIGHTY, MARGARET. *Emotion and Conduct in Adolescence*. New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1940. 563 pp.

Report for Progressive Education Association's Commission on Secondary School Curriculum. Dr. Zachry was its Director of Research, Miss Lighty an editor of some of its publications. Bibliography, pp. 547-48.

PART VI. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA

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